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THE CONTRIBUTORS

H. Gordon Skilling is Emeritus Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. Among his recent books are *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (1976) and *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* (1981).

Howard L. Biddulph is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria (British Columbia). He was a contributing author to *Dissent in the U.S.S.R.* (edited by Rudolf Tökes), and is the author of a forthcoming book, *Regionalism and Soviet Policy-making: Influencing the Political Agenda in the Post-Stalin Era.*

Richard W. Wilson is Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. A specialist on political behavior, he is co-editor of *Moral Development and Politics* (1980) and *Moral Behavior in Chinese Society* (1981). Currently he is completing a manuscript on rights and political change.

Jack S. Levy is an Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975* (1983), and is currently working on a theory of the causes of war.

Chong-do Hah, Professor of Government at Lawrence University (Wisconsin), is currently completing a theoretical study on triangular international relations.

Frederick C. Bartol, a Watson Foundation Fellow, is currently working on a comparative study of Western European railroad systems.

Nicholas Greenwood Onuf is Professor in the School of International Service, The American University. He is editor of *Law-Making in the Global Community* (1982).

G. K. Helleiner is Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Toronto. He is the author of *International Economic Disorder: Essays in North-South Relations* (1981) and *Intrafirm Trade and the Developing Countries* (1981), and the editor of *For Good or Evil, Economic Theory and North-South Negotiations* (1982). He is currently serving as Chairman of the Commonwealth Group on the International Financial and Trading System.

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ABSTRACTS

Interest Groups and Communist Politics Revisited

By H. G. SKILLING

Empirical research has demonstrated the utility of an interest group approach for the study of Soviet politics, as well as for interpreting the politics of tsarist Russia and Eastern European communist systems and the dissident movements. The flowering of group activity in Poland and Czechoslovakia at certain times and the activity of dissent movements show, however, the rudimentary character of "normal" interest groups in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Although the Soviet system has changed since Stalin's death, it remains fundamentally authoritarian in character. The use of models, such as totalitarian, authoritarian, bureaucratic, corporatist, and pluralist, hinders rather than facilitates an understanding of Soviet politics and of the place of interest groups in that system.

Local Interest Articulation at CPSU Congresses

By H. L. BIDDULPH

Soviet regional leaders were modestly successful in their attempts to add local projects to the agenda of forthcoming five-year economic plans at Party Congresses during the Brezhnev era. The volume of local demands expressed in Congress speeches steadily increased from the 24th to the 26th Congresses, as did the frequency of speaker participation in petitioning for investment. This seems to reflect the gradual legitimation of regional consultation in long-range planning and the sharpening politics of stringency of the latter Brezhnev era. While the vast majority of requests were purely provincial in scope, broader regional interests were articulated to an increasing extent at the 25th and 26th Congresses. Requests respecting agriculture were the most frequent, followed by energy and fuels, water resources, and transportation.

Moral Development and Political Change

By R. W. WILSON

Since World War II, a number of advances have been made in theories of revolution and political change. One approach not yet utilized is moral development theory, which adds a normative dimension to existing structural and psychological concepts. In this paper, moral development variables are related to the positive and negative rights that modern men seek within the dominance structures in which they live. Dominance patterns may become perverted due to social change and the amoral behavior of dominant individuals. Political movements characterized by demands for positive or negative rights arise as a reaction to these perversions. Whether change is restorative, accommodative, or transformative depends upon the subsequent patterns of interaction among individuals who are amoral, allegiant, or morally mature.

Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems

By J. S. LEVY

The author presents a conceptualization of different forms of misperception and the theoretical linkages by which they may lead to war under certain conditions. The forms of misperception most directly relevant to war include misperceptions of the capabilities and intentions of both adversaries and third states. The theoretical linkages to war, which vary across these different forms, include the intervening variables of military overconfidence, unsuccessful strategies of coercive diplomacy or appeasement, conflict spirals and arms races, preemptive strikes, or the failure to prepare for war or to attempt to deter the adversary. Particular attention is given to conceptual and methodological problems involved in the identification of misperceptions and in the assessment of their causal impact on war.

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Political Leadership as a Causative Phenomenon: some recent analyses

By CHONG-DO HAH and F. C. BARTOL

The study of political leadership has undergone a shift of focus in recent years. Since the late 1960s, political scientists have been increasingly interested in the question of exactly how the persons identified as leaders influence the political process. Two recent studies are critically examined: Paige's, based on a systems or macrolevel approach, concerns itself mainly with leadership as a phenomenon within the context of a political system which acts upon it and upon which it impinges; Burns's, based on a sociopsychological or microlevel approach, emphasizes the interaction between leaders and followers as an engagement of persons with diverse predispositions and motivations. The authors focus on different aspects of the same general set of phenomena, but they share a common goal. Both seek a vehicle on which to move toward a general theory that explains how leadership acts as a causative phenomenon in a polity. The clarification of their differences and complimentariness offers new opportunities for further research, theoretical or descriptive.

Reports to the Club of Rome

By N. G. ONUF

The Club of Rome was formed to publicize the contemporary human predicament—an unprecedented social pathology which, according to founder Aurelio Peccei, "is aggravated by the interrelatedness . . . of everything in the human system." The Club has commissioned and accepted nine reports, the first and most famous of which is *Limits to Growth* (1972). This report's "Malthusian" viewpoint and popular format identified the Club with a controversial issue evidently unacceptable to many of its members, not to mention most economists and technologists. Subsequent reports, with one exception, have progressively retreated from that initial position by denying the predicament's resistance to serial solution. Instead, reports have taken refuge in conventional liberal nostrums and blindly asserted technological optimism. The debate on the future of industrial civilization brought to the fore by *Limits* deserves a better fate.

The Less Developed Countries and the International Monetary System

By G. K. HELLEINER

Eleven recent books are surveyed in a review article which finds that there is still no up-to-date and comprehensive treatment of the interests and roles of the developing countries in the international monetary system. The rise of international commercial bank lending to developing countries has significantly altered the system by which balance-of-payments credit is offered. The International Monetary Fund has been relatively weakened, with especially serious implications for the poorest countries. Stabilization at both global and national levels has thus been impaired.

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INTEREST GROUPS AND COMMUNIST POLITICS REVISITED

By H. GORDON SKILLING*

MORE than fifteen years have passed since the outline of an interest group approach to communist politics appeared in *World Politics*, and more than a decade has elapsed since the publication of a volume devoted to a fuller elaboration of this theme in its Soviet context.[1] Since then, according to Jerry Hough's generous judgment, "Soviet studies have been dominated by the discussion of interest groups and pluralism," and most major research in this field has "focused in one way or another on the input side of the Soviet political system."[2] David Garson, by contrast, wrote of "a flutter of group analyses of Soviet politics" and predicted that the interest would soon wane as it had with respect to interest groups in political science generally.[3]

Although it is too early to estimate the lasting impact of this approach, it is perhaps appropriate to attempt some evaluation of its effects on Soviet studies at this stage. *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* initially struck a responsive chord among many students of Soviet and communist politics, and stimulated a number of studies that employed some version of interest group analysis. The book was translated into German, and two volumes devoted to group interests in Soviet politics were subsequently published in that language.[4]

On the other hand, the approach was later subjected to severe criticism,

* This article was written at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, in Sapporo, Japan, where the author was in residence for six weeks during August and September 1982. It will appear as a chapter of a forthcoming Japanese version of *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*. Appreciation is expressed to Professor Hiroshi Kimura, of the Center, to Professor Osamu Nakanishi, of Soka University, Tokyo, and to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, for making my visit to Japan possible.

[1] H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," *World Politics* 18 (April 1966), 435-51; H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[2] Jerry F. Hough, "Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Soviet Union," paper presented at Conference on Organizational Participation and Public Policy, Princeton University, September 1-2, 1981, p. 1; published in revised form under the same title in Susan Gross Solomon, ed., *Pluralism in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1983).

[3] G. David Garson, *Group Theories of Politics* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Library of Social Research, 1978), 153.

[4] Skilling and Griffiths, *Pressure Groups in der Sowjetunion* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1974); Boris Meissner and Georg Brunner, *Gruppeninteressen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Sowjetunion* (Cologne: Wissenschaft & Politik, 1975); Hans-Heinrich Nolte, *Gruppeninteressen und Aussenpolitik: Die Sowjetunion in der Geschichte internationaler Beziehungen* (Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt 1979).

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largely negative in character.[5] The critics assumed that interest groups were incompatible with totalitarian, authoritarian, or neo-Marxist models of communist society, or at least very difficult to reconcile with them. No new empirical evidence was submitted, however, and the data offered by the contributors to the Skilling-Griffiths volume or by other scholars were passed over in silence. The emphasis of the criticisms tended to rest upon the uniqueness of Soviet politics and the futility of comparing it with other political systems. In most cases it also tended to focus on the Soviet Union to the virtual exclusion of other communist systems. A much more positive and discriminating critic (A. H. Brown), while not fully accepting the concept of interest groups, sought to integrate the study of "groups," and Soviet studies in general, into the general study of politics.[6]

Students of comparative politics failed to acquaint themselves with the findings of research on interest groups in the Soviet context or to incorporate these in the discipline as a whole. David Garson, for instance, in *Group Theories of Politics*, referred to our volume only once, and interpreted it inaccurately at that.[7] Other scholars writing on interest groups or group theory ignored the Soviet or other communist cases almost entirely.[8] Hough has noted that the fifteen years of scholarly work on the input side of Soviet politics did not have much impact on the views of the Western public, which retained "the old image of an all-powerful state, directing society. . . ."[9]

[5] William E. Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics," *World Politics* 28 (July 1976), 542-67; Andrew C. Janos, "Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralistic Model," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 437-50; Bill McGrath and Simon McInnis, " 'Better Fewer but Better': On Approaches to the Study of Soviet and East European Politics," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 18 (September 1976), 327-37. See also the symposium (including a paper by Janos and comments by Odom and others), "Pluralism in Communist Societies: Is the Emperor Naked?" *Studies in Comparative Communism* 12 (Spring 1979), 3-38. For my comments, see "Pluralism in Communist Societies: Straw Men and Red Herrings," and a rejoinder by Janos, *ibid.* 13 (Spring 1980), 82-88, 89-90. See also the critique by David E. Powell, "In Pursuit of Interest Groups in the USSR," *Soviet Union* 6, Part 1 (1979), 99-124, according to which interest group theory relating to Soviet politics was based on "intuition, surmise and supposition" (p. 108), and was "not supported by empirical evidence" (p. 124). The article was aimed primarily at the more theoretical writings of Jerry Hough and the empirical study of the role of specialists by Peter Solomon. For their replies, see Hough, " 'Interest Groups' and 'Pluralism' in the Soviet Union," and Solomon, "Soviet Policy-Making in Comparative Perspective," *Soviet Union* 8, Part 1 (1981), 103-9 and 110-18 respectively.

[6] Brown, *Soviet Politics and Political Science* (London: Macmillan, 1974), esp. chap. 3, "Groups, Interests and the Policy Process."

[7] Garson (fn. 3), 153-54; see also pp. 96, 138.

[8] J. David Greenstone, "Group Theories," and Robert H. Salisbury, "Interest Groups," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, II and IV, respectively (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

[9] Hough (fn. 2), 32.

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Hough himself, however, made a sustained effort to integrate the field of Soviet studies in the general discipline of political science, eventually publishing his essays on this theme in a single volume. In it he expressed the opinion that statements to the effect that "there are no interest groups in the Soviet Union, despite the obvious correspondence of Soviet political phenomena to Arthur Bentley's and David Truman's definitions of interest groups" are not "worth prolonged and serious discussion."[10] In his revision of the classic text by Merle Fainsod, Hough treated the interest group (and the factional conflict) approaches as "a valuable supplement to other models" and maintained that they "should not be considered controversial." Although Soviet officials and scholars do not use the term "interest group" (or "faction"), "unquestionably that system [the Soviet] features political behavior which corresponds to western definition of those terms." The ministries, and other Soviet institutions, "certainly are interest groups by the classical definition of such groups: 'any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.' "[11] Hough advanced his own version of the group approach, "institutional pluralism," as a deliberate break with the "directed society model," and employed it extensively in his empirical studies of the Brezhnev period.[12]

Lawrence Whetten, in a recently published guide to research on comparative communism, summed up the evidence for the presence of interest groups in the Soviet system (although—strangely, in view of the comparative purpose of his book—he does not refer to other communist systems):

> There appears to be little doubt that interest groups exist in some form in the Soviet system. The task is to identify them correctly, determine their structure, scope and composition, and to ascertain their methods of interest formulation and articulation.

He grasped the meaning of interest groups as used in our book better than many other readers:

> These are not interest groups in the Western sense with shared characteristics, but rather they are identifiable through common attitudes and

[10] Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 8.

[11] Hough, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 528-29. (The definition is Truman's.) This book is a revised and enlarged version of Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, rev. 1963).

[12] Hough (fn. 10), 10-14.

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claims. These associations are not formal organizations but loose informal clusterings that articulate distinctive interests. . . .[13]

Interest Group Theory

The reluctance of some scholars to accept the validity of a group approach to Soviet politics derives in part from the controversies surrounding interest group theory in Western political science. In the long and tortuous history of group theory, one version has followed another, with successive phases of criticism or condemnation and defense. Bentley's classic, which appeared in 1908, was ignored by political scientists for almost two decades. Meanwhile, the importance of groups in politics was recognized by many distinguished scholars, such as Charles A. Beard and Harold J. Laski, and later by E. Pendleton Herring. The "golden era" of interest group theory was in the 1950s, after the re-publication of Bentley's work in 1949 and the revival of his ideas by David Truman in his influential volume, *The Governmental Process*.[14] A few years later, Robert Dahl reformulated group theory in his version of pluralism. By the 1960s and 1970s, however, successive waves of criticism of both Truman and Dahl brought about what Garson called the disintegration of group theory—at the very time, be it noted, of the publication of *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*.[15]

It is not appropriate to review here even briefly the substance of the critiques of American group theory and pluralism. Much of the discussion had little or no relevance to the very different conditions of Soviet politics. The group approach, even at the height of its influence, was not dominant in American political science—which, as time passed, became more and more fragmented into various schools of political interpretation.[16] In view, however, of the successive appearance of various versions of the group approach over a period of at least eighty years, it can hardly be said that this model has not been a vital and dynamic element of political science. In spite of the proliferation of other theories

[13] Whetten, *Current Research in Comparative Communism: An Analysis and Bibliographic Guide to the Soviet System* (New York: Praeger, 1976), 24.

[14] Truman, *The Governmental Process, Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Knopf, 1951). See also Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Evanston: Ill.: Principia, 1949).

[15] See Garson (fn. 3) for a detailed account of the ups and downs of interest group theory: on Beard, 17; on Laski, 18 ff., 48 ff.; on Bentley, 26 ff.; on Herring, 60 ff.; on Dahl, 91 ff. See also Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), and *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

[16] Garson (fn. 3), 110, 177.

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of politics, group theory has not lost its relevance and utility as a tool for explaining and analyzing certain aspects of the political system.[17]

David Truman, in the introduction to *The Governmental Process*, made a statement that is relevant to the controversy surrounding the application of his ideas to Soviet politics. As Andrew Janos has reminded us, Truman spoke of formulating, not a group theory of politics, but rather a theory of groups in politics.[18] Some ten years after the original publication, Truman restated this *caveat*, denying that his work was a general group theory of politics, and describing it as an attempt "to examine interest groups and their role in the formal institutions of government in order to provide an adequate basis for evaluating their significance in the American political process."[19] His critics, according to Garson, having distorted the group approach as a general model of politics, were the more easily able to condemn it as having failed to fulfill the latter purpose.[20]

Similarly, with respect to the group approach in the study of Soviet politics, we expressly stated that this approach did not offer a complete model of the Soviet political system or of the process of decision making in that system, a reservation that was often ignored by the critics. We might paraphrase Truman's statement to say that the book advanced a theory of groups in Soviet politics, not a group theory of Soviet politics. Interest groups were not asserted to be the most significant feature of the Soviet polity, still less was policy considered an automatic product of group pressures, as some have argued. Nor was the importance of state (and party) authority in policy making denied or minimized. Our approach sought to focus attention and encourage research on a previously neglected aspect of Soviet politics.[21]

Interest Groups and Models—Totalitarian and Authoritarian

Another obstacle to understanding, and accepting, the group approach to Soviet politics has been the relationship some have attempted to establish between it and various theoretical models of the Soviet system. Garson, for instance, found strength in the group approach because it

[17] Note, for instance, the continuing use of the concepts of interests and groups by critics of Bentley,—e.g., Truman, Dahl, McConnell, and Lowi (Greenstone, fn. 8), 300.

[18] Janos (fn. 5, 1979), 19; Truman (fn. 14), xxii-xxviii.

[19] Cited by Garson (fn. 3), 103; see also pp. 109, 131-32; Truman, "On the Invention of Systems," *American Political Science Review* 54 (June 1960), 494-95; also Truman (fn. 14), 505.

[20] Garson (fn. 3), 112.

[21] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 1), 44-45, 335, 413.

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appeared to be compatible with virtually any model of the political process.[22] Others, however, such as Odom, in explicitly reviving the model of totalitarianism, ruled out the possibility of interest groups. Andrew Janos posited a more or less black-and-white distinction between authoritarianism and pluralism, and concluded that authentic groups could not be identified in the former category. And, as we shall see below, still others linked the group approach with pluralist, bureaucratic, or corporatist models.

Juan Linz, a prominent scholar in the field of comparative politics, distinguished totalitarian from authoritarian systems: he described the former as having "a monistic but not monolithic center of power," and asserted that "whatever pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that center, [and] is largely mediated by it."[23] In contrasting authoritarian regimes with democratic ones, he maintained that the former are characterized by a certain "limited pluralism," sometimes confined to strictly political groups, but sometimes extended to include "interest groups" which are "not created by or dependent on the state" and "which influence the political process one way or another." Some authoritarian regimes, he noted, may even institutionalize such groups and encourage their emergence, although ultimately it is the rulers who "define which groups they will allow to exist and under what conditions."[24]

The protagonists of the group approach did not rule out a strictly limited form of group activity even under the Stalinist system, which I have described as "quasi-totalitarian."[25] Jerry Hough, in his revision of Fainsod's work, cited that author as having recognized that "behind the monolithic facade of totalitarianism, the plural pressures of professional bureaucratic power continued to find dynamic expression."[26] Alexander Shtromas, a legal scholar in the U.S.S.R. who is now an émigré, has gone further; he argued that interest groups could, and did, exist under totalitarian regimes such as the Soviet Union's. Totalitarianism was incompatible, he admitted, with "independent or autonomously functioning organizations adequately representing different interest groups," but this did not exclude certain group activities.

[22] Garson (fn. 3), 71.

[23] Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Greenstein and Polsby (fn. 8), III, 191.

[24] *Ibid.*, 265-66.

[25] Skilling, "Group Conflict and Political Change," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford Universtiy Press, 1970), at 222-23; see also Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 1), 399-400.

[26] Hough (fn. 11), 187, 529; also Hough (fn. 10), 12.

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> Hence, in every totalitarian system, interest groups undoubtedly exist; they only function under specific circumstances and in peculiar forms but otherwise act similarly to their counterparts in authoritarian . . . and even pluralistic (polyarchic) systems.

Recalling his own experience, he asserted that his former place of work, the *advokatura*, was able to function as "a typical interest group" because Stalin concentrated on major issues.[27]

In my own view, it is more appropriate to describe the present Soviet regime as authoritarian than as totalitarian. In an earlier essay, I characterized all communist systems as "authoritarian"; according to the degree and kind of interest group activity permitted or encouraged, they fell into different categories. These ranged from the "quasi-totalitarian" (in which groups are severely curbed) and "consultative authoritarian" (in which bureaucratic and professional groups are brought into the decision-making process by the authorities), through "quasi-pluralistic authoritarian" regimes (in which groups, although not fully legitimate, are allowed to present distinctive views on their own initiative), to "democratizing and pluralistic authoritarian" regimes (in which groups are substantially independent and even institutionalized, and play a significant role in policy making, although still functioning within an authoritarian framework).[28] Thus, interest groups are compatible with an authoritarian system—although subject, in varying degrees, to curbs and restrictions imposed by that power.[29]

Interest Groups and Pluralism

Pluralism and interest groups have been closely linked in Western political science.[30] Harold Laski, the father of "classical pluralism," inveighed against absolute sovereignty (in his day, the counterpart of the totalitarian model), and expounded the rights of groups of citizens vis-à-vis the state. Robert Dahl's concept of pluralism emphasized the fragmentation of state power rather than the influence of private groups,

[27] Shtromas, *Political Change and Social Development: The Case of the Soviet Union* (Frankfurt a/M: Peter Lang, 1981), 68. An earlier version of parts of this book was published as "Dissent and Political Change in the Soviet Union," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 12 (Summer/Autumn 1979), 212-44; comments and rejoinder, *ibid.*, 245-76.

[28] Skilling, in Johnson (fn. 25), 22-28. For a positive appraisal of this classification, see Richard Lowenthal, "On 'Established' Communist Party Regimes," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 7 (Winter 1974), 337-38, 344-45, 356; and Linz (fn. 23), 245, 277, 336-47.

[29] See Skilling, "Leadership and Group Conflict in Czechoslovakia," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), 276-93, for an application of this typology to successive phases of communist rule in Czechoslovakia.

[30] Salisbury (fn. 8), IV, 172-73.

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but represented yet another version of group theory.[31] It is not surprising, therefore, that Western critics of pluralism often made interest group analysis the target of their attacks.

In my view, communist systems are *not* pluralist according to traditional standards, however varied. The presence of informal interest groups admittedly introduces a pluralist element into communist politics but, as already noted, does not erase the authoritarian character of such systems. In the Soviet political process, the activity of interest groups constitutes at best "a low and primitive form of pluralism"; it remains a "qualified" pluralism even in the "quasi-pluralistic" or "democratizing and pluralistic" stages of communist authoritarianism in Eastern Europe.[32]

Efforts to distinguish the interest groups approach from a pluralist theory of Soviet and communist politics were on the whole unsuccessful. The critics, in spite of frequent protestations on our part, persisted in equating the two approaches and condemning both of them. The distinction became more difficult to sustain than ever when a scholar as positive to the idea of interest groups as Jerry Hough began to use terms such as "bureaucratic" or "institutional pluralism." As early as 1973, Hough suggested a bureaucratic model of Soviet politics, arguing that the bureaucracy of Western political science presupposed not a centralized command-giving hierarchy, but rather an organization characterized by a "coalition of individuals, some of them organized into subcoalitions."[33] He had already coined the term "institutional pluralism" to describe a system that is "somewhere in between authoritarianism and classical pluralism." According to this view, the Soviet political process takes place within an official framework of institutions and is characterized by a multiplicity of interests, "a conflict among a complex set of crosscutting and shifting alliances of persons with divergent interests," with the political leaders serving as "mediators or brokers."[34] He added the *caveat*, however, that at most the Soviet Union was moving *toward* this model of institutional pluralism, which was not to be equated with the pluralist model of the contemporary West or with classical pluralism; in fact, it was not likely to move toward the latter.[35]

[31] Garson (fn. 3), 18-20, 120-21. [32] Skilling (fn. 5), 85.

[33] Hough (fn. 10), 61. Hough even suggested that the Soviet system under Brezhnev was closer to the model of pluralism of Western political science than the American political system itself (*ibid.*, 69; also 9-10).

[34] Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" *Problems of Communism* 22 (March-April 1972), 28-29; see also Hough (fn. 10), 23.

[35] Hough (fn. 34), 29, 42; (fn. 10), 24, 43-44. See Stanislaw Ehrlich, *Pluralism on and off Course* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), 204, 206. See also Solomon (fn. 2) for other discussions of the pluralist concept as applied to Soviet politics.

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Bureaucratic Pluralism

Hough was not alone in proposing a bureaucratic model of Soviet politics.[36] At a conference of the International Political Science Association in Moscow, in 1979, Darrell P. Hammer employed the term "bureaucratic pluralism" to describe the Soviet system as one made up predominantly of "different and conflicting bureaucratic interests, with the ministries and the party apparatus acting as the chief interest groups." In his words,

> A bureaucracy which functions as an interest group will be a complex organization (most typically a ministry) which is a permanently established institution, structurally separate from the political leadership. It is subordinate to the leadership, but it provides services which the regime finds valuable. . . . The interests of the organization, as perceived by its leading officials, can be called "bureaucratic interests."[37]

This position was not unlike the one taken by a Soviet scholar, B. M. Lazarev (cited by Hammer), who openly discussed the conflicts between the general interests of the state as a whole and the interests of different republics and administrative-territorial entities, branches of the national economy, economic organizations and enterprises, and also referred to personal interests. He saw the task of the party as one of bringing these conflicting interests into harmony, and, in case of collision, to assure the priority of "integral interests" over departmental, and of general state interests over local ones. Lazarev also noted that persons employed in the organs of administration had "personal and group interests which can foster or hinder the appropriate fulfillment of this or that function or competence."[38]

In distinguishing the "bureaucratic model" from the group approach, Hammer correctly described the latter as dealing with "inchoate groupings, lacking in organization," although he inexplicably (and mistakenly) suggested that it excluded bureaucratic organizations from its purview. On the other hand, he minimized the role of "informal, non-associational

[36] Cf. the "group interaction and organizational process model" advanced by Donald R. Kelley, "Group and Specialist Influence in Soviet Politics: In Search of a Theory," in Richard B. Remnek, ed., *Social Scientists and Policy Making in the USSR* (New York and London: Praeger, 1977), chap. 5.

[37] Hammer, "Bureaucratic Pluralism," mimeo (Moscow, 1979), 17. See also Hammer's earlier book, *U.S.S.R.: The Politics of Oligarchy* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 1974), chap. 6.

[38] Lazarev, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (No. 10, 1971), 86, 93; also Hammer (fn. 37, 1979), 10. Brezhnev himself defined the task of the CPSU as "accurately to take into account the interests of the whole nation, as well as the interests of the classes and social groups which make it up and to direct them in one general current" (Report to the 24th Congress, March 30, 1971), in *Leninskym kursom; rechi a statya* [The Leninist Course; Speeches and Articles] (Moscow: Izd. pol. literatury, 1972), III, 274-75; my translation.

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groups," and ignored the fact that these might exist within bureaucratic organs as well as elsewhere. His analysis placed the emphasis almost entirely on administrative organs and inter-agency conflicts; he thus reduced group politics purely to its state and party components, and neglected the activity of professional and occupational categories, such as scientists and writers. Similarly, Hough's concept of "institutional pluralism," as he himself has admitted, gave the impression that only institutions could be actors in the political arena. He suggested an alternative term, "institutionalized pluralization," which, however, did not succeed in removing the ambiguity of his approach. On the other hand, he did emphasize the fact that the individual is also important in Soviet politics—referring, for example, to scholars and educators who are not state employees but who nonetheless work within "official channels."[39]

Interest Groups and Corporatism

During the 1970s, still another model—that of corporatism—was proposed by two American scholars as a better vehicle for interpreting the Soviet system under Brezhnev than "institutional pluralism" or "pluralism" of any kind.[40] Western political science has in fact long regarded pluralism and corporatism as alternative versions of interest group theory, sometimes sharply opposed, sometimes associated with each other.[41] More recently, the two approaches have again been examined as alternative forms of organizing interests and providing for their representation in the body politic.[42]

Philippe Schmitter, an influential exponent of the corporatist model, advanced it as "a distinctive modern system of interest representation" and applied it to political systems as different as Portugal and Sweden.[43]

[39] Hough (fn. 11), 547; also Hough (fn. 10), 24.

[40] Valerie Bunce and John M. Echols, III, "Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era: 'Pluralism' or 'Corporatism'?" in Donald R. Kelley, ed. *Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

[41] Garson (fn. 3), 47 ff., 70.

[42] See Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); also the Conference on Organizational Participation and Public Policy, Princeton University, September 1-2, 1981—especially Discussion Paper No. 1, by Cyril E. Black, "Organized Participation: Notes on the Literature"; John P. Burke, *Organizational Participation and Public Policy: A Conference Report*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Policy Memorandum No. 41 (Princeton, 1982). See also Cyril E. Black and John P. Burke, "Organizational Participation and Public Policy," *World Politics* 35 (April 1983), 393-425.

[43] Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," *Review of Politics* 36 (January 1974). See also his introduction to a special issue on corporatism, and his contribution, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," in *Comparative Political Studies* 10 (April 1977), 3-6 and 7-38, respectively.

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According to Schmitter, corporatism is a system of interest representation in which the constituent units (the interest groups) are compulsory, noncompetitive, and hierarchically organized categories which have been given a representational monopoly by the state in return for control over their articulation of demands. He distinguished this system from pluralism, in which the units are voluntary, competitive, and non-hierarchical; are not controlled by the state; and do not exercise a monopoly of representation.[44]

Schmitter argued that the principal difference between corporatism and pluralism lies in the role of the state vis-à-vis the interest groups. He smudged this distinction, however, by his attempt to differentiate two types of corporatism—"societal" and "state"—depending on the degree of state intervention and on whether this intervention is voluntarily accepted or imposed. Societal corporatism is considered to be characteristic of a number of Western European democratic states and, in an emergent way, of Canada and the United States, where interest groups are in some measure officially incorporated in the state system, but on a voluntary basis. State corporatism, on the other hand, is exemplified by such states as Portugal, Spain, Brazil, and Chile, as well as by defunct systems such as Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, where the process of incorporation was coercive. Oddly enough, Schmitter did not include the Soviet Union in either of the two categories, but treated it as a "monist" model—defined as a system of interest representation in which the units are created by a single party and are granted a representational role within that party and vis-à-vis the state in exchange for certain controls over their activity. This conception, which seems difficult to distinguish from state corporatism, was not further analyzed and was omitted from the later article.

In spite of these ambiguities, Bunce and Echols found that the corporatist model—characterized as it is by an active role of the state in decision making—fits the Soviet system under Brezhnev better than the pluralist model. It is, they wrote, "a system of participation and cooperation among major elements in the policy [sic], society, and economy, enforced and coordinated by the state (or the party)...." The state "works with groups to make public policy and does not, as in the pluralist model, simply act as a passive broker, mediating interests; interest groups are not the autonomous, independent actors they are in pluralism...."[45] The latter assertion is, of course, a far cry from pluralism anywhere; it is a travesty of the group approach. The position of the authors is

[44] Full definitions are in Schmitter (fn. 43, 1974), 93-94, 96, 104, 97; also in Bunce and Echols (fn. 40).

[45] Bunce and Echols (fn. 40), 18, 4.

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rendered all the more confusing by the fact that they described the Soviet system as a mixture of both societal and state corporatism.

Jerry Hough has admitted that there are disadvantages in the pluralist model, and that the corporatist model represents in some ways an advance in analyzing Soviet politics.

> It does get away from any suggestion of totally autonomous groups or of equality of opportunity for all groups. Its emphasis on the activist role of governmental agencies and officials is a useful reminder of a fact well-known to pluralists, but played down in their imagery. It does emphasize an important aspect of modern government—the attempt to manage the economy in order to produce sustained economic growth.[46]

In the same paper, Hough pointed out that proponents of the pluralist approach had recognized the active role of the state and had never assumed the existence of voluntary associations in the Soviet Union; they were talking about " 'interests' represented by or embodied in governmental agencies and a 'group struggle' that had to take place within a tightly-structured and restrictive framework" (p. 17). He observed that corporatism, too, had its disadvantages, including the ambiguity of its two variants and the difficulty of distinguishing its societal version from pluralism. Moreover, the corporatist model tended to overemphasize the role of the state and to ignore the latter's internal divisions. Its use would create the danger of a return to the "directed society model," or even the totalitarian model, and might lead to the neglect of the societal autonomy and the political debate characteristic of current Soviet politics. In any case, Hough observed, in a warning relevant to much of our previous discussion, there was a risk in the use of models of any kind, since their ambiguity created misunderstanding and often produced sterile debate in place of scholarly research.

There is another drawback to the adoption of the corporatist model. As employed by Bunce and Echols, it includes within its purview the bureaucratic institutions of state and party, and thus overlaps confusingly with the bureaucratic or institutional models of Hammer and Hough; like them, it places undue emphasis on the bureaucratic side of group politics. Strictly speaking, corporatism in its original Western sense refers to nonstate interest organizations such as trade unions, which are incorporated in the state structure on either a voluntary or a compulsory basis. Most advocates of the corporatist model, however, have conducted little or no empirical research on Soviet mass organizations, and have

[46] Hough (fn. 2), 27. See also discussion of corporatism by A. H. Brown and others in Solomon (fn. 2).

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not attempted to fit them into either the societal or state models of corporatism as applied to the Soviet Union.

Some scholars, such as Cyril Black, writing about "organizational participation" in tsarist and Soviet Russia from an explicitly corporatist perspective, have concluded that "corporatist interests are much more systematically consulted" in the Soviet system than in the tsarist.[47] Robert Dahl, writing from a pluralistic standpoint, coined still another term, "organizational pluralism," to describe the growing influence of interest organizations as a result of the liberalization of hegemonic regimes.[48] Other authors have been more cautious in assessing the importance of such organizations, contending that in the Soviet Union they have continued to be primarily transmission belts, and that they have developed a certain independence as articulators of particular interests only in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia and, in 1968, Czechoslovakia.[49]

In a well-documented study of Soviet trade unions, Blair Ruble, while not using a corporatist model, concluded that they are "significant institutions"; he maintained that, in spite of the authority of the party and the supremacy of the central trade union bodies, the unions, at least at the lower factory level, engaged in "considerable activity having a favorable influence on the lives of Soviet workers."[50] Apart from this, it has yet to be demonstrated that organized interest groups, at least in the U.S.S.R. and other countries of "real socialism," play a role which is comparable even to that of informal and nonorganized interest groups, or which is sufficient to justify their treatment as elements of a corporatist system.

The increasing importance of "specialists" in Soviet decision making has been presented as further evidence of the corporatist character of the Soviet polity. According to Bunce and Echols, for instance, there has been a growing rationality of policy and planning as the party has made use of specialists within its own ranks, and as outside specialists are regularly consulted by policy makers.[51] Without employing a cor-

[47] Black, "Organizational Participation in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union," paper presented to the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington, D.C., October 1982, p. 9. See below for further discussion of interest groups in tsarist and Soviet Russia.

[48] Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," in Stanislaw Ehrlich and Graham Wootton, eds., *Three Faces of Pluralism: Political, Ethnic and Religious* (Farnborough, England: Gower, 1980), 27.

[49] Robert K. Furtak, "Interessenpluralismus in den politischen Systemen Osteuropas," *Osteuropa* 24 (November-December 1974), 779-92, esp. 790-91.

[50] Ruble, *Soviet Trade Unions, Their Development in the 1970's* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 140.

[51] Bunce and Echols (fn. 40), 9-12. On the role of experts, see Brown (fn. 6), 74-76, 85-88.

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poratist approach, Tatjana Kirstein documented the substantial role of such "outsiders" (*Aussenstehenden*) acting in an advisory capacity to the party, the state administration, and the Supreme Soviet.[52] Still other scholars, such as Peter Solomon, Thane Gustafson, and John Löwenhardt, have substantiated the growing role, and the considerable influence, of outside specialists in Soviet decision making, but have treated them as evidence not of interest group activity or of pluralism or corporatism, but of increased "participation" in the Soviet system.[53]

Some Case Studies

Concrete empirical research has been much more fruitful in advancing the study of interest groups than wrangling over relevant models; it has been most productive when not entangled with one model or another. As we suggested in *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (p. 408), the examination of specific issues of public policy has afforded insight into the actual role of interest groups and into the nature of the policy-making process in general. These efforts to test the hypothesis of the interest group approach deserve at least brief mention.[54]

One, by Theodore H. Friedgut, examined the role of interest groups in the reform of machine tractor stations (MTS) in 1958. Although recognizing the "limiting nature of the Soviet framework of politics" and "the broader context of institutional and technical environments," Friedgut concluded that the collective farm chairmen formed "a functional group expressing a common consciousness of needs," and were able to use official channels, such as journals, conferences, and institutes, for articulating and aggregating their interests. United on some issues and divided on others, the *kolkhoz* chairmen were able in some cases to achieve the satisfaction of their demands, but they were not able to gain the establishment of an autonomous *kolkhoz* union. The MTS tractor drivers and mechanics, too, acted as "an organized pressure group to defend their work conditions. . . ." The case study, Friedgut concluded, "contains all the classic elements of interest group activity."[55]

[52] Kirstein, in Meissner and Brunner, (fn. 4).

[53] Peter H. Solomon, Jr., *Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy Making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics, Lessons of Recent Policies on Land and Water* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981); John Löwenhardt, *Decision Making in Soviet Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981). See below for further discussion.

[54] On the desirability of such case studies, see Brown (fn. 6), 73-74, 85-86. Articles by P. D. Stewart, J. J. Schwartz and W. R. Keech, and Milton Lodge, cited in Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 1), 379, will not be discussed here.

[55] Friedgut, "Interests and Groups in Soviet Policy-making: the MTS Reforms," *Soviet Studies* 28 (October 1976), 524-47.

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In another study, Donald R. Kelley analyzed the role of interest groups in environmental policy making in the U.S.S.R., taking as his subject the case of pollution control in Lake Baikal. He identified three categories of groups involved: (1) industrial and commercial lobbies, including government ministries and agencies concerned with the manufacture of products; (2) state-related environmental protection agencies, such as the Ministry of Public Health; and (3) semi-official public conservation organizations and informal, *ad hoc* coalitions of environmentalists—the latter best described, he noted, as "opinion groups." "*There can be no question*," Kelley concluded, "*that non-institutionalized, ad hoc environmental lobbies, working in concert with state environmental protection agencies, played an important role in securing more stringent protection of Lake Baikal.*" Although it was an uphill battle, it was significant that these "environmental lobbies, working without the benefit of an organizational base of operations or high-ranking political allies, were able to have any impact at all." He argued that the Lake Baikal case demonstrated "the importance of a non-institutionalized or at best semi-institutionalized environmental lobby" which was able to force the recognition of an issue and also to counteract the resistance of bureaucratic inertia and vested interests within the bureaucracy.[56]

In an earlier article, Kelley had examined two other cases of Soviet decision making—the decentralization of industrial management in 1957 and the reform of education of 1958. In each case, he used a content analysis of several hundred articles published in newspapers and journals by individuals belonging to certain groups. He concluded that the influence of certain specialized interest groups (educators in one case, industrial managers in the other) varied according to the political sensitivity of the issues involved. The educators were able to affect the outcome significantly with respect to higher education, and to a lesser degree in regard to secondary schools. By contrast, the managerial elite were unable to prevent the abolition of ministries, as they had desired; but they were not completely without influence on less sensitive and technical aspects of the reform. Further, the intelligentsia were successful in preserving the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences.[57]

More recently, Howard Biddulph, in a paper presented in 1982 to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, focused his attention on the articulation of territorial interests at CPSU con-

[56] Kelley, "Environmental Policy-making in the USSR: The Role of Industrial and Environmental Interest Groups," *Soviet Studies* 28 (October 1976), 570-89; emphasis in original.

[57] Kelley, "Interest Groups in the USSR: The Impact of Political Sensitivity on Group Influence," *The Journal of Politics* 34 (August 1972), 860-88.

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gresses. Examining the speeches of regional party secretaries at the 23rd, 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses, Biddulph demonstrated what he called "institutionalized interest articulation" in the form of the defense of the territorial interests of their respective regions by the secretaries. Admittedly, the influence of these speeches on policy—i.e., on the content of the budget ultimately approved—appeared to be minimal, though some effect could be detected. Biddulph deliberately spoke only of "interests," and avoided the term "groups," but his data seemed to suggest the existence of regional interests on behalf of which the secretary was speaking, and of a group of regional secretaries who sometimes expressed similar demands.[58]

The Role of Specialists in Soviet Decision Making

As a kind of outgrowth of the interest group approach and of case studies such as the foregoing, other scholars have been encouraged to engage in a search for "participaton," especially of technical specialists, in the wider context of Soviet decision making. Peter Solomon examined the role of outside specialists in a number of case studies of policy making in the field of criminology.[59] Thane Gustafson studied the role of technical experts and advisers in several cases of agricultural and environmental policy during the Brezhnev period.[60] John Löwenhardt brought together nine earlier case studies of policy making under Khrushchev, and added a detailed inquiry into the reorganization of the Academy of Sciences between 1954 and 1961.[61] And at a workshop on Soviet policy making, held in California in 1980, a number of scholars embarked on a comparative investigation of that subject, which would examine studies of policy issues in various fields and during different periods.[62]

Without offering a new model of the Soviet system or even a comprehensive picture of policy making, studies such as these attempted a fuller and more systematic analysis of the process—including its successive phases of initiating issues, building an agenda, making decisions, and implementing them—in a number of spheres of public life and at successive stages of Soviet politics from Stalin to Brezhnev. They con-

[58] Biddulph, "The Public Articulation of Territorial Interests at CPSU Congresses," (Victoria, B.C., 1982), published as "Local Interest Articulation at CPSU Congresses," *World Politics* 36 (October 1983), 28-52. Cf. Hough's analysis of speeches by regional party secretaries at the 23rd Congress in Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 1), 65-66.

[59] Solomon (fn. 53).

[60] Gustafson (fn. 53).

[61] Löwenhardt (fn. 53).

[62] Workshop on Soviet Policymaking, University of California (Berkeley, June 19-20, 1980). Cf. the earlier volume by Remnek (fn. 36).

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sidered the role of the several actors involved in each case—political leaders, institutions (official and non-official), individual specialists, interest groups, and so forth. These studies left far behind the concept of a political system in which total power is exercised centrally from the topmost pinnacle and in which there are no inputs from below by a variety of actors in conflict with each other. The authors concluded that there was meaningful participation by outside specialists even during the Stalin period, and that this participation expanded and improved in quality, and was to some extent institutionalized, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Not surprisingly, their work showed that interest groups are but one of the many elements involved in policy making; they are not necessarily decisive, and may sometimes be marginal in their impact. This research also confirmed that the participation of specialists is hampered and sometimes blocked by other factors, in particular the power of political leaders and authoritative organs of government and the party.

Studies such as these—as Solomon remarked about his own work—may be regarded as falling "within the interest group tradition" in the sense that they "deal with participation and influence in the policy-making process."[63] He himself deliberately avoided the use of the term "interest group" and focused on individual specialists, thus skirting the controversial issue whether the specialists constituted interest groups. Gustafson also concentrated on individual technical specialists and discounted the role of groups. Löwenhardt, although focusing not on the group but on the decision, did examine the part played by groups. He distinguished "three types of political groups with differing degrees of 'groupness': interest groups, opinion groups, and policy coalitions. Apparently equating "interest groups" with entire occupational categories, he discerned "different opinion groups that may exist within one and the same interest group," and described policy coalitions as "composed of representatives of different interest and opinion groups." The process of decision making involved, in his view, not only groups, but also institutions (formally constituted state and party organizations) and individuals (prominent scientists, writers, and other intellectuals).[64]

Löwenhardt's case studies certainly support the generalization that the party is not monolithic and does not have a monopoly of power in the decision-making process. Influence is shared by many other actors, such as political leaders, individuals, institutions, and groups. His conclusions are, however, confusing and somewhat contradictory. None of the studies, he declared categorically, provided "evidence of a group or

[63] Solomon (fn. 53), 13.
[64] Löwenhardt (fn. 53), 6, 25, 26.

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institution in Soviet politics qualifying and behaving as an interest group." "Therefore the concept of interest group seems to be of limited use in the study of Soviet decision making." Yet at the same time, Löwenhardt noted the existence of opinion groups and policy coalitions, and in his own case study assigned influence to these groupings.[65] His analysis, if not his conclusions, does not seem too far removed from that of *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, where emphasis was placed on the role of "opinion groups" (within the broader occupational or professional groups) and of alliances of such groups with each other across occupational lines. Nor is it remote from Franklyn Griffiths' tendency analysis, which examined "sets of *individuals* who share common attitudes" and presumable act in concert.[66]

Interest Group Studies in Germany

The fact that *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* was translated into German suggests a concern with this theme in Austria and Germany. Two other books later addressed themselves to group interests in Soviet politics, but were less successful in demonstrating interest group activity. The first, a collection of essays edited by Boris Meissner and Georg Brunner, examined the role of "group interests in the Soviet decision-making process."[67] As the editors explained, these studies expressly deal with group interests, and not with interest groups, since the mass organizations in the Soviet Union cannot be compared with Western organized interest groups (p. 7). The editors referred to "unorganized large social groups," especially the high-ranking bureaucracy and the army, and to a lesser degree the technical-economic intelligentsia (scholars, writers, and artists). They noted that these groupings are not united; each is divided into "individual partial groups of an institutional and professional kind." The Kremlin must take account of the interests of these large groups and even the "unarticulated interests" of workers and peasants, although these groups have no possibility of exerting any

[65] *Ibid.*, 86, 184-85.

[66] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 1), 24-27, 384-87, 395; on tendency analysis, 342, 344, 352, 412. Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, in their study *The Politics of Economic Modernization in the Soviet Union* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), chap. 6, discern what they call "policy groups," which combine the characteristics of Griffiths' "tendencies of articulation" with institutional interests. Their book focuses on the policy group of "economic modernizers," a coalition that includes economic planners, planning theorists, managers, management theorists, and others who work in a variety of party, government, production, and academic institutions and share many views on the policies needed for economic modernization.

[67] Meissner and Brunner (fn. 4).

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influence (pp. 53-54, 7-8). In individual chapters, the contributors examined the role of specialists, the military, enterprise directors and technical cadres, the agricultural population and the workers, as well as scholars, scientists, and writers, but they did not offer empirical evidence that any of these act as interest groups; neither did they document the assumed influence of the military, managers, scholars, and writers.

In the second book, Hans-Heinrich Nolte, drawing extensively on Western interest group literature, presented an original and provocative analysis of group interests in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy.[68] Accepting the idea of "participation of groups outside the party apparatus" (p. 47), Nolte identified what he called "indirect groups," i.e., groups whose members do not personally know each other, but "act together in a relevant manner" (p. 42). These include older groups based on nationality and religion as well as newer ones based on occupation (pp. 54, 58). He found that the Soviet system does not differ from parliamentary systems in having "no group interests," although the group conflict takes place within the framework of the party's hegemony (pp. 123, 132-33). Nolte conducted a content analysis of major Soviet newspapers and journals on the issues of Germany and peaceful coexistence, not on a quantitative basis, but through a qualitative comparison of major articles. He concluded that important differences of opinion are openly or indirectly expressed (chaps. III and IV). In particular, he identified "an interest group coalition friendly to détente" and one "hostile to détente," as well as a party-army-arms industry complex. He admitted, however, that it was not clear how group conflicts work in concrete cases (p. 68).

Robert Furtak, in an article on "interest pluralism," set forth a comparative analysis of "the rise, legitimization and organization of particular interests" in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[69] He noted the recognition by communist theory of the existence of interest conflicts and even groups, and the rise of institutionalized articulation of group interests in certain countries. In view of the part played by societal organizations and professional groupings, and by movements for the defense of religious and nationality interests, he concluded that the totalitarian model had limited explanatory value; but because of the continuing preponderance of the party, he did not think the Western pluralist model was applicable. In suggesting a continuum between

[68] Nolte (fn. 4).

[69] Furtak (fn. 49).

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totalitarianism and pluralism, he divided the East European states into three categories. The first, and largest, consists of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia (until 1968), Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, where the mass organizations remain transmission belts. The second group includes Poland and Hungary, where professional organizations have attained a certain independence, and where the Church, in Poland, has enjoyed far-reaching independence. Only Yugoslavia falls into the third category, with its self-management system, the trade unions, and the national republics all serving as institutions of interest representation.

Groups in Tsarist Russia

Discussion by historians of the role of interest groups in tsarist Russia is not without relevance to our analysis, especially since some critics of the group approach have referred to Russian political culture, and in particular to the "tradition of positively rejecting interest groups," to support the argument that even a limited pluralism was hardly likely in the Soviet system.[70] In contrast to this view, Cyril Black, in a brief but suggestive essay, drew attention to the action, in Russia between 1861 and 1917, of "interest groups," which he defined as "associations of individuals with a common sense of values, one of whose main purposes is to influence government policy along lines favorable to their concerns." He referred to landowners, Moscow entrepreneurs, national and religious minorities, workers and peasants, and even treated political parties as "interest groups in disguise." These groups were regularly consulted in the drafting of legislation, and often took the initiative for change. After 1905, some of them formed "organized pressure groups which sought to influence government policy in support of their diverse interests."[71]

Richard Wortman described the efforts of the nobility and the merchants to further their interests in post-reform Russia, but noted the obstacles to their success in the dominant political culture. The supremacy of the tsar and the imperial bureaucracy, which "provided the framework for the expression of the interests of the social groups," frustrated most of their efforts. The autocracy asserted the dominant interest of the state against the interests of the nobility and the merchants. Spokesmen of the latter groups were so bound to the autocracy that "loyalty to authority superseded loyalty to group interest"—a comment that

[70] Odom (fn. 5), 562-65.

[71] Black, "Political Participation: From Estates to Interest Groups," paper presented at the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 1980, pp. 2, 6.

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seems strikingly applicable to the frequent subordination of group interests to party policy in contemporary Soviet Russia.[72]

Cyril Black developed this theme further in his later paper on the role of interest groups in policy formation from 1861 to the present. Black was struck by the continuity between tsarist and Soviet Russia (p. 7); he observed "an active and growing interchange between the central government and the estates and other interests" in the period from 1861 to 1917 (p. 3), and stated that "Soviet society now tends to be seen as comprising a plurality of institutions with varied strengths and interests" with which the central authorities are obliged to interact (p. 6). His paper concluded on the controversial note that "the representation of interests in public policy is a great deal more extensive, systematic, and complex in the 1980s than it was in the late 1860s, or in the early 1900s" (p. 7).[73]

Other Communist Systems

More directly relevant to our subject is the place of interest groups in other communist states. In a symposium on pluralism in communist systems, Sarah Terry presented "A Case for a 'Group' Approach to Polish Politics," urging its cautious and selective application, at least as "a secondary or supplementary approach." Granting that the groups indentifiable in Poland do not, strictly speaking, meet the minimal criteria of interest groups in Western pluralist societies, Terry contended that "one cannot adequately explain the political situation in Poland" after 1976 "without taking into account the very real influence of significant sectors of Polish society," such as the Church, the intellectuals, the workers, and the peasants.[74] In addition to this limited "quasi-group activity," she identified the Polish Sociological Association, and its Warsaw branch in particular, as a "bona fide group"—a coherent organization not only capable of articulating its own interests, but also of serving as a forum for open discussion of policy issues. Terry also noted that Polish scholars perceive the group approach as relevant and applicable to their political system. For instance, in presenting an argument for a better system of "interest articulation," Krzysztof Jasiewicz, a

[72] Wortman, "The Autocracy and the Interests, 1861-1905," paper presented at the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 1980, pp. 3, 11. Donald Treadgold and Richard Pipes have also written of interest groups in tsarist Russia; see Whetten (fn. 13), 25. See also, on the relationship of group interests and Russian despotism, Bentley (fn. 14), 335-37. Cf. my comments, and those of Janos, on this topic in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (fn. 5, 1980), 84, 90.

[73] Black (fn. 47), 7.

[74] Terry, in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (fn. 5, 1979), 29.

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sociologist, explicitly used Western interest group theory as a tool for analyzing the Polish political system.[75]

Terry, writing in 1977, referred to this quasi-group activity as having at most a "negative influence," but described the process of group formation as a dynamic one (pp. 30, 34). She could not foresee the blossoming of authentic interest groups and their immense impact on politics and public policy several years later. During 1980 and 1981, with the rise of the independent trade union Solidarity, there emerged in Poland a system of group activity which went far beyond anything that had developed in the Soviet Union and which approached the pluralistic process of a democratic society—although limits to this activity and to its success were set by the continued hegemony of the Communist Party as well as by the pressures emanating from the Soviet Union.

These pluralizing tendencies in Poland resembled "the explosion of group activity" in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968, which I have analyzed in *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*. In that case, writers, journalists, scholars, scientists, workers, farmers, the churches and various nationalities, as well as other interest groups based on sex, generation, profession, or simply the pursuit of common goals, sprang into action and transformed the political scene. Within each of these groups, these were significant divergencies of interest and attitude, reflecting underlying economic and social diversity and a wide spectrum of varying opinions.[76]

These two cases of "democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism," as I have called them, not to mention similar examples in Poland and Hungary in 1956 or the comparable events in Croatia in 1971, threw a shaft of light on the role of interest groups in "normal" times. When a communist system experiences such a breakthrough to relative freedom, the "proto-interest groups" that have led a shadowy existence beneath the surface and could express themselves only in rudimentary forms, take on real flesh and blood in the new setting: restraints are removed

[75] For an earlier analysis of interest groups and opposition in Communist Eastern Europe, see Skilling, "Background to the Study of Opposition in Communist East Europe," *Government and Opposition* 3 (Summer 1968), 294-324; republished in Leonard Schapiro, ed., *Political Opposition in One-Party States* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 72-103, and in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 121-41. See also A. H. Brown, "Pluralistic Trends in Czechoslovakia," *Soviet Studies* 17 (April 1966), 453-72.

[76] Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. XVIII, esp. pp. 563, 611. See also my forthcoming article, "Two Interrupted Revolutions," a comparative analysis of the reform movements in 1968 and 1980-81, to be published in *Poland in Crisis*, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada, forthcoming).

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or lessened and a genuine interest group society begins to emerge.[77] This situation hints at the wide range of unsatisfied interests that existed earlier and appeared, at best, only as the tip of an iceberg of suppressed reality.

Dissent and Interest Groups

A new and significant form of interest articulation emerged in the Soviet Union in the mid-sixties and in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the mid-seventies in the form of movements for the defense of human rights and independent cultural and scholarly activities. Dissent, or dissidence, as it came to be called, had hardly existed at the time of the publication of *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*; it is still neglected or played down in interest group analysis. This kind of activity represents a genuine pluralism of ideas and opinions, expressed openly, without censorship, in *samizdat* articles, journals, and books. Although such groups operate under the difficult conditions of constant police harassment, they approximate in some ways interest associations in democratic societies. They are "less orthodox" and "less legitimate" than other forms of interest group activity, but paradoxically, they are "more organized and institutionalized."[78] In the Soviet Union, organized groups—such as the Helsinki monitoring committees, the committee on the abuse of psychiatry, and nationality and religious movements—were formed for the defense of specific or more general interests. In Poland, in the late 1970s, dissident movements—KOR, ROPCiO, many newspapers, the Flying University, and so forth—were even more numerous and active than in the U.S.S.R. They helped to prepare the way for the outburst of intense group activity during the period of Solidarity in 1980-1981. There was similar dissident activity in Czechoslovakia (Charter 77), and on a smaller scale in other communist countries.[79]

Alexander Shtromas has analyzed dissent as a form of interest group activity.[80] The totalitarian model of Soviet society does not exclude, in his opinion, "certain interest groups who are able to influence the political decision-makers by trying to present the interests of a group as those of the decision-makers themselves" (p. 68). This "intra-structural dis-

[77] I owe this idea and the term "proto-interest groups" to Robert C. Tucker of Princeton University, who read a draft of this article.

[78] Skilling, *Studies in Comparative Communism* (fn. 5), 87.

[79] See my analysis of dissent in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the final chapter of Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981).

[80] Shtromas (fn. 27), 74-77, 104.

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sent" consists of the pursuit of constructive political, social, economic, or cultural goals by advancing ideas and proposals, or making practical initiatives and experiments (pp. 75, 77). Shtromas described the "professionals" as "one of the most important interest groups in the Soviet Union" (p. 104); he included in this category not only those specialists who are officially brought into the policy-making process as consultants, but also those who take the initiative in making "constructive demands for essential changes in the system of the country's management" (pp. 74-77).

Shtromas included in the category of "intra-structural dissent" those whom he called "moral dissenters"—i.e., "people motivated by more general moral, philosophical, political and cultural ideas and commitments," pursuing goals of change in the civic realm, and in nationality and religious life (pp. 79-82). Such groups also belong, he noted, in the category of "extra-structural dissent"—i.e., "the independent activities of individuals and groups outside the framework controllable by the authorities" and "directly undermining, challenging, or criticizing the regime and its current and long-term policies ..." (p. 82). While it is normally concealed, this dissent often becomes overt, and the dissenters, through no desire of their own, move from intra-structural to extra-structural dissidence, as, for instance, in the cases of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. Although overt dissent constitutes only a tiny fraction of dissent as a whole, it is important, in Shtromas's opinion, in expressing the views of most Soviet citizens and encouraging others to follow their example (pp. 86-87).

Conclusions

The interest group approach did not succeed in one of its purposes—namely, to contribute to a more comprehensive general theory of group politics.[81] As already noted, the results of research on Soviet interest groups were not incorporated in comparative political analysis. The fact that specialists in Soviet studies drew various models from political science and applied them to the Soviet system impeded rather than facilitated a better understanding of that system and the role of interest groups in it. The totalitarian model, and even the authoritarian one (as interpreted by the critics), which excluded, almost by definition, the very possibility of interest groups, naturally discouraged concrete research on this theme. The bureaucratic and institutional models, by focusing on official structures, distracted attention from looser, nonorganized profes-

[81] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 1), 23.

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sional and other groupings. The pluralist and corporatist models implied a greater participation by interest groups and social organizations than was warranted.

On the other hand, empirical research conducted during the past decade or so has demonstrated the utility of an interest group approach in analyzing the politics of the U.S.S.R., not only under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, but also under Stalin, as well as in tsarist Russia. It showed itself to be even more useful in interpreting the politics of East European communist countries, and proved helpful in the study of the dissident movements in those countries and in the Soviet Union.[82] This research, while not neglecting the role of the official authoritative organs of state and party, confirmed, to the satisfaction of many, that interest groups contributed important inputs to the process of decision making. Other scholars, while not employing the interest group concept, established the significance of participation and the influence of specialists. Together, these studies corroborated the assumption that the Soviet system has indeed been "operating differently than under Stalin."[83]

The term "interest groups" remained somewhat ambiguous and was given a variety of meanings. It was used to refer to state institutions, such as entire ministries or government departments and agencies; to the party as a whole or its component parts; to nonofficial bodies such as the Academy of Sciences or its institutes; to nonstate societal or mass organizations, such as the trade unions; to outside specialists in specific disciplines; to dissidents and opposition groups; and to broader social groups, such as collective farmers. More discriminating research demonstrated the need to differentiate between the common interests of such groups in their entirety and the partial interests of "opinion groups" within the same category. Interest groups ought not to be identified with the whole group unless a common attitude of all members could be established empirically. It was the "opinion groups," or coalitions of such groups (in Griffiths' words, the "tendencies of articulation"), that were the crucial barometer of interest group activity.[84] This concept, it

[82] Victor C. Falkenheim has adopted an interest group approach in a comprehensive symposium which he has edited, entitled *Citizens and Groups in Chinese Politics* (manuscript only). Referring to *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Falkenheim writes that interest group approaches "have become virtually universal tools of analysis, reflecting, on the one hand, their almost unarguable indispensability in substantive policy analysis, and on the other, the increasingly salient character of group activity in modernizing socialist systems." The manuscript focuses on "the role of social aggregates, professional groups and bureaucratic interest groups at the base and intermediate levels" of the Chinese political system, including, for instance, workers, peasants, and the youth, as well as scientists, intellectuals, managers, and the military, and explores the interactions between "social groups" and elite factions."

[83] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 1), 44.

[84] *Ibid.*; see pp. cited in fn. 66.

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would seem, offered a basis for treating specialists as a group whenever a similarity of opinions and a common set of demands could be established.

Later research confirmed our hypothesis that the Soviet system, regardless of the changes in its mode of operation that had been introduced or tolerated by Khrushchev, remained much the same in its essential features:

> The making of policy remains highly centralized and authoritarian, with great power resting in the hands of a few at the top, and with groups usually playing a secondary and subordinate role.... Top Soviet leaders are often at one and the same time articulators and aggregators of group interests, as well as the final rule-makers, and may often be in a position to impose policies upon the groups rather than be forced by the groups to follow certain policies.[85]

Even under Khrushchev, changes had been limited, slow, and erratic; in some measure, they were reversed under Brezhnev. Groups were in the main informal and not institutionalized, and were still officially regarded as illegitimate. Significant activity was confined to elite groups such as the specialists; larger social groups, for instance workers or nationalities, played little or no role in policy making. If this interest group activity was described as "incipient pluralism," it does not mean that the system had become pluralist in any meaningful sense of the word.[86]

Interest group activity has differed greatly in various communist countries. It was substantial in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia at certain times, and rose to an unprecedented and qualitatively different level in Czechoslovakia and Poland during periods of radical reform. As noted above, this efflorescence of group politics of a quasi-pluralistic kind revealed the hitherto concealed wealth of unsatisfied interests and the potential for radical interest articulation. The weak and informal process of group activity in the Soviet Union, appeared, by contrast, embryonic and undeveloped, capable of giving only limited and inadequate expression to the basic interests of the population. The Polish and Czechoslovak experience provided at least a hint of what *might* occur in the U.S.S.R. if groups such as workers and peasants, the nationalities, and religious believers had an opportunity to voice their opinions and defend their interests freely.

The study of dissidence raises still more intriguing and controversial questions. Many scholars would challenge the link postulated by Alexander Shtromas between the attitudes and claims of the dissidents and

[85] *Ibid.*, 45.

[86] *Ibid.*, 44; also 399, 401-05.

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the attitudes of the population at large, or even of the less radical and more orthodox critics.[87] The dissenters operate on the margin of Soviet political life and do not necessarily embody broader public opinions and wishes. Nonetheless, it is likely that the voices of the dissidents reveal, at least in some degree, tendencies of opinion that are hidden in mainstream politics or only expressed in Aesopian language in normal interest group activity. In Poland, where the dissent movement was greater in scope and enjoyed wide popular support, there could be no doubt that it articulated unsatisfied group interests and unexpressed opinions, and that it helped to pave the way for the more radical and uninhibited pluralism of the Solidarity period.

The reaction of the Soviet regime toward the Czechoslovak and Polish reform movements and toward its own dissidents tells us a great deal about the real nature of Soviet power. The use of military coercion and police violence in these cases indicates how determined Moscow was to curtail genuine articulation of interests in the neighboring countries and to prevent any comparable development in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet regime, it is clear, remained adamantly opposed to any degree of genuine pluralization at home or abroad.

The future of group activity is as difficult to foresee now as it was in 1970.[88] Certainly there was not then, and there is not now, any likelihood of an early advance to a more pluralistic society in the Soviet Union or elsewhere in Eastern Europe.[89] On the contrary, genuine group activity has suffered another severe setback. The establishment of military rule in Poland, like the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, terminated the outburst of group activism and the birthpangs of a genuine pluralism, and also eliminated even the relatively modest group and dissent activity that preceded more radical strivings for reform. In turn, this repression discouraged pluralizing tendencies in Hungary and solidified the rigid authoritarianism of Rumania. Yuri Andropov, the new leader of the U.S.S.R., whose power rests on the coercive forces of police, army, and party, is hardly likely to permit a revival of group activity in Eastern Europe or of dissent in the Soviet Union. It remains to be seen whether he will tolerate even the modest degree of group activity that was permitted or encouraged by his predecessors.

[87] Shtromas (fn. 27, 1979), 221, 237-39, 272-73.
[88] Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 1), 404, 405.
[89] Skilling (fn. 25), 230, 234.

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LOCAL INTEREST ARTICULATION AT CPSU CONGRESSES

BY HOWARD L. BIDDULPH*

THIS essay is a study of localism in Soviet policy making, which will show that on questions involving economic planning and appropriations, regional Party leaders tend to be advocates of local development issues in all-Union politics.[1] The discussion of the five-year plan at CPSU Congresses constitutes an arena in which local (territorial) interest articulation has become sufficiently visible to permit systematic analysis.

Western scholarship has usually rejected any significant role for CPSU Party Congresses in the formulation of policy. Merle Fainsod, for example, characterized the Congress as essentially a "rally of the faithful."[2] Leonard Schapiro has described the Congress as a convocation for the "publicity of future policy already decided on in advance."[3] Most other scholars have echoed these standard views.[4]

During the Brezhnev era, the CPSU Congress assumed greater importance in the policy process than this traditional view would lead us to believe. Aside from its function of proclaiming and legitimizing central policies, the Congress became a forum for discussing the preliminary guidelines for the forthcoming five-year plan.

Speeches by union republic, *oblast, krai* and autonomous republic Party first secretaries, and by Union Republic Council of Ministers chairmen at the four Congresses of the post-Khrushchev era will be examined. The objectives of this analysis are: (1) to identify the phenomenon of

* I would like to thank Gordon Skilling, Bohdan Harasymiw, Franklyn Griffiths, and Lenard Cohen, who read an earlier version of this article and offered useful criticisms, suggestions, and encouragement.

[1] Jerry Hough gave the first detailed analysis of local interest representation in *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision Making* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), chap. 12.

[2] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 217-18.

[3] Leonard Schapiro, *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union*, 6th ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1977), 64.

[4] See, for example, John Reshetar, *The Soviet Policy*, 2d ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1978), 113; Darrell P. Hammer, *USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1974), 180. Jerry Hough admits Fainsod's conclusion may be "overdrawn," and acknowledges some effort on the part of Congress speakers to influence future but not present policy; cf. Hough, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 450-51.

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local interest articulation at Party Congresses; (2) to compare the access of various regional leaders to the public policy discussions at Party Congresses; (3) to distinguish the types and frequency of local interest articulation over four Congresses; (4) to present the principal issues addressed by regional speakers; and (5) to examine the impact of local proposals on centrally decided economic policies.

I. Local Interest Articulation at CPSU Congresses

By interest articulation, I mean the assertion of a claim by individual or group advocates to those who make the decisions within a polity. Such an assertion is an attempt to influence the authoritative policy process at the agenda-setting, decision-making, or policy-implementation stages. In the context of Soviet politics, and specifically the CPSU Congress, speeches by regional or sectoral officials articulate requests or complaints to the Politburo in the presence of the assembled Congress delegates. Interest articulation is identified where the speaker makes a specific request for centrally allocated goods and services, or makes a pointed comment or argument interpreted as seeking to influence the outcome of a particular policy issue. The present study is confined to the discussion of the *Basic Guidelines* for each of the forthcoming five-year plans.

Beginning with the 23rd Congress in 1966, CPSU Congresses have convened every five years during the Brezhnev era, during the year of the drafting and commencement of the five-year plan. The first draft of the *Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR* is published in late fall of the previous year. The Congress, meeting during February or March, is called upon to discuss, amend, and officially approve the *Basic Guidelines* after a study of this document has produced recommendations from republic Party Congresses, *oblast* and *krai* conferences, and mass organizations.

The draft guidelines are discussed at the CPSU Congress in the Central Committee report, traditionally delivered by the General Secretary, and in the report on the five-year plan given by the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. They are also discussed in a series of speeches by regional leaders and central state officials. A commission on the revision of the draft guidelines then considers the changes proposed and presents a final version of the *Basic Guidelines*, which is unanimously ratified by the Congress. The approved *Basic Guidelines* become the basis for a new five-year plan, to be drafted by *Gosplan* under the direction of the Council of Ministers; it is submitted for final

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approval to the Supreme Soviet in the fall.[5] Two-thirds of the officials called upon to give speeches at the Congress (exclusive of foreign dignitaries) are important regional leaders (i.e., Party first secretaries of union republics, *oblasts*, autonomous republics, *krais*, and chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the larger republics).

TABLE 1
DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS IN PARTY CONGRESSES
BREZHNEV ERA: 1966-1981

Speakers	*23rd Congress*	*24th Congress*	*25th Congress*	*26th Congress*	*Average*	*%*
Regional Party and State Leaders	43	37	38	33	38.25	66.0
USSR Ministers	8	9	7	5	7.25	12.5
Cultural and Scientific Representatives	5	3	4	3	3.75	6.5
Mass Organization Representatives	2	2	2	2	2.00	3.5
Local Production Representatives	6	9	12	2	7.25	12.5
Total Speakers	64	60	63	45		

Speeches by regional leaders are obviously designed to reinforce the legitimacy of the CPSU leadership. Increasingly, however, regional speakers have utilized the public podium of the Party Congress to articulate local interests and proposals before the assembled Party faithful.

Although regional leaders are competitors for micro-appropriations and material resources, the Soviet political culture requires that "acceptable" requests for goods and services be communicated in a style that avoids open partisanship, confrontation, or dramatization of demands. Furthermore, even the most particular territorial issue must be framed rhetorically in terms of broad national interests or tasks to avoid the despicable label of "localism." What is good for Yakutsk must be justified as essential for the Union.

Many of the proposals made by territorial leaders in the four congresses simply involve asking for the addition of specific local projects to the national economic plan. For example, at the 25th Congress, Party

[5] This procedure is outlined in the official resolution on the approval of "The Basic Guidelines for the 11th Five-Year Plan," adopted at the 26th Congress; cf. *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, March 3, 1981, p. 1, and *Current Soviet Policies* [hereafter cited as *CSP*], 8, p. 76.

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First Secretary Chiryayev of the Yakut Autonomous Republic requested a railroad into Central Yakutia;[6] Party First Secretary Gapurov of the Turkmen Republic asked for both a railroad extension and a highway in his territory;[7] and Party First Secretary Kunayev of the Kazakh Republic asked for the reconstruction of the Pavlodar Tractor Plant so that it could produce K-701 tractors.[8] The corrected final draft of the *Basic Guidelines* added Kunayev's request to the official agenda covering the new plan, but ignored the proposals by Chiryayev and Gapurov (at least for the period covering this plan).[9] Chiryayev did succeed in having a feasibility study for the Berkakit-Tommot-Yakutsk Railway approved at the 26th Congress, five years later. Presumably, Gapurov is still waiting.

Other proposals by local leaders have required major shifts in priorities and allocations of financial and natural resources. For example, after the commencement of the Non-Black–Earth Zone agricultural program in northern and central Russia, some southern leaders proposed a massive project at the 25th Congress that would bring about a partial diversion of northern rivers to aid agriculture in the Volga Basin and North Caucasus.[10] Simultaneously, the Central Asian leaders advocated an even costlier project involving the partial diversion of Siberian rivers to provide water resources for the development of their area.[11] Such proposals are perceived as being more competitive than the usual incremental allocations, since they involve major subtractions and additions of resources distributed among the various regions.

While regional officials refrain from openly challenging the official policy lines laid down by the Party leadership at the Congress, they sometimes criticize the means proposed in the *Basic Guidelines* for achieving specified objectives. For example, the draft of the guidelines for the 11th Five-Year Plan sought to solve the problem of labor shortage and high labor turnover in remote Siberian and Far Eastern projects by substantial wage increases.[12] The Chairman of the R.S.F.S.R. Council

[6] Speech by G. I. Chiryayev, *XXV s"ezd, Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow: 1976), Vol. 2, p. 108; [The reports are hereafter cited as *XXV s"ezd KPSS, XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, and so forth.]

[7] Speech by M. G. Gapurov, *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, pp. 348-49.

[8] Speech by D. A. Kunayev, *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, p. 142.

[9] *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2, pp. 295-96, 299, 303. An analysis of changes in the *Basic Guidelines* is made by the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [hereafter cited as *CDSP*], 28, Nos. 15-17; see esp. No. 17, pp. 17-19.

[10] See the speeches by I. A. Bondarenko and S. F. Medunov, *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, pp. 336-39, 204-08.

[11] Speeches by D. A. Kunayev, Sh. R. Rashidov, and M. G. Gapurov, *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, pp. 142, 179-80, 348.

[12] *XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2, pp. 284-85.

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of Ministers, Solomentsev, in a speech at the 26th Congress, obliquely criticized this proposal as an inadequate solution; he pointed out that wage increases would not solve the problem of high labor turnover so long as family accommodations and cultural services remained inadequate in these remote areas.[13]

Local leaders also often criticize the implementation of policy by central state administrators, publicly appealing over the heads of the latter to the Politburo in the presence of the assembled Party delegates. Sometimes they put U.S.S.R. ministers on the defensive in such gatherings. Moscow *Oblast* First Secretary Konotop did just that, for example, in his criticism of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of the Automotive Industry at the 26th Congress. He charged the ministry with extravagant labor and capital construction practices at its Likino plant.[14] The Minister, V. N. Polyakov, responded in his speech by publicly announcing his intent to investigate the allegations.[15]

Konotop's speech also provides an example of another issue that local Party leaders regularly bring up against central state administrators: they complain about the local problems created by the failure of central branch planning to consider the needs of comprehensive regional or "special purpose" planning. The complexity of urban development in Moscow Province, Konotop urged, requires

> integrated planning ... that takes into account nature preservation, the fuel and power balance, water supply and other utility lines. Today the resolution of these questions depends in large part on the mood of the ministries and the branch departments of the USSR and RSFSR State Planning Committees, and we are continually compelled to beg them for funds for numerous critical urban needs.[16]

II. Access of Local Leaders to the Public Forum

A speech at a Party Congress is more than a symbolic honor for an *obkom* or republic first secretary. Access to the "high podium" gives such leaders the chance to place on the public record a proposal that otherwise would have to be made through less visible channels. The speech will appear in *Pravda, Izvestia*, and the regional media, and will be published in the widely distributed stenographic report of the Congress.

Even if the speaker fails to secure approval for the local project, the

[13] Speech by M. S. Solomentsev, *XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 8, p. 52.
[14] Speech by V. I. Konotop, *XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2; cf. *CSP* 8, p. 65.
[15] Speech by V. N. Polyakov, *XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2; cf. *CSP* 8, p. 67.
[16] *CSP* 8, p. 65.

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proposal remains part of the public record, thus providing the possibility of support or consideration on a future agenda. Moreover, whether or not such requests for goods or services are granted, addressing the Congress gives the regional leader the opportunity to cultivate his image at home as a dedicated advocate of local interests. A speech published in *Izvestia* offers proof in black and white that he did not fail to discuss local needs.

An *oblast* first secretary is responsible for a regional economy that is subordinate to the decisions of *Gosplan* and administrative actions of powerful central ministries. His speech to the Congress is a rare opportunity to criticize these central administrators publicly for their mistakes, on which he can place the blame for local economic woes. And all this takes place in the great Kremlin Palace of Congresses, before a presumably attentive Politburo and assembled Party functionaries; he can be expected to make the most of such an opportunity.

Not all local leaders enjoy an opportunity to address the Party Congress. A total of 46 regional position holders have been permitted to address at least one of the four Congresses of the Brezhnev era. This figure includes less than 30 percent of the total number of republic, *oblast*, and *krai* first secretaries, and less than 40 percent of those regional first secretaries who are full or candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee. These participants include all 14 union republic Party first secretaries, four of the 15 Republic Premiers, 25 percent of the Autonomous Republic Party first secretaries, and approximately 20 percent of the *oblast* and *krai* first secretaries.

Of the 46 speakers, 31 officials are always, or almost always, chosen to deliver an address. (A total of 24 positions holders were invariably chosen, and 7 were denied the opportunity at only one of the four Congresses). These 31 include all 14 Union Republic Party first secretaries; 14 regional first secretaries within the R.S.F.S.R. (including the City of Moscow, 8 important *oblast*s, 2 major autonomous republics, and 3 *krai*s beyond the Urals); and 3 union republic premiers (R.S.F.S.R., Ukrainian, and Kazakh Republics). These 31 officials are chosen so as to represent the principal political subdivisions and economic regions of the Soviet Union.

Some of these 31 speakers are important national as well as regional leaders. The first secretaries of Moscow City, Leningrad *Oblast*, and the Ukrainian and Kazakh Republics were full members of the Politburo. The Chairman of the R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers and four other union republic first secretaries (Uzbek, Belorussia, Georgia, Azerbaidzhan) are candidate members of the Politburo. These 9 officials are the

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TABLE 2
LEVELS OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC ARTICULATION (BREZHNEV ERA)

	Number of Congress Speeches
TOP ECHELON (9) (Representation in Politburo)	
Moscow City Party Committee First Secretary	4
Leningrad Oblast Party Committee First Secretary	4
Ukrainian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Kazakh Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Chairman, R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers	4
Uzbek Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Belorussian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Georgian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Azerbaidzhanian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
SECOND ECHELON (22)	
Chairman, Ukrainian Republic Council of Ministers	4
Chairman, Kazakh Republic Council of Ministers	4
Lithuanian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Moldavian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Latvian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Kirghiz Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Tajik Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Turkmen Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Estonian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	4
Moscow Oblast Party Committee First Secretary	4
Gorky Oblast Party Committee First Secretary	4
Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee First Secretary	4
Novosibirsk Oblast Party Committee First Secretary	4
Tatar Autonomous Republic Party First Secretary	4
Bashkir Autonomous Republic Party First Secretary	4
Krasnoyarsk Krai Party First Secretary	4
Armenian Republic Party Committee First Secretary	3
Saratov Oblast Party Committee First Secretary	3
Rostov Oblast Party Committee First Secretary	3
Kemerovo Oblast Party Committee First Secretary	3
Altai Krai Party Committee First Secretary	3
Krasnodar Krai Party Committee First Secretary	3
THIRD ECHELON (15)	
Orenburg Oblast First Secretary	2
Belgorod Oblast First Secretary	2
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast First Secretary	2
Maritime Krai First Secretary	2
Volgograd Oblast First Secretary	1
Penza Oblast First Secretary	1
Donetsk Oblast First Secretary	1

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TABLE 2 (*cont.*)
LEVELS OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC ARTICULATION (BREZHNEV ERA)

	Number of Congress Speeches
Tyumen Oblast First Secretary	1
Ulyanovsk Oblast First Secretary	1
Khabarovsk Krai First Secretary	1
Chelyabinsk Krai First Secretary	1
Yakut Autonomous Republic First Secretary	1
Buryat Autonomous Republic First Secretary	1
Dagestan Autonomous Republic First Secretary	1
Mari Autonomous Republic First Secretary	1

TABLE 3
REPRESENTATION OF REGIONAL LEADERS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND AS SPEAKERS AT CPSU CONGRESSES

	1971	*1976*	*1981*
Union Republic First Secretaries	14	14	14
Autonomous Republic First Secretaries	20	20	20
Oblast and Krai First Secretaries	121	127	128
Total Regional First Secretaries	155	161	162
Total Regional First Secretaries as Full or Candidate Members of CC/CPSU	110 (71.0%)	119 (73.9%)	116 (71.6%)
Regional First Secretaries Speaking at Congress	32 (20.6%)	35 (21.7%)	30 (18.5%)

Source: *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR*, Vol. 1970, p. 44; Vol. 1975, p. 44; Vol. 1979, p. 40.

top echelon of regional leaders, inasmuch as they are members of the highest policy council. They invariably address the Congress. The other 22 constitute a second echelon of access, representing the remainder of the principal political units and economic regions of the U.S.S.R. A total of 15 other local leaders have been chosen to address at least one Congress. They are a third and final echelon of access.

In sum, less than one-fifth (18 percent) of the combined total number

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of secretaries and republic premiers enjoyed practically *continuous* access to the Congress podium during the Brezhnev era. Slightly more than one-quarter of this total (27 percent) had at least one opportunity to address a Congress.

III. Types and Frequency of Local Interest Articulation

Public proposals and appeals by regional leaders are addressed to three levels of the Soviet policy process. The attempt of a speaker to place a proposal on the political agenda and secure a favorable provisional decision covering the matter is designated a *level I articulation* if that proposal was not included in the pre-Congress draft of the Basic Guidelines for the new five-year plan.

One of the most prominent examples of a level I articulation at the 25th Congress is the previously mentioned proposal—supported by Kazakh, Uzbek, and Turkmen Party leaders—for the partial diversion of Siberian rivers to provide water resources for Central Asia. This massive and costly project was not mentioned in the pre-Congress draft of the *Basic Guidelines*, nor was it included in Brezhnev's main address at the Congress. It was, therefore, not on the agenda before the Congress convened. At the end of the Congress, the Central Asian lobbyists were granted an insertion in the final draft of the *Basic Guidelines* calling for "scientific research" to study the feasibility of the controversial project.[17] Although it was not approved by this Congress, it was at least placed on the political agenda.

The attempt of a speaker to move an item already on the agenda to a more favorable placement in the plan is designated as a *level II articulation.* Not all proposals listed in the *Basis Guidelines* are included in the final plan. Some low-priority projects are cut before funds are allocated, or are delayed by *Gosplan* or a relevant central ministry from being carried to completion. Local leaders are keenly aware of the fate of some provisionally approved proposals that receive low priority from the central planning organs. Therefore, in their speeches to the Congress, they give public emphasis to those scheduled projects that they consider to be particularly vulnerable to cuts at the hands of the central planners. For this reason, they may attempt to shift a proposal that is already on the agenda into a priority position.

Level II articulations constitute a fairly common type of request in Congress speeches of the Brezhnev era. One example from the 24th Congress is found in the speech of Altai First Secretary Georgiyev, which

[17] *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2, p. 271; cf. *CSP* 7, 110.

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started by noting with satisfaction that "the CPSU Central Committee and the government have supported our proposals to irrigate the Kulunda Steppe." Now Georgiyev formally requested that this project be included in the Congress directives to *Gosplan*.[18]

A *level III articulation* is an attempt by a speaker to remove administrative obstacles that have blocked the implementation of a previous decision. Thus, a speaker may complain that an approved proposal was not included in the economic plan, or that it was included in the plan but was subsequently delayed in commencement or completion.

At the 24th Congress in 1971, for example, Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest noted that the failure to allocate the planned capital investments, machinery, and fertilizers had an "adverse affect on the rates of agricultural development in his republic."[19] Similarly, Georgian Republic First Secretary Shevardnadze complained at the 25th Congress that not all of the approved programs for his republic had been included by *Gosplan* and the U.S.S.R. ministries in the 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans. His speech was a public attempt to remove the roadblocks by appealing to the Party leadership and the Congress at large.[20]

Table 4 examines the types of interest articulation contained in the speeches of regional leaders at the last three Congresses. Table 5 charts the volume and frequency rate of local requests in the speeches of regional leaders over the same three Congresses.

As is evident in Table 4, regional speakers at the last three CPSU Congresses have been primarily concerned with adding proposals to the political agenda (level I). The 25th and 26th Congresses saw, however, a sustained increase in local criticisms of past policy implementation by

TABLE 4
TYPES OF LOCAL INTEREST ARTICULATION

Congress	*Total Articulation Statements*	*Type of Articulation (Percentages)*		
		Level I	*Level II*	*Level III*
24th	34	76.5	8.8	14.7
25th	43	51.2	25.6	23.2
26th	65	66.1	10.8	23.1
	142	64.1	14.9	21.0

[18] *XXIV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2; cf. *CSP* 6, p. 90.
[19] *XXIV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 6, p. 62.
[20] *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, p. 184; cf. *CSP* 7, p. 53.

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TABLE 5
VOLUME AND FREQUENCY OF INTEREST ARTICULATION BY REGIONAL LEADERS

Congress	*Total Local Speakers*	*Total Articulation Statements*	*Articulation Rate*	*Speakers Making Proposals*	*Percent of Local Speakers Making Proposals*
24th	36	34	.944	22	61.1
25th	37	43	1.162	28	75.7
26th	33	65	1.970	31	93.9
	106	142	1.340	81	76.4

Gosplan and the ministries (level III), accounting for nearly one-quarter of the proposals made by regional speakers.

Both Table 4 and Table 5 show a gradually increasing volume of articulation statements by regional speakers at the three Congresses. The articulation rate per regional speaker and the proportion of regional speakers making proposals steadily increased from the 24th to the 26th Congress.

There are at least two plausible explanations for the significant increases in the volume and frequency of public advocacy by regional leaders during the Brezhnev era. The first may be labeled the "institutionalization hypothesis." The second, in Seweryn Bialer's phrase, may be called "the politics of stringency."[21]

Following the practice of the Khrushchev leadership at the extraordinary 21st Congress in 1958,[22] the Brezhnev leadership timed the 24th, 25th, and 26th Congresses to coincide with the consideration of the draft guidelines for the next five-year plan and encouraged local discussion and proposals. The institutionalization hypothesis postulates that, as local interest articulation is increasingly perceived to be acceptable and a routine step in the planning process, its rate will tend to increase.

Bialer has noted that, because of decelerating economic growth in the U.S.S.R. during the late 1970s and 1980s, "diverse claimants must compete for shrinking marginal increments of resources," making allocation more difficult and controversial.[23] The "stringency hypothesis" that I have extracted from Bialer's thesis holds that stringency stimulates both

[21] Seweryn Bialer, "The Politics of Stringency in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* 29 (May-June 1980), 19, 23.

[22] Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Spatial Efficiency in the Soviet Economy," in V. N. Bandera and Z. L. Melnyk, eds., *The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 13.

[23] Bialer (fn. 21), 19, 23.

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the volume and the rate of public requests for goods and services and increases the number of participants offering new "inputs" and criticizing past "outputs."

The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and each seems to account for part of the picture revealed in Tables 4 and 5. The articulation of economic proposals by regional leaders in CPSU Congress speeches was a well-established practice during the Khrushchev era (20th-22d Congresses). The attack on "localism" (*mestnichestvo*) at the 22nd Congress and the abolition of the regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*) in the 1960s may have reduced the legitimacy of public regional articulation in the early Brezhnev era. This may explain the decline in the rate of regional interest articulation at the 24th Congress as compared with the Khrushchev era.[24] Tables 4 and 5 chart the "re-institutionalization" of public articulation by regional leaders in the Brezhnev era. The greatest upsurge in volume and frequency of regional interest articulation is at the 26th Congress, which correlates with the stringency theme in the *Basic Guidelines* for the 11th Five-Year Plan and the main addresses at that Congress.

IV. Policy Issues Raised by Regional Leaders

The fact that local leaders were overwhelmingly preoccupied with purely local issues in their proposals to the Congresses of the Brezhnev era is not surprising. At the 25th and 26th Congresses, however, their attention expanded to broader regional issues, as shown in Table 6. Nearly 40 percent of the proposals made at the 26th Congress involved issues that transcended narrowly local limits, with regional issues accounting for more than one-quarter of total requests.

Table 6
Scope of Proposals by Regional Leaders

	Percentages			
	24th Congress	*25th Congress*	*26th Congress*	*Average*
General Proposals	17.1	14.6	11.1	14.5
Regional Proposals	2.7	17.1	26.8	13.6
Local Proposals	80.2	68.3	62.1	71.9

[24] Howard L. Biddulph, *Regionalism and Soviet Policymaking: Influencing the Political Agenda in the Post-Stalin Era* (forthcoming).

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Proposed projects sited solely within a single *oblast*, republic, or *krai* are considered local issues. Projects sited within and immediately benefiting two or more local units in the same part of the country are regional issues. By this definition, the appeal by Rostov First Secretary Bondarenko for the diversion of northern rivers for agricultural use in the Volga Basin and North Caucasus represents a regional issue. A general issue is any policy or program encompassing a broader area than a single region. The argument made by Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze in support of structural reform of the *raikom* level of party organization is an example of a general issue.

PURELY LOCAL ISSUES

Nearly three-quarters of the requests for capital allocation by *oblast*, republic and *krai* leaders at Party Congresses have been for purely local projects. Table 7 examines the frequency of nine specific kinds of such local issues.

As measured by the frequency of its occurrence in Table 7, agriculture has been the most persistent issue. The number of agricultural proposals has increased from Congress to Congress. Speakers requested additional agro-industrial complexes, new bases for food production, substantial investments in the mechanization of animal husbandry, dairy, and fodder production, conversion of local facilities for tractor and implement production, and the building of agricultural storage facilities. It is evident that agricultural production remains the most serious local problem. Of

TABLE 7
REQUESTS FOR ECONOMIC GOODS AND SERVICES IN SPEECHES BY REGIONAL LEADERS AT CPSU CONGRESSES

Type of Request	*Percent (23rd-26th Congresses)*	*Priority*
Agriculture	23.2	(1)
Energy and Fuels	16.1	(2)
Water Resources	13.5	(3)
Transportation	11.6	(4)
Labor and Training	9.0	(5)
Heavy Industry	8.4	(6-7)
Minerals Industry	8.4	(6-7)
Light Industry	7.2	(8)
Housing and Services	2.6	(9)
	100.0	

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all the central state agencies, the Ministry of Agriculture and other state committees concerned with agricultural equipment and land reclamation have come in for the most frequent and severe criticism by local and regional leaders.

The second most prevalent concern was the allocation of capital for energy development. Here, too, there was a noticeable escalation at the 26th Congress in requests by regional leaders for capital investment: hydro-electric, thermal, and atomic power projects, oil and gas exploration, and capital reconstruction of coal production facilities constituted important requests.

Although regional leaders did not openly attack the national leaders' commitment to cut back substantially on new capital construction, the volume of requests for new capital construction outlays escalated substantially at the 26th Congress. The politics of stringency sharpened the intensity and increased the volume of public appeals for specifically local projects.

Competitiveness between coal-producing territories and gas- and oil-producing territories for priority in the allocation of funds constituted a prominent example of regional rivalry.[25] Similar competitiveness is shown in the appeals for priority by rival claimants for reconstruction of metallurgical enterprises, water resource development, mineral extraction, and the mechanization of agricultural production projects.[26]

REGIONAL ISSUES

The 25th and 26th Congresses were remarkable, in part, for the open advocacy of regional issues on water resources and agricultural development by a growing number of local leaders. As has been noted, some planners and engineers proposed a scheme for the partial diversion of several northern rivers to support irrigated agriculture in the southern part of the Russian Republic and the North Caucasus area. This proposal was also designed to arrest the decline of the Caspian and Aral Seas and to alleviate pollution.[27] At the same time, other engineers advanced a plan for diverting part of the flow of some Siberian rivers (principally the Ob River in West Siberia) to Kazakhstan and Central Asia in order to stimulate agricultural development and to serve other consumption purposes.[28]

The river diversion projects were extremely controversial. According

[25] *XXVI s"ezd KPPS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 6, p. 62; and *CSP* 8, pp. 66, 65, 63.
[26] *Ibid.*, 51, 53, 61, 62, 52-55, 65-69.
[27] Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 71-75.
[28] *Ibid.*, 77-79.

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to Gustafson, they represented two of the largest engineering projects ever undertaken by any civilization—at a cost that to many, including Kosygin, seemed prohibitive. Two alternative policies to this "southern strategy" were devised: (1) the so-called "intensification strategy," calling for efficient use of existing water resources in the south without river diversions; and (2) a cutback in southern agricultural development in favor of a northern plan that emphasized the allocation of capital to the development of the Non-Black-Earth Zone agricultural program.

The draft of the *Basic Guidelines* for the 10th Five-Year Plan and Brezhnev's opening address to the 25th Congress did not mention the issue, but struck a definite theme that favored cutbacks on new construction and emphasized intensive strategies of development.[29] Five speakers, however, lobbied directly for placing the two river diversion projects on the political agenda: Kunayev of Kazakhstan (a full Politburo member), Rashidov of Uzbekistan (a candidate Politburo member), and Gapurov of Turkmenia advocated the Siberian River diversion,[30] while Kransnodar First Secretary Medunov and Rostov First Secretary Bondarenko supported the diversion of northern rivers to the Volga Basin and North Caucasus.[31] Kosygin's report on the 10th Five-Year Plan, a few days later, and the final text of the *Basic Guidelines*, placed the diversion proposals on the agenda for research and design studies.[32] On December 21, 1978, a decree of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers gave equal support to beginning the design studies for both projects.

At the 26th Congress, the Central Asian lobby—Kunayev, Rashidov, and Gapurov—made an effort to move the policy makers toward a final decision that would commit the 11th Five-Year Plan to the funding and commencement of their project (level II articulation).[33] Medunov continued to advocate the Volga Basin/North Caucasus project.[34] The *Basic Guidelines* for the 11th Five-Year Plan, in calling for the beginning of preparatory work on the project, apparently gave final approval to the Volga Basin plan. The Siberian river diversion plan, however, has not moved beyond the stage of "continuing research and design studies."[35]

Some intimations of opposition to the "southern strategy" surfaced in one or two speeches at the 25th and 26th Congresses. One senses more than unease in the remarks of Altai First Secretary Aksyonov at the 26th Congress. He spoke of the shortfall in grain and fodder harvests

[29] Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Congress, by L. I. Brezhnev, *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, p. 73-78.
[30] See fn. 11. [31] See fn. 10. [32] See fn. 17.
[33] *XXVI s"ezd KPPS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 8, pp. 51, 53, 61-62.
[34] *Ibid.*, 57. [35] *Ibid.*, 107.

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in the Siberian steppe, which he attributed to a shortage of moisture, and he mentioned the urgent need for increased irrigation, calling on *Gosplan* to "give this further consideration when it takes up problems of the redistribution of Siberia's water resources."[36] One can also detect competitiveness with the south on the part of northern leaders who offered ringing endorsements of the Non-Black-Earth Zone agricultural project. Ukrainian appeals for agricultural investments also joined in the chorus of demands and requests for finite agricultural funds.[37]

Other regional interests were publicly advocated at the 25th and 26th Congresses. Aliyev of Azerbaidzhan and Shevardnadze of Georgia appealed for an improvement in energy resources in the Transcaucasus region. Siberian leaders asked for priority for the east in investments for technologically advanced equipment, energy, housing, and consumer and social services.[38] All in all, the consciousness (or boldness) of local leaders seems to have expanded to a regional focus at recent Congresses.

GENERAL ISSUES

At each Congress, regional leaders have taken positions on general domestic issues, particularly on those of special concern to subnational units of administration.[39] The most interesting general issues involved territorial criticisms of the central planning and economic administrative apparatus. Various U.S.S.R. ministries, state committees, and *Gosplan* were taken to task. One outstanding example was the unprecedented attack, at the 25th Congress,[40] on the policies and procedures of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The general issue most frequently raised by local speakers involved complaints concerning the lack of coordination between central branch planning and compartmentalized ministerial administration at the top, and the integrated planning and administrative requirements of the local areas. For example, in an address at the 23d Congress, Masherov, the

[36] *Ibid.*, 63.

[37] *Ibid.*, 66, 51.

[38] Speeches by G. A. Aliyev and E. A. Shevardnadze, *XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 8, p. 54-55, and speeches by Solomentsev, Chyorny, Shakirov, Fedirko, Bogomyakov, at the 26th Congress, *ibid.*, 52, 53-54, 62, 63; Georgiyev, Tabeyev, and Fedirko at the 25th Congress, *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, pp. 241-42, 382-83; Vol. 2, pp. 204-05.

[39] Consult, for example, Masherov's speech at the 24th Congress, *XXIV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. I, and Romanov's speech at the 25th Congress, *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, 144-49, on Production Associations; Masherov's speech at the 25th Congress, *ibid.*, 158, and R. M. Musin's speech at the 26th Congress, *CSP* 8, p. 64, on polytechnical education; Shevardnadze's proposals on *raikom* reforms, *ibid.*, 55; Goryachev's ideas for institutes for advanced training of local executives in industry and agriculture, *XXIV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2; cf. *CSP* 6, p. 87; Pel'she's proposal to the 23rd Congress, on consolidation of educational administration into a single ministry, *XXIII s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 5, p. 55.

[40] See esp. speeches by A. P. Lyashko, F. S. Goryachev, A. V. Kovalenko, V. I. Konotop, and D. Rasulov, *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1, pp. 71, 433-39, 410-11, 390-91, 328.

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Belorussian First Secretary, accepted the post-Khrushchev economic reorganization (which abolished the regional *sovnarkhozy*). Nevertheless, he was critical of the effect produced by the "narrow departmental approach" of the central economic ministries, who are driven by "the desire to have everything or almost everything in one branch of industry," thereby producing a "highly wasteful and even dangerous tendency."[41]

Sverdlovsk First Secretary Ryabov continued this line of criticism at the 24th Congress, singling out "especially big mistakes in capital construction" for "persuasive confirmation of the existing shortcomings in the coordination of proportional development between the branches of production and the country's economic regions on the part of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Committee."[42]

Various territorial leaders continued this critical theme at other Congresses; at the 26th Congress, Sverdlovsk First Secretary Yeltsin offered a reform measure that is bold in its implications. He began by cataloguing the existence of 387 construction organizations under the jurisdiction of 36 ministries and departments operating in Sverdlovsk *Oblast*. Many of these, he noted, duplicate each other's efforts. In his view, it was reasonable for the right hand to know what the left hand was up to.

As a means of coordinating branch and territorial planning, Yeltsin advocated two measures: (1) implementation of the decision (already taken) to place *Gosplan* representatives within the economic regions; and (2) his own proposal to combine the multitude of ministerial branch organizations under a single agency and to create district base organizations for construction and other industries.[43] Yeltsin's proposal is close to the regional economic council concept of the Khrushchev era. It would increase regional influence through significant decentralization, in order to coordinate central-branch and integrated regional planning. The final edition of the *Basic Guidelines* for the 26th Congress refers to the need for solving central and territorial coordination problems, but it fails to respond specifically to Yeltsin's initiative.

Other general criticisms of the central state bureaucracy by local speakers at both the 25th and 26th Congresses involved the inefficient allocation of scarce labor resources;[44] furthermore, Siberian leaders have been critical of the central planners for failing to solve the problem of a shortage of housing and consumer services in remote areas, thus ex-

[41] *XXIII s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 5, p. 52.
[42] *XXIV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 6, p. 80.
[43] *XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 8, p. 57.
[44] *XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2; cf. *CSP* 8, p. 65.

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acerbating the acute problems of labor shortage and instability in the east.[45]

V. The Impact of Local Interest Articulation

An outsider cannot look into the "black box" of the Soviet decision-making process to assess the power and influence of regional interest articulation. It is possible, however, to demonstrate from published Congress materials that central political leaders do with some regularity respond favorably to efforts by local leaders to place new issues on the policy agenda.

The 24th, 25th, and 26th Congresses established a commission to examine amendments to the draft *Basic Guidelines* for the new five-year plan. (The 23rd Congress did not announce the establishment of such a commission.) All three commissions have been dominated by central Party and state leaders, including the General Secretary and the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, as well as other prominent Politburo members. The commission at the 26th Congress, for example, included, in addition to Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Suslov, Kirilenko, Chernenko, Andropov, and Gromyko, other secretaries of the Central Committee and members of the inner Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, such as N. K. Baibakov, head of *Gosplan*.

The largest contingent on the commissions has consistently been drawn from the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. More than half of the commission members holding full or candidate membership in the Central Committee at the 24th and 25th Congresses were from the Council of Ministers. An increased number from the CPSU Secretariat and apparatus at the 26th Congress lowered the proportion of the U.S.S.R. Ministers, but the latter continued to remain the largest group on the Commission. The local representation on the Commission at all three Congresses remained stable at approximately one-third of the total.

The level I articulation statements of regional speakers at the 25th and 26th Congresses seem to have resulted in substantive changes in the *Basic Guidelines* for the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plans between the first and the final drafts. The final draft of the 1976 *Basic Guidelines* includes several additions that respond to proposals raised by regional speakers at the 25th Congress: (1) the call for improving the quality and reliability of tractors, combines, and other farm machinery; (2) the proposal to increase construction of storehouses for agricultural products; (3) the proposed diversion of northern rivers to the Volga Basin and North

[45] See especially Solomentsev's speech at the 26th Congress, *ibid.*, 52.

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TABLE 8
COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION ON CHANGES IN THE BASIC GUIDELINES FOR THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

	24th Congress	*25th Congress*	*26th Congress*	*Average*
CPSU Secretariat and Apparatus	11 (13.4%)	9 (12.8%)	16 (24.2%)	12.0 (16.5%)
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers	44 (53.3%)	37 (52.9%)	28 (42.4%)	36.3 (50.0%)
Regional Leaders	27 (33.3%)	24 (34.3%)	22 (33.4%)	24.3 (33.4%)
Total Central Committee Members and Candidates on Commission	82	70	66	

TABLE 9
CORRELATION OF REGIONAL SPEAKERS TO REPRESENTATION ON THE COMMISSION ON CHANGES IN THE BASIC GUIDELINES

	24th Congress	*25th Congress*	*26th Congress*	*Average*
Total regional speakers	36	37	33	
Regional speakers making proposals	22 (61.1%)	27 (73.0%)	31 (93.9%)	26.7 (73.1%)
Regional leaders on Commission	27	24	22	24.3
Regional leaders on Commission and speaking at Congress	9 (33.3%)	8 (33.3%)	11 (50.0%)	9.3 (38.3%)
Regional leaders on Commission publicly articulating proposals	7 (25.9%)	5 (24.9%)	10 (45.4%)	7.3 (30.0%)
Regional leaders on Commission not speaking at Congress	18 (66.7%)	16 (66.7%)	11 (50.0%)	15.0 (61.7%)

Caucasus; (4) the proposed diversion of Siberian rivers to Kazakhstan and Central Asia; (5) the proposal to develop more adequate central networks for the repair and maintenance of construction machinery; (6) the proposed expansion of public services and social amenities in Siberia and the Far East; (7) the commissioning of the Volgadonsk Heavy

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Machinery Plant; (8) the conversion of the Pavlodar plant in Kazakhstan for the production of K-701 tractors; and (9) the establishment of the South Tadzhik Territorial Production Complex.[46]

The final draft of the 1981 *Basic Guidelines* includes additions that respond to the following proposals raised by regional speakers at the 26th Congress: (1) for the production of high-quality grain-harvesting combines at the Rostov Farm Machinery Association (*Rostselmash*); (2) for feasibility studies of the development of the iron ore deposit in South Yakutia; (3) for building the Berkakit-Tommot-Yakutsk Railway; (4) for the further development of orchard-growing and viticulture in Tadzhikistan; and (5) for an increase in the capacities of regional power stations in the Turkmen Republic.[47]

TABLE 10
SUCCESS RATE OF PUBLIC PROPOSALS BY REGIONAL LEADERS AT CPSU CONGRESSES

	25th Congress	*26th Congress*
New proposals (level I) by regional speakers	21	43
New proposals by regional speakers incorporated in final draft of *Basic Guidelines* by the Congress Commission	9 (42.9%)	5 (11.6%)

Although regional speakers at the 26th Congress had doubled the number of attempts to place issues or specific projects on the political agenda, the final draft of the *Basic Guidelines* shows that a much greater *proportion* of the proposals had met with success at the 25th Congress. The Commission of the 26th Congress held the line more stringently against proposals by local speakers. It did not approve any new general or regional projects as the 25th Congress had done. The record of both Congresses demonstrates, however, that public requests by local leaders are able to produce at least some immediate alterations in the domestic policy agenda of the U.S.S.R.

Some regional proposals that are not acted upon at one Congress sometimes influence subsequent policy agendas. For instance, at the 24th Congress, the Kazakh and Central Asian First Secretaries had lobbied

[46] See changes in *Basic Guidelines* for the 10th Five-Year Plan in *CDSP* 28, No. 15, pp. 13-17; No. 16, pp. 14-22; and No. 17, pp. 11-19, 28.
[47] See changes in *Basic Guidelines* for the 11th Five-Year Plan in *CSP* 8, pp. 94-120.

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for more water resources in their region;[48] the response came at the 25th Congress, where additional campaigning resulted in placing the Siberian river diversion plan on the agenda. At the 23rd Congress,[49] the Altai First Secretary proposed the extensive project of irrigating the Kulunda Steppe, which was eventually placed on the agenda at the 24th Congress;[50] further work was commissioned by the 25th and 26th Congresses, possibly as a result of level II articulations from the Altai leader.[51]

At the 23rd and 24th Congresses, local leaders had requested that an increase in vegetable and fruit storage systems be placed on the agenda;[52] this item finally appeared in the *Basic Guidelines* of the 25th Congress.[53] The commissioning of the construction of a railway in the Yakut Autonomous Republic, proposed originally at the 25th Congress by the First Secretary of that republic, reached the feasibility-study stage in the revised *Guidelines* for the 26th Congress.[54]

There are other additions that appear in the final edition of the *Basic Guidelines* which, though not publicly requested by regional leaders, seem to be responses to nonpublic lobbying by local officials. At least four of these were approved by the 26th Congress Commission on Changes: (1) an expansion of the Krasnoyarsk Grain-Harvesting Combine Production Association, so as to increase its productive capacity; (2) the provision of sanatoria and health resorts for Siberia and the Far East; (3) construction of a cable-producing plant in Georgia; and (4) at least one additional nitrogen fertilizer plant in the Turkmen Republic beyond those originally announced.[55] Lobbying by local leaders may also have helped to bring about the final decision to proceed with an "industrial cluster" for extracting and processing gas and condensate for the Astrakhan deposit, which was not mentioned in the draft *Guidelines* published before the Congress.[56]

Although it is not possible to measure the extent of regional and local influence accurately, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that it has at least a modest impact on economic planning policy for the U.S.S.R. at the preliminary guideline stage.

[48] Speeches by Kunayev, Rashidov, Gapurov, in *XXIV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 6, pp. 64-65, 71-72, 101.

[49] Speech by Georgiyev, *XXIII s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2; cf. *CSP* 5, p. 114.

[50] *XXIV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2; cf. *CSP* 6, pp. 90, 149-60.

[51] *XXV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 2; cf. *CDSP* 28, No. 16-17; *XXVI s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; *CSP* 8, p. 63.

[52] See Rasulov's speech at the 23rd Congress and Konotop's speech at the 24th Congress; *XXIII s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 5, pp. 60-61; *XXIV s"ezd KPSS*, Vol. 1; cf. *CSP* 6, p. 98.

[53] *CDSP* 28, No. 16, pp. 20-22.

[54] *CSP* 8, p. 114.

[55] *CSP* 8, pp. 114-17.

[56] *Ibid.*, 114.

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VI. Conclusion

This essay examines only one small part of the planning process, but it illustrates the possibility of analyzing more intensively and systematically the politics of economic policy making in the U.S.S.R and other socialist countries. Data on the politics of Soviet planning are available in the media and in records of official proceedings throughout the year-long process, from the publication of the initial draft *Guidelines* to the final discussion and approval of the five-year plan at the Supreme Soviet.

Although limited in scope, the present study provides evidence on the basis of which earlier conclusions on political participation in the U.S.S.R. may be reassessed.

Regional participation in central politics

Scholars who see the Soviet Union as a "directed society" have tended to consider regional leaders as nonparticipants or, at best, as participants without impact on policy making at the all-Union level.[57] In economic planning, at least, such an assessment underestimates the participation of intermediate actors. Regional leaders are vigorous participants in both the "high politics" and the "low politics" of preliminary planning.[58] The rivalry of regions is "high politics." Adding one more nitrogen plant in Turkmenia is "low politics." Perhaps the Congresses are examples of the rare occasions where, according to Bialer, "the low and high dimensions of Soviet politics intersect."[59] In any case, regional participation exercises a modest but not insignificant influence on the revision of the *Guidelines* that the Party prepares for the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission.

How public is policy participation?

T. H. Rigby maintains that the presentation and discussion of alternative proposals in Soviet policy making "is confined to behind-the-scenes bureaucratic settings, while public participation is limited to dot-

[57] See Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964), 558-75, at 566-67 and 572-73; T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964), 539-57, at 539, 554-56. For a modification of Rigby's position, cf. his "A Conceptual Approach to Authority, Power and Policy in the Soviet Union," in Rigby and others, eds., *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR* (London: Macmillan, 1980), 9-28, and Rigby, "Politics in the Mono-Organizational Society," in Andrew C. Janos, ed., *Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe; Unity and Diversity in One-Party States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 31-80.

[58] Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 166-67, 186.

[59] *Ibid.*, 167.

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ting the i's and crossing the t's, or at best contributing marginally to the climate of opinion in which later choices may be made."[60]

This assessment may indeed be accurate for some vital areas of policy making in the U.S.S.R., but it significantly underestimates the degree to which alternative views on local and intermediate planning issues could be publicly discussed in the Brezhnev era.

The policy role of the Congress. CPSU Congresses are more than "rallies of the faithful" for announcing policies already settled.[61] They also provide a public consultation stage during the planning process, in which regional officials may have input before national economic priorities are set. One study reports that about 20 percent of the directives contained in the "draft" *Basic Guidelines* for the 8th Five-Year Plan were changed substantively by the 23rd Congress.[62] Careful analysis of other Congresses of the Brezhnev era would probably produce quite similar results; a respectable portion of these changes was introduced at the Congress by regional Party leaders.

The "interest broker model" and diffusion of power. Jerry Hough suggests that the top Party leaders have progressively become arbiters or brokers for various interests, "bargainers imbued with the values of the civic culture." In his view, "power relationships" in the U.S.S.R. have much in common with "pluralist political systems ... the regime has been moving towards a diffusion of real political power."[63] Although the present study is too specific to evaluate Hough's pluralist perspective fully, it is possible to comment provisionally on two of Hough's propositions.

In order to establish that central leaders have become *primarily* brokers of outside interests, it would be necessary to show that they have relinquished unilateral control over setting the most important policy goals for the Soviet economy. There is as yet little solid evidence that this has occurred.[64] The information available to us suggests that regional leaders become significant participants primarily in the "siting of productive forces" and the clamor for scarce appropriations. In this more limited arena, the "broker model" is relevant. Will Siberia or the western provinces receive priority in new capital investments? On such intermediate

[60] Rigby, "Hough on Political Participation in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* 28 (April 1976), 260.
[61] See fns. 2, 3, 4.
[62] Holubnychy (fn. 22), 13-14.
[63] Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 3-10.
[64] Bialer (fn. 58), 204.

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issues (still qualifying as "high politics"), as well as on a host of local siting requests, it would not be improper to speak of central Party officials as performing an "arbiter role" in the policy process. Only the four regional members of the Politburo and five candidate members have access, however, to the closed discussions concerning the most basic economic goals; during the Brezhnev era, none of these were in the top echelon of this highest policy body.

Regional leaders do not possess autonomous resources or independent instruments of power. They exercise influence by consent of the top leadership. As Gustafson has observed, the central leaders of the post-Stalin era have tacitly accepted the "playing out of delegated powers" for the sake of administrative rationality.[65]

Such devolution of authority leads quite naturally to the expansion of policy consultation with intermediate officials, and to a response to some of their initiatives. The data would seem to confirm that regional consultation on preliminary planning was fully re-institutionalized in the Brezhnev era. Policy requests have grown in frequency as well as volume in the agenda-setting and implementation stages of economic planning. Nevertheless, this expansion of participation in policy formation remains fragile. The Party leadership retains considerable ability to counteract perceived constraints on its power and to reverse the diffusion of influence.[66]

Regional versus functional interests. Sidney Tarrow has observed that the competition between functional and territorial interests presents a fundamental cleavage in all industrial states. Functional interests are concerned with orientations based on institutional, occupational, and class affiliation; territorial interests with orientations based on geographically determined loyalties or constituencies.[67]

It has been shown that conflict between regional and functional interests is characteristic of the planning process in the Soviet Union; the collision of the integrated planning needs of an *Oblast* or Republic with the central branch planning of state ministries is representative of that type of conflict. Because of the structure of the Soviet economy, central functional interests have traditionally dominated local or regional in-

[65] Gustafson (fn 27), 158-59; cf. Paul Cocks, "The Policy Process and Bureaucratic Politics," in Cocks and others, eds., *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 158.

[66] This point is made by D. Richard Little in his essay, "Bureaucracy and Participation in the Soviet Union," in Donald E. Schulz and Jan S. Adams, eds., *Political Participation in Communist Systems* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 97-98.

[67] Tarrow and others, *Territorial Politics in Industrial Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1978), chap. 1, 2-23.

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terests in the planning process. This situation may have been substantially reversed, at least temporarily, during the *sovnarkhoz* period of the late Khrushchev era.

In permitting public consultation with regional Party leaders to become a regular part of the preliminary planning process, the leadership of the Brezhnev era probably aimed at partly redressing the intrinsic imbalance between functional and local interests. The result has been greater flexibility for the Politburo in the complex task of choosing and setting economic priorities for the U.S.S.R.

INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE LOCAL DIMENSION

Scholars with an institutional pluralist perspective have identified various managerial and specialist elites as competitors in the Soviet policy process.[68] Party *apparatchiki* are sometimes seen uniformly as constituting one of these elites.[69] Scholars with a corporatist perspective have viewed Soviet policy formation as functionally segmented into institutional groups, but they regard the participation of the latter as more collaborative than conflictive.[70]

The present study demonstrates that the pattern of interest articulation in the U.S.S.R. is often more complex than it has been portrayed in the institutional pluralist or the corporatist perspectives. Both paradigms include what Tarrow calls "functional interests," but both usually omit the local dimension of interest articulation. On questions of economic planning and appropriations, middle-level Party *apparatchiki* as well as other officials are divided by regionalism and localism in their policy perspectives.

[68] As representative of this large body of scholarship, see the following: H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), esp. Skilling's two introductory essays; Phillip Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968); Joel Schwartz and William Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," *American Political Science Review* 62 (1968), 840-51; Paul Cocks (fn. 65); Sidney Ploss, ed., *The Soviet Policy Process* (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn & Co. 1971); Gordon B. Smith, ed., *Public Policy and Administration in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1980); Thane Gustafson (fn. 27); Peter H. Solomon, *Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy: Specialists in Policy Making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978); Milton Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1969); David Lane, *Politics and Society in the USSR*, 2d ed. (London: Robertson, 1978), chap. 8.

[69] See, for example, Lodge (fn. 68); H. Gordon Skilling, "Groups in Soviet Politics," in Skilling and Griffiths (fn. 68), 24; Lane (fn. 68), 234-43; Vernon V. Aspaturian, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 531-33.

[70] Valerie Bunce and John M. Echols, III, "Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era: 'Pluralism' or 'Corporatism'?" in Donald R. Kelley, ed., *Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era* (New York: Praeger, 1980), 1-21.

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MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE

By RICHARD W. WILSON*

Introduction

THE study of political change is one of the oldest subfields within the social sciences. It has interested commentators from Plato and Confucius in the ancient world to modern writers such as Marx and Max Weber. No doubt its salience increases during periods when societies experience massive structural and value change. Such conditions, of course, characterize our own era.

It is probably fair to say that the study of political change has had its greatest popularity in the post-World War II era during which many societies gained their independence and others were locked in the throes of revolutionary upheaval. A marked upsurge occurred in the decade of the 1960s, when radical protest movements arose in tandem with terrorism and urban rioting. Although there is no doubt about the importance of the subject itself (over a hundred wars and revolutions have taken place since 1945), scholars have experienced great difficulty in ordering the data of political change theoretically. Henry Bienen, who reviewed a large volume of literature more than two decades after World War II, still felt that work in this area was insufficient and that theory regarding the subject was weak and inadequate.[1] Harry Eckstein has

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[1] Bienen, *Violence and Social Change: A Review of Current Literature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). Additional useful works not otherwise cited are Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, eds., *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); David E. Apter and Louis Wolf Goodman, eds., *The Multinational Corporation and Social Change* (New York: Praeger, 1976); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971); Everett Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962); Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Joel S. Migdal., *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action*, rev. ed. (New York: Schocken, 1971); Jeffrey M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and*

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pointed out that hypotheses regarding revolution (a particular form of change) may emphasize a wide range of elements: psychological causes such as alienation, economic factors such as increasing poverty, social explanations that stress the tensions resulting from the rise of new social classes, political hypotheses concerning bad and inadequate government, as well as more general explanations such as the rate of social transformation; while all of these are undoubtedly valid, they are often difficult to reconcile with each other.[2] In a specific comment on this statement by Eckstein, Lawrence Stone suggests that theories regarding revolution are rife with subjectivity, ambiguity, and self-contradiction.[3] Over a decade later, Eisenstadt still bemoans a failure on the part of most approaches to distinguish between conditions that lead to violence and those that generate peaceful, far-reaching change. In his opinion, most of the research focuses on relatively easily identifiable factors in political life and neglects the more difficult problem of the relationship between change in the political sphere and that which occurs in the social order as a whole.[4]

These and other criticisms notwithstanding, scholarship has made significant advances in the post-World War II era. The social-psychological background of political change, for instance, has been more carefully delineated than it was in the days of theorists such as Marx—due no doubt, to the increasing sophistication of psychological theory in general, and to an awareness that explanations of political change in terms of class warfare or economic conditions are relatively meaningless without a more complete understanding of the motivations of those involved. Recent critical literature suggests that we have now progressed to a third level or "generation" of analysis:[5] the early first-stage descriptive work of scholars such as Sorokin and Brinton was followed by the structural-functional and frustration-aggression theories of thinkers such as Davies, Gurr, Johnson, and Smelser; in turn, analysts such as Eisen-

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Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (New York: Free Press, 1975); Barbara Salert, *Revolutions and Revolutionaries: Four Theories* (New York: Elsevier, 1976); James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976); Kay Ellen Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978); and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York and London: Academic Press, 1974).

[2] Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal Wars," *History and Theory* 4 (No. 2, 1965).

[3] Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics* 18 (January 1966), 164.

[4] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations* (New York: Free Press, 1978), 7.

[5] Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980), 425-29, 448-49.

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stadt and Skocpol have developed theories that stress interest-group conflicts which exceed the conflict-mediation capabilities of political institutions.[6] In third-generation theories, the structural preconditions for change are given sharper delineation; questions of timing are simplified by emphasis, not on brief periods of instability, but on the continued pressures for change that arise from international contradictions conjoined with internal structural strengths and weaknesses; attention shifts from elite intransigence to the nature of elite responses when a need for increased extraction of resources conflicts with the actual capabilities of political and more general social structures.

Yet problems remain. Part of the difficulty in dealing with questions of political change is the propensity of many theorists to focus their attention on the most dramatic case, that of revolution. But as we know, though most societies (in our era) are undergoing change, few have revolutions. Moreover, even when revolutions take place, there is a difference between the events of the majority of these and the cataclysmic explosions of the French, Russian, and Chinese examples. Revolutions are the extreme or ultimate expression of political change; they involve the rapid and violent disruption of existing institutions concomitant with the mobilization of new groups into politics and the creation of new political structures.[7] Yet, surely, valuable though a focus on revolution is, dramatic resort to violence may obscure motivations that are common both to revolutionary situations and to more mundane, but far more common, occurrences of change. Violence, in fact, may be the response of only a certain type of actor; the elevation of this person to a central role in the drama of change may be possible only under special circumstances. On the other hand, opposition to government, struggle over the control of political institutions, and the expression of ideological heterodoxy are characteristic of many types of political movements.[8] The tendency of scholars to concentrate on the violent end of the continuum from peaceful to bloody change bespeaks the fact that people are in-

[6] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook* (New York: Dutton, 1941); Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1952); James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior* (New York and London: Wiley, 1963); Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1962); Eisenstadt (fn. 4); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[7] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 266-67; also, Harry Eckstein, "Introduction. Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War," in Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York: Free Press, 1964), 12.

[8] Eisenstadt (fn. 4), 202, 218-19.

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trigued by this aspect of human behavior. Yet, if we are to see political change in its truest perspective, we must isolate the elements that hold for all points on the continuum. We must understand the behavior of elites no less than that of those who are in opposition. We must know which general processes have a bearing on the stability of authority structures and which processes lead to instability; by understanding the relationship between them, we can see political disorganization not as distinct from political order, but as the reverse image of the conditions that facilitate tranquility.[9] This type of approach to the problem helps to explain the perennial quality of change. For, although many political systems have shown remarkable stability for long periods of time, all have also changed to one degree or another.

In the sections that follow, I will suggest that moral development theory generates hypotheses that explain both peaceful and violent change, and both political order and political disorganization. In setting forth this argument, an appropriate place to begin is with moral development theory itself. I will then discuss change as an interrelationship between the micro-level motivational aspects of moral development and macro-level structural factors.

Moral Development Theory

The central question of moral development theory is how individuals develop internalized controls over behavior. Contemporary schools of psychology view morality predominantly in terms of personality, social, or cognitive factors. Thus, Freud and his followers have placed special emphasis on the superego as a regulator of behavior and on the internal emotional controls that direct behavior toward certain ends. Social learning theorists, on the other hand, place primary emphasis on the social context, especially on the way in which behavior is molded during socialization. According to these theorists, of whom B. F. Skinner is a prominent example, a child acquires notions of right or wrong in terms of particular training influences.[10] A third school, which is predominant in the field of moral development, emphasizes the importance, during growth, of changes in cognitive structure that permit the mind increasingly to comprehend and integrate abstract concepts. In this view, the highest form of morality is said to consist of judgments that are based on internalized principles of justice.[11]

[9] Eckstein, (fn. 2), 153.

[10] B. F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Knopf, 1971), 109, 112-13.

[11] Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development," in Theodore Mischel, ed., *Cognitive Development and Epistemology* (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 213.

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Within the field of moral development, the formulations of Lawrence Kohlberg have received such widespread attention that much of the debate about the subject tends to be oriented toward the support or refutation of his ideas. Kohlberg's theories derive from earlier work by Jean Piaget, who postulated that the child's moral character is initially self-centered; external influences are relatively undifferentiated and are perceived as given. Piaget referred to this type of thinking as egocentrism, and he termed the moral orientation that is associated with it heteronomy; at this level, rules are deemed to be good *per se* because they emanate from an unquestioned adult authority. But, as children grow, they are increasingly able to see themselves in relation to others. Gradually, egocentrism gives way to forms of cooperation and mutual respect that are internally motivated. Piaget called the later stage autonomy.[12] Kohlberg elaborated this moral development process into a stage model, in which the individual progresses from early self-centered amorality through a group-centered, rule-maintaining allegiant orientation, to a final stage of mature morality, in which judgment is governed by internalized principles. An essential feature of the theory is that the stages form an invariant sequence in accordance with the notion that cognitive restructuring underlies moral development. Kohlberg later tested this model comparatively. The results indicate universal validity, although cultures differ in their most frequent or modal stage.[13]

Tests of the stage concept have shown that morally mature people generally show greater consistency and greater ability to disregard situational factors than do amoral individuals; inhibitions with regard to cheating are greater for the morally mature, less for those who are highly allegiant, and far less for the amoral, whose behavior is clearly contingent upon punishment, rewards, group status, and obligations.[14] Some scholars have hypothesized that one of the factors affecting variability in moral development is group membership. Moral action, they think, can be influenced by a group perception of reality, by shared notions of loyalty and obligation, by the definitions of choices that are available, and by the type of social control that is exercised over behavior. Under some circumstances, as when a group is led by amoral or allegiant individuals (or when the group is composed predominantly of such

[12] Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

[13] Lawrence Kohlberg, "Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order" in Richard C. Sprinthall and Norman A. Sprinthall, eds., *Educational Psychology* (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1969); Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization" in David A. Goslin, ed., *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).

[14] Lawrence Kohlberg and Dan Candee, "Relationships Between Moral Judgment and Moral Action," mimeo (Cambridge: Harvard University, December 15, 1979), 5-14, 18, 30, 46-47.

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types), behavior that violates the rights of outsiders may appear justified if the rewards for group members are perceived as very great.[15]

Despite Kohlberg's assertions about invariant stage development, alternate tests have shown that some individuals apparently regress.[16] In one of the now best-known reformulations of Kohlberg's work, his student, James R. Rest, has suggested that moral growth is not invariant; rather, it is the development of predominant forms of moral reasoning with a possibility of regression to earlier forms, depending on situational or other criteria.[17] In my opinion; Rest's ideas are a significant advance over Kohlberg's theory; they are also closer to current thinking about trait consistency, for they encompass an explanation both of the process of moral growth and of why an individual may express different moral judgments in different situations.[18]

Kohlberg's approach has also been criticized as having a bias toward liberal democracy.[19] In his emphasis on stages that progress from self- through group-centered values to internalized principles, he appears to be prejudiced against systems that favor group sharing and cooperation rather than individual freedom from external restraint. In fact, of course, the stages refer to a progression from a relatively uncritical acceptance of group norms to the notion of personal reflection about—and acceptance of—a set of guiding principles that may or may not include group-related values. A large part of Kohlberg's difficulty in making this clear[20] is caused by his emphasis on cognitive factors and his deemphasis of personality variables (such as affect) that are integral to cooperation and sharing.

As a consequence, in my own formulations I have attempted to in-

[15] *Ibid.*, 47-48, 58-59.

[16] Carol Gilligan and John M. Murphy, "From Adolescence to Adulthood: The Moral Dilemmas of Reconciliation to Reality," *Moral Education Forum* 4 (Winter 1979), 3-13. See also Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969), 762; and James Fishkin, "Relativism, Liberalism, and Moral Development," in Richard W. Wilson and Gordon J. Schochet, eds., *Moral Development and Politics* (New York: Praeger 1980), 85-106.

[17] Rest, "New Approaches in the Assessment of Moral Judgment" in Thomas Lickona, ed., *Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976), 198-218.

[18] Lawrence A. Pervin, *Current Controversies and Issues in Personality* (New York: Wiley, 1978), 14.

[19] Herbert G. Reid and Ernest J. Yanarella, "The Tyranny of the Categorical: On Kohlberg and the Politics of Moral Development" in Wilson and Schochet (fn. 16), 107-32.

[20] Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Future of Liberalism as the Dominant Ideology of the Western World" in Kohlberg, ed., *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice*, Vol. 1 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 231-42. (First published in Proceedings of the Annenberg Conference on the Future of the West (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, Center for the Study of the American Experience, 1977).

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tegrate the cognitive aspects of moral development as advanced by Kohlberg more fully with social learning and personality variables.[21] In this scheme, each of these aspects is considered to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral development. A morally mature person is one who has acquired three interrelated competencies. The first is reciprocity, or the ability to understand the related goals of others; reciprocity is related to cognitive development. The second is empathy, or the ability to sympathize with and relate to the feelings of others; this component is associated with affective maturation, a personality variable. The third is individual responsibility, or the ability to act without reliance on external cues, especially those that emanate from authority figures; this component is related to training in being autonomous or self-governing, a type of learning that is governed by social values.[22] Reciprocity, empathy, and individual responsibility develop in varying degrees in a complex interaction between external influences and internal capabilities. Levels of moral development thus differ among individuals, even within the same family. Groups as a whole show modal patterns and these, of course, also vary; the differences largely reflect the relative importance of reciprocity, empathy, and individual responsibility within particular social environments. A truly morally mature society would support all three competencies and would uphold both individual autonomy and distributive justice.

Rights, Obligations, and Dominance

Although insurrections occurred, often successfully, in the ancient and medieval worlds,[23] political change appears to hold a particular fascination for modern people. In previous centuries, the acceptance of inequality—linked with a desire for stability—was deeply rooted; even though inequality was intensely resented, there was a greater degree of resignation to it. Low levels of economic development, combined with little or no conception of how to increase productivity, left the multitude of impoverished individuals with little hope of liberation from servitude and want. People who exist in a static socioeconomic condition which they more or less accept are unlikely to rebel frequently. Nor is the urge to rebellion stimulated when people do not perceive ruling groups as impeding the possibility of progress.[24] In such cases, political change,

[21] Richard W. Wilson, "Political Socialization and Moral Development," *World Politics* 33 (January 1981), 153-77.
[22] Merelman (fn. 16), 756, 759-61, 764-65.
[23] Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (New York: Harper 1961), 308.
[24] Davies (fn. 6), 350.

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when it occurs, is gradual and peaceful. In the absence of firm data, these assertions are, of course, matters of speculation. But it is clear that in the modern world, people have come to see life as a situation where alternatives, choices, and preferences are possible; where government is perceived as a key to change; and where acceptance of being a victim has been replaced by the belief that one can master the economic and social factors that are thought to cause impoverishment and degradation.[25] All modern thinkers have forcefully challenged the notion that poverty and inequality are inherent. Challenge itself has become enshrined as a central value in constitutions and in the ideologies of the political movements of our era.

Preeminent among the goals that modern men seek are two rights that are analytically distinct. The first of these is "freedom to" (positive rights)—the desire for access to a fair share of the goods of society. Included in the notion of a fair share is the right to participate in public affairs, to be admitted into the realm of decision making with regard to social goals. When people champion "freedom to," they call for a redistribution of resources and for a redefinition of the evaluation of social classes.[26] "Freedom to" is usually asserted against dominant groups that uphold an unequal distribution of power and resources. The second right is "freedom from" (negative rights)—the desire to be free from restraints and exactions imposed by those in positions of dominance.[27] The assertion of "freedom from" is frequently directed against the ideological authority wielded by a dominant group—that is, against the power of that group to establish norms for the rest of society and to enforce their observance. The search for positive and negative rights changes social patterns in a manner that permits greater access to fair shares, and freedom from repression, in the lives of individuals. Although by no means universally accepted, the goal of many in modern society is to create conditions where both rights can thrive.

Rights, however, never stand alone. Inseparably linked to them are obligations that are related to the features of reciprocity, empathy, and individual responsibility that I noted earlier. In addition to the right of "freedom to," there is an obligation to foster its development and to protect its existence when it has been extended to others. A person who promotes "freedom to"—access to common goods,—is one who is aware of the goals of other people and who empathizes with their feelings.

[25] William Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Development" in Eckstein (fn. 7), 151-55.

[26] Charles R. Beitz, "Economic Rights and Distributive Justice in Developing Societies," *World Politics* 33 (April 1981), 321.

[27] Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 11, 15, 16.

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The right of "freedom from" is associated with an obligation not to interfere in the affairs of people in a manner that violates personal autonomy. It is an obligation that calls for restraint, moderation, and prudence in social relationships. A person who champions "freedom from" is one who assumes individual responsibility for his actions and who permits others to assume responsibility for theirs. The positive right of "freedom to" is balanced, therefore, by what can be called "obligation to," while the negative right of "freedom from" is linked to a duty that can be termed "obligation not to." The right to a fair share of the rewards of society goes with an obligation to ensure that these rewards are made available to others, while the right to be free from repression goes with the obligation not to place unwarranted restrictions on what other people wish to do.

Rights are enjoyed or sought; obligations are something that one takes on oneself. In terms of moral maturity, obligations involve individual responsibility for one's actions, governed by awareness of the goals of others and empathy for their feelings. Obligations thus entail both a responsibility to ensure that others have access to fair shares and a responsibility not to do those things that will unduly repress others. Although the acceptance of these responsibilities is preeminently a characteristic of personal moral maturity, obligations can clearly be articulated as laws or rules—or, less formally, as shared folk orientations. In any society, some individuals will develop a strong sense of obligation, but the likelihood of its becoming a general pattern will be enhanced when feelings of obligation are widely shared and are buttressed by the sanctions of law.

Obligations are responsibilities taken on in families, schools, job settings, local politics, and, in fact, in every social context. The violation of responsibility by a parent, for instance, may affect other family members just as much, or more, as the lack of responsibility on the part of a local political boss or work manager. There, is, in a sense, a seamless web of obligation among all members of a society, at all levels, and in all contexts. In another sense, however, those who occupy dominant positions have an additional obligation for responsibility. As controllers of resources, coercive power, and ideological authority that can affect the lives of everyone, dominant individuals especially must demonstrate responsibility if political patterns are to be moral in nature. Because of the control that dominant individuals exercise over the most important organizations in society, and because they are often looked upon as exemplars of acceptable behavior, a failure of responsibility within the dominant strata can have severe repercussions throughout society.

There is a complementary relationship between those who are dom-

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inant and those who are subordinate. Coercion, although sometimes an aspect of dominance, is usually little in evidence.[28] Differences in wealth and access to resources are justified in terms of the services that the dominant are thought to provide. Moreover, the institutions of rulership moderate the naked authority aspects of relationships. Those who are dominant are in a position to manipulate symbolic supports that bolster their own status and retard suspicions of aggrandizement. Feelings of group solidarity welded by shared goals and values operate to internalize constraint and to legitimize the existing social order. Yet, though the desire for stability and just rulership usually overrides feelings of exploitation on the part of subordinates, tension between dominant and nondominant groups virtually always occurs; it is probably related to the desire for parity and for an end to feelings of slight that have been noted in face-to-face groups among those of lower status.[29]

Those who lead society are never a homogeneous order. Especially in the modern world, dominant status is enjoyed by groups that have skills in areas such as military operations, resource management, intellectual endeavor, bureaucratic administration, and so forth. Within large-scale social units, there is a balance of interests and abilities among the dominant as well as among the subordinate. Nevertheless, the major goals of society are always related to a cluster of values (which embody a particular distribution of rights and obligations) that also legitimize associated patterns of dominance. In some cases, for instance, dominant status is based upon knowledge of and adherence to ideological principles that uphold a goal of communal well-being. This system of dominance may be referred to by the Platonic term of *guardian*. In another case, emphasis is on enhancing personal choice (and increasing total resource productivity) where specific rewards are shared unequally. This type of dominance system, which glorifies individual initiative, is *entrepreneurial*. There is also a form of dominance that obtains benefits for its adherents by the unbridled exploitation of conquered foreign peoples (as in some colonial regimes), or of certain categories of home groups (such as the Jews during the Nazi rule). This form of dominance is *predatory*. A final type of dominance may be termed *moral*. In this case, rulership is committed to the maximum enhancement of individual well-being and autonomy.

[28] Richard Sennett, *Authority* (New York: Knopf, 1980), 25.

[29] Davies (fn. 6), 45-49; Robert Amdur, "Rawls' Theory of Justice: Domestic and International Perspectives," *World Politics* 29 (April 1977), 441; Robert E. Lane, "Motives for Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: The Effects of Market and State," *Political Psychology* 1 (Autumn 1979), 7; Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (New York: Knopf, 1972), 121, 191; Richard Peters, "The Place of Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education," *Journal of Moral Education* 7 (May 1978), 155.

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Of course, there are other forms of dominance involving relations between the sexes, the generations, ethnic and religious groups, and a number of other cross-cutting cleavages. Furthermore, societies often combine the characteristics of several dominance forms in varying degrees, or manifest different forms of dominance toward different groups. I believe, however, that the "ideal" dominance systems just enumerated—guardian, entrepreneurial, predatory, and moral—are the most significant ones in the modern world, as well as the most important ones for analysis of political change.

Figure 1 sets forth schematically the ways in which obligations are related to moral, guardian, entrepreneurial, and predatory dominance systems. When those in dominant positions recognize and carry out obligations to assist others to obtain their fair share, and also refrain from repressive acts, the dominance pattern is located in the upper right quadrant where there are positive values for both of these obligations. In this quadrant, both negative and positive rights are balanced with their appropriate obligations.

In the lower right quadrant, there is an obligation to assist, but not an obligation not to interfere. Positive rights are furthered by the responsibility to help people attain a fair share of social resources, but

FIGURE 1
FORMS OF OBLIGATION AND RELATED DOMINANCE PATTERNS



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negative rights are violated since there is no obligation not to restrict what people wish to do. In this typical guardian pattern, leadership places heavy emphasis on the criteria for obtaining a fair share within the community, but is unrestricted in its ability to direct the lives of citizens and to establish the criteria that define deviance.

In the upper left quadrant, the characteristic dominance pattern is entrepreneurial. Negative rights exist and are balanced with the obligation not to interfere in the lives of citizens. Positive rights, however, are accorded far less value as less attention is given to the obligation to assist others to obtain a fair share. In contrast to the guardian system, the emphasis is on the self or small group rather than on the whole community.

The "ideal" pattern of the last case, that of predatory dominance, is shown in the lower left quadrant. Toward enemies or conquered peoples, there is scant obligation to accord either positive or negative rights. After dominance has been achieved, obligations may be assumed as other interests (entrepreneurial or guardian, for instance) come into play. But this need not happen. Genocide may occur internally and foreign foes may be delivered to the same fate to which Carthage was by Rome.

By determining the value cluster that is most significant for legitimizing a particular dominance system, any society can be placed relative to others on the grid of Figure 1. For our purposes, it is not necessary to do this; nor, in fact, is sufficient empirical evidence available to make these calculations with exactness. Nevertheless it is not difficult, I believe, to see that Hong Kong or the United States would be located in the upper left quadrant, the Scandinavian countries in the upper right, China and Cuba in the lower right, and Idi Amin's Uganda and Pol Pot's Cambodia in the lower left.

Perversions

Within every dominance system, there is interaction among people with different levels of moral development. As a consequence, there are always a few people in a society who will, if they can, impose disadvantages on others. Partly, the reason lies in inadequate moral development, conjoined with competition in environments of resource scarcity. In the case of dominant groups, such behavior may involve the progressive avoidance of constraints from those lower in the social order; some dominant individuals may utilize their status to seek increased rewards of wealth or power. Responsibility and obligation may be overridden by self-interest, expediency, or even force of circumstances to such a degree that ordinary people begin to feel that the dominance

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system is characterized by a critical failure of obligation, and that dominance values which served the needs of subordinate people during an earlier period now illegitimately protect exploitative control by dominant groups and individuals.

Centuries ago, Aristotle observed that systems of rulership "which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms. . . . "[30] What is the essence of perversion? It lies, I believe, in the increased capacity for exploitative behavior by dominant groups. Perversions always involve a discrepancy between the actual distribution of obligations and rights that characterizes a dominance pattern and the values that some or many people hold concerning what that distribution *should* be. In the simplest case, perversion constitutes a loss, for subordinate individuals, of both positive and negative rights; for dominant individuals, there is a decrease of the corresponding obligations to assist others to obtain a fair share and to refrain from undue interference in the lives of others. Perversion of this type is likely to be experienced by broad elements of the population, including many members of the elite. A second type of perversion is an increasing imbalance in the distribution of rights and obligations that characterizes a particular form of dominance. Negative rights, for instance, and their corresponding obligations, may be progressively emphasized at the expense of positive rights; or the reverse may occur. This situation, which is most easily noted in the entrepreneurial and guardian systems, involves a strengthening of one type of right and obligation in a manner that increasingly favors those elites who are best placed, and most able to use, this particular distribution for their own advantage.

Perversions are the result of two different (but sometimes combined) causes. They may be the consequence of deliberate actions on the part of a dominant group; the rule of the Somoza family in Nicaragua until 1979, and of the communist party in Afghanistan since 1978, are examples. In the modern era, however, perversion is frequently subjective in nature. It is the consequence of a shift in values; the dominance pattern is unchanged, but is perceived as perverted because of the discrepancy that has come to exist between the values that support the prevailing pattern and the new values that people hold.

In most cases, a shift in values leading to a perception of perversion is the consequence of altered international and/or internal conditions

[30] Aristotle, *Politica*, Book III, chap. 6, in Richard McKeon, ed., *Introduction to Aristotle* (New York: Random House, Modern Library, 1947), 590.

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that have invalidated the legitimacy of a prevailing distribution of rights and obligations. For instance, changes in women's work and childbearing patterns have led to shifts in values (sometimes called heightened moral consciousness) regarding the role of women in society; the result is that traditional male dominance patterns are perceived as wrong. In many communist societies, the increasing inefficiency of centralized decision making as economic growth proceeds has led to persistent debate over the granting of autonomous decision-making powers to lower-level units. The granting of such powers, however, would constitute a significant increase in the importance of negative rights; therefore, it is strongly resisted. The rigidity and overbureaucratization in such societies is mirrored by covert and deviant (from the official point of view) activity throughout many sectors, indicating a pronounced discrepancy in values.

Grievances, Justice, and Social Change

Differential access to privileges is translated hierarchically into different evaluations of social positions. These evaluations become a component of a person's self-identity such that social rewards are associated with self-respect and esteem. This condition also holds true for relations among strata. The norms associated with social hierarchy promote stability and continuity in society through definitions of acceptable rewards for differenct roles; at the same time, they also determine the power of unequal groups and, in a rough sense, how these groups feel about themselves.[31] The same social rules that promote stability are perceived as unjust, however, when their exercise prevents individuals and groups from acquiring the rewards and self-esteem to which they feel entitled.

Crane Brinton has noted, "Men may revolt partly or even mainly because they are hindered ... but to the world—and, save for a very few hypocrites, also to themselves—they must appear *wronged*. Social change cannot do without the word, 'justice.' "[32] In fact, frustration over justice and a sense that oneself and others have been slighted,[33] lie at the root of theories of relative deprivation. But the notion that individuals have choices, and can and should seek alternatives, is derived from the allied concept of obtainable remedy. This "passion of compassion" is what Hannah Arendt has expounded as the most powerful and devastating emotion impelling proponents of social change.[34] Ultimately, the search

[31] Eisenstadt (fn. 4), 41-42.

[32] Brinton (fn. 6), reproduced in part in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1963), 558-59.

[33] Rod Aya, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence," *Theory and Society* 8 (June-December 1979), 41.

[34] Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1963), 66.

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for remedy is focused on political authority as the force within the community which establishes and maintains limits on the rewards that individuals and classes can obtain. As a consequence, there is a propensity in the modern world to perceive governments in moral terms—to say, as Apter does, that "no government is better than its moral standard."[35]

Historically, the passion for justice has not been propounded in an abstract, formless manner. Rather, the demand for positive or negative rights is usually a response to an increasing awareness of perversion of the obligations owed by dominant groups. These perversions occur partly as the conscious choice of some dominant individuals, and partly because of shifts in underlying social and economic conditions that enhance the status of some groups and require new justifications for dominance. Social change, as Feldman has pointed out, is not synchronous in all areas of society, but manifests itself with varying intensity in different spheres—the market, political structures, and so forth.[36] Tension escalates, sometimes only within particular social structures, and at other times throughout a number of structures. Whether localized or not, there is a predisposition (never invariable, in view of the groups that may be involved) for demands for a particular type of right. Although positive rights as a social goal have often preceded the demand for negative rights, the two have sometimes been sought jointly within large-scale movements by different groups in quest of change (e.g., workers and dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe).

In predatory societies, those who pursue change call for positive or negative rights, or some combination of both. In societies where guardian control is a hallmark of dominance, and where there is interference in individual lives, the most important demands are for negative rights. In societies where entrepreneurial criteria determine dominance, and where shares are distributed unequally, there is likely to be a prevalence of demands for positive rights. I hypothesize that in the search for a moral political order there is a reciprocating relationship between patterns of dominance and the search for rights. Thus, in dominance systems where positive rights are degraded and negative rights are strong, there exists, along with intellectual nonconformity, an unequal distribution of political, economic, or social rewards. Ultimately this pattern may be perceived as a perversion of "freedom to"—of a right to access to fair shares—and may fuel expressions of outrage and movements for the establishment of a new system with rules for greater equity. The pu-

[35] Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 14.

[36] Arnold S. Feldman, "Violence and Volatility: The Likelihood of Revolution" in Eckstein (fn. 7), 125.

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ritanical enforcement of a new orthodoxy, however, involves a degradation of negative rights and will lead yet other, often previously unformed, groups to demand an extension of "freedom from"—of emancipation from dominance patterns that permit unwarranted interference in individual lives. Over time, the patterns and participants change; Roundheads oppose Cavaliers, bourgeois lifestyles supplant puritanism, communists oppose capitalist entrepreneurs, and dissident writers struggle against the dictates of central committees. Which rights are asserted depends upon the social makeup of a society at a given time, its level of economic development, the groups that are involved, and the degree to which moral maturity infuses dominance values.

Reformers, Coups, and Conspiracy

The pressure for political change intensifies when there is open debate concerning the ground rules of social interaction;[37] the debate begins with demands for positive or negative rights. Those who espouse a shift in the distribution of rights and obligations are dissatisfied with the arrangements of the current order. Their frustration—their sense that obligations are being violated—is expressed by demands on those in dominant positions for rights associated with "freedom to" (fair shares) and/or "freedom from" (the elimination of interference in personal choice). Their motives, of course, are varied. Many advocates of change have a genuine commitment to rights and are morally mature. But that is not always the case. Some may seek personal gain or status in a new type of dominance structure, or the enhancement of rights for their followers, accompanied by the ruthless subjugation of others. Whatever their motives (and these have an important bearing on the nature of political change), initially such people are often considered to be deviants.

People who press claims for rights frequently do so at considerable personal peril. Speaking out when it would be safer not to do so involves a calculation, an assessment of net benefits and costs mediated by psychological variables. The original advocates of change are not a large group relative to the population as a whole. Before starting any action, they undoubtedly first weigh the likelihood of change occurring, the benefits they personally can expect, their feelings about the enterprise, the probability of group or organizational support, the sanctions that might be experienced by doing nothing, and the costs that might be incurred by doing something.[38] In many cases the absence of feelings of

[37] Eisenstadt (fn. 4), 43.
[38] Salert (fn. 1), 30-37 (from the work of Mancur Olson, Jr., fn. 1).

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anger or frustration, or a belief that the issues are irrelevant (or, if relevant, that they can legitimately be solved within the system), may constrain action. When such feelings and beliefs do not act as restraints, an activist will emerge.

As political tension accelerates, it is characterized by sharp conflicts of interest within the elite and by the desertion of intellectuals from support of the values that legitimize dominance. These conditions, of course, may occur with varying degrees of intensity; only when they manifest themselves in the most extreme form, and when they are aggravated by the elite's loss of control over the army and police, do they result in actual revolutionary activity.[39] What is clear is that political change takes place in an environment of intense discussion, in which an idealized society is contrasted with the perversions of the existing social system.

Expressions of outrage are not usually universal throughout society; rather, they are most prevalent within the elite itself or within the strata just below the apex of dominance. It is no accident that the most famous protestors in history—men like Martin Luther, Lenin, Robespierre, Thomas Jefferson, and Mao Zedong——did not emerge from the depths of society but came, in fact, from the old elite or from allied if less dominant strata. In France in the 1780s, for instance, the loudest protests came from the prosperous middle class.[40] The social groups that first demand rights are thus, in one sense, cousins of those who resist granting them. Their very proximity to the ruling class sharply focuses the assertion that current practices violate moral ideals, and reinforces the probability that some elite individuals in the military, business, and government will identify with those who are discontented.

The crucial social disjunction takes place within and between dominant groups and classes that are closely associated with them. It would be a mistake, as has been the tendency in class analysis, to view these groups as blocs. Rather, elements of these groups oppose each other; members of the government, for instance, may be opposed by other dominant (or near-dominant) groups, belying any notion of strict homogeneity within the upper levels of the dominance system.[41]

When cleavages first occur, the lowest levels of society may barely be involved. As the influence of dominant groups is lowered and the implications of change become increasingly evident to everyone, subordi-

[39] Barrington Moore, Jr., "Revolution in America?" in Christopher Katope and Paul Zolbrod, eds., *The Rhetoric of Revolution* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), 544.

[40] Brinton, in Eckstein and Apter (fn. 32), 557.

[41] Skocpol (fn. 6), 27.

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nate groups may also press demands; these are not necessarily of the same type as those that were raised initially.[42] The social change that results may be largely accommodative in nature (i.e., within the framework of the existing dominance system), or it may involve a genuine transformation of values and social structures.[43] The latter condition is more likely to occur when a great number of people come to believe that the dominance system is irremediably unjust.

Activists and dominant individuals often have different perceptions of the implications of shifts in underlying economic or social conditions. Allegations to the contrary, not every conservative defense of an existing system is deliberately evil. The moral question arises when new needs and problems reveal the inadequacy of traditional practices and bring into question the legitimacy of prevailing patterns of dominance. Still, many individuals in dominant positions may not realize that their defense of existing norms and structures is questionable on the basis of the fullest possible rights for others. Indeed, they may perceive their defense as necessary in order to protect all in society. Some few may be aware of other motives—of a desire to maintain an advantageous access to scarce resources. Many, however, truly perceive the norms and values that legitimize a particular form of dominance as beneficial for society as a whole. The defense of these values and the social and political structures related to them is seen as appropriate and good, and as justifying whatever actions are required. While the overall orientation of a dominant group may debase rights or heavily emphasize one type of right over the other (and, hence, favor the perpetuation of a particular type of dominance system), elite reformist responses may enhance positive or negative rights or both; these responses may, in fact, be congruent in some instances with activist demands. As a consequence, it should not be assumed *a priori* that every elite response and conservative claim is without moral validity.

Accommodative forms of social change appear to be correlated with an alliance between activists and sympathetic members of the dominant group who maintain a capability for carrying out compromise policies. This alliance is never easy—even when institutional forms and practices promote it. Nor is the outcome always nonviolent. Given the correlation of forces within a dominance system, accommodative change is best assured when many of those who are involved are morally mature; when reformist forces retain a capability for action; when broad segments of

[42] Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

[43] I am indebted to Thomas A. Metzger for introducing me to these concepts.

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the population consider dominance values to be relatively legitimate; when the degree of perversion is limited in extent; and when reformist and activist responses are relatively congruent. The absence of any of these conditions does not foreclose accommodative change, but it increases the likelihood of violence and undermines the probability of a reduction in political tension. Figure 2 is an example of the way in which accommodative change proceeds. For purposes of simplicity, I have illustrated this process only within the guardian dominance sector; the example is based loosely on the pattern of events in China following the fall of the Gang of Four.

FIGURE 2
OUTCOME OF INTERACTION BETWEEN ACTIVISTS AND REFORMERS TO A PERCEPTION OF PERVERSION WITHIN A GUARDIAN DOMINANCE SYSTEM*



*Measurements along the axes are indeterminate. Vector values are thus also indeterminate and are meant to be descriptive only.

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The actual change that takes place is always some form of continuous vector resolution of the forces involved. If the perversion is seen as passive, the result of unintended social changes, malaise regarding the viability of the entire system of dominance may develop, accompanied by an anxious hope for new leadership. If the perversion is seen as active—i.e., as a conscious avoidance of obligations—tension and hostility may arise. If the alliance between activists and sympathetic members of the dominant group is a powerful one, the resolution is likely to be peaceful, involving a reduction in forms of exploitation through the extension of political and/or economic privileges (such as, for instance, events in Spain since the death of Franco in 1975). Where conservative members of the dominant group overshadow the reformers, changes may largely be within the framework of prevailing dominance values, accompanied by the possibility of riots, strikes, or demonstrations by interests that are still disaffected (for instance, the pattern in South Korea). Where there is a split within the reformist group—often based on different evaluations of the claims of activists—there may be conspiracies, coups d'état, sudden but legal changes of government, or palace revolutions, depending upon the reformist groups' assessments of the likelihood of displacing or eliminating their rivals within the dominant class (for instance, Poland in 1981).

Violent Change or Reaction

I assume that a desire for rights is widely shared in the modern world, by members of ruling groups almost as often as by the populace as a whole. What, then, makes change such an agonizing experience for so many people? Why, in the search to bring society closer to the ideal, should so much hatred and cruelty frequently be engendered—often by those who proclaim their own selflessness most loudly? What subjective attitudes stand between the ideals that people hold and objective reality and action?

As Merelman has pointed out, the stiffening of resistance to change is most apparent when those who head the current dominant strata assert the overriding validity of prevailing group norms.[44] Many dominant individuals respond collectively to a perception of threat[45] by intensifying their adherence to the existing rules of the social order. They perceive pressure for a shift in the balance of rights and obligations as a form of deviance, abetted by some of their own peers, that erodes the

[44] Merelman (fn. 16), 750-67.

[45] Harvey Waterman, "Insecure 'Ins' and Opportune 'Outs': Sources of Collective Political Activity," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 8 (Spring 1980), 111.

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values which bolster their dominance, and that leaves them vulnerable to victimization. Since dominance values are part of the group-solidarity values of social systems, some elites may perceive attacks against the dominance system as impugning their moral worth. The strong response thus invoked makes it less likely that a more tolerant view of opposition could permit an early accommodative resolution of social tension. Against the assertions of activists and reformers, these elites set forth a countervailing interpretation of justice that stresses respect for authority, tradition, and law. There is frequently a concomitant effort on their part to take over social control organizations and to establish procedures that will bolster the dominance system, even in cases where that system has become grossly perverted.

When important elements within the dominant group do not display openness toward the possibility of change, there is a strong probability that the judgments and behavior of many who seek change will shift to lower moral levels. The proponents of change, like their dominant group opponents, may begin to include individuals who are strongly rule-maintaining and allegiant—but in this case toward a different set of values. These new norms and values then become all-important; because those who espouse them have a greater egocentric outlook, their ability to relate to the feelings and goals of elite opponents is reduced, and the latter come to embody all that is evil. The guilt that might arise from such behavior is avoided by self-identification with a completely virtuous group, and by attributing all wrong to one's opponents.[46]

When those who seek change feel brutally exploited or threatened and intimidated by dominant forces, there is a strong likelihood that lower levels of morality will begin to characterize the movement. Increasingly, moreover, the challengers will be individuals motivated by hostility and fixated on their own beliefs to the exclusion of feelings of reciprocity and empathy regarding members of the dominant class and their adherents. At this point, accommodative change or a restoration of the status quo may still occur if the dominant forces are overwhelmingly powerful and widely supported, or if compromise policies are still a viable option. The stage is set, however, for the emergence of those whom Mazlish calls "revolutionary ascetics"[47]—men and women who claim morality in the name of their own social goals and who, in the pursuit of these goals, are capable of the ruthless destruction of their fellow-men.

[46] Davies (fn. 6), 45.

[47] Bruce Mazlish, *The Revolutionary Ascetic: Evolution of a Political Type* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976).

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As the intensity of confrontation increases, morally mature activists give way to those who are more ideologically skilled, or have better fighting ability and a willingness to use violence as a means for achieving success.[48] The likelihood of social disruption increases when those whose goals and actions are moderate become subordinate to militant idealists who seek change for personal reasons and who work to expand political participation in order to bring new groups into politics as a means of increasing their own power.[49] Studies of the radical protest movement at the University of California at Berkeley have shown that it was fueled not only by individuals with high moral levels, but also by those at the lowest levels—people who used the movement as a vent for repressed anger. These amoral individuals justified their behavior in terms of the values articulated by the morally mature activists, but directed their actions as much toward the fulfillment of their individual needs and the expression of personal hostility as toward the achievement of social goals.[50]

Lower levels of moral development include an inability to empathize and to be sensitive to the needs of others. Although cognitive ability may be highly developed, there is a tendency to assert one's own position and to be unwilling to confront and deal with the views of opponents. The values of one's own group are seen as transcendent to the point where those who disagree—regardless of their motives—are perceived as guilty of deliberate malfeasance.[51] It is under these conditions that the most violent forms of political change occur, often accompanied by the ascent to power, both in revolutionary organizations and in the forces of social control, of amoral individuals who might otherwise occupy more peaceful stations in life. Individual judgment and responsibility are suspended, and with them those "stirrings of decency" that might have inhibited the expression of cruelty and ruthlessness.[52]

In the process of political change, tension escalates as the revolutionary and social control forces achieve parity. As behavior on both sides becomes increasingly predatory, ascetic militant revolutionaries confront hanging judges in an explosion of violence and terror in which each side attempts to discredit and eliminate its adversary. If the revolutionary

[48] Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (fn. 42), 295.

[49] Huntington (fn. 7), 270.

[50] N. Haan, M. B. Smith, and J. Block, "The Moral Reasoning of Young Adults: Political-Social Behavior, Family Background and Personality Correlates," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 10 (1968), 183-201.

[51] Merelman (fn. 16), 755-56.

[52] Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), 98.

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forces increase their capability relative to the social control organizations, the resolution may tend toward a transformation of the existing dominance system (as, for instance, in China in the late 1940s). Where elite cohesion remains strong, however, and where popular support for the elite is substantial, there may be a shift back toward the prevailing form of dominance (as in Argentina in the 1970s, for example). Long before the final phase has been reached, however, rights will have fallen victim to desires for dominance for its own sake.

Conclusion

Rousseau observed that "the nature of things does not madden us: only ill-will does."[53] In this paper, I have attempted to show how what maddens people and frustrates them is interpreted in moral terms and becomes the basis of movements for political change.

We are aware that political change is frequently preceded by altered social circumstances resulting from economic change, the impact of foreign institutions, changes in major institutional structures, or the propagation of new ideological orientations. Not all movements for change are successful, however; in many cases, traditional structures continue—sometimes, indeed, in more rigid and coercive forms. In other cases, the break with the past is sudden and involves fundamental alterations in almost all aspects of life. In still other instances, change is peaceful, gradual, and continuous, leading toward a dominance system that upholds both positive and negative rights. This outcome, which has yet to arrive for most of mankind, can be fully as transformative as more violent change.

In this paper I have attempted to show that those who espouse change and those who oppose it do so in terms of moral criteria. In seeking their various objectives, however, the actors perform at different levels of morality. The potential for violence rises when individuals with low moral levels take control both of the movement for change and of the forces that oppose it. Reciprocity, empathy, and individual responsibility then cease to be the primary guidelines for behavior and are supplanted by personal interest and a belief that opponents are beyond the bounds of virtue. At that point, the passion for justice becomes the passion for power.

[53] Cited in Johnson (fn. 6), xiv.

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MISPERCEPTION AND THE CAUSES OF WAR: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems

By JACK S. LEVY*

THIS study is addressed specifically to the relationship between misperception and the causes of war, a question that has received surprisingly little treatment in the theoretical literature. The aim is to provide a conceptualization of the forms of misperception and the theoretical linkages by which each may contribute to war under certain conditions. Considerable attention will be devoted to the conceptual and methodological problems confronting such an analysis.

I. The Literature

Although diplomatic historians have given considerable emphasis to the role of misperceptions in the processes leading to individual wars, political scientists have generally minimized the importance of this variable in their theories of the causes of war. A diversity of scholars, ranging from Thucydides to Morgenthau and Bueno de Mesquita, have instead constructed "rational" models of conflict based on the assumption that statesmen accurately perceive external threats and opportunities and select policies on the basis of a cost-benefit calculus in order to advance the national interest.[1] These hypotheses are inconsistent with a growing body of theory, systematic empirical research, and historical case studies on decision making and crisis behavior.[2] The resolution of this apparent

* This study was completed under a Fellowship for Independent Study and Research from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Harrison Wagner, Karl Schmitt, and Cliff Morgan.

[1] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

[2] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision Making* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972); Charles F. Hermann, ed., *International Crises* (New York: Free Press, 1972); Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981);

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inconsistency is particularly important because of the divergent implications of these frameworks for stability and policy in the nuclear age.[3]

Misperceptions are a key variable in many "nonrational" perspectives on conflict, but the literature provides little guidance for those concerned with an empirical analysis of the impact of misperception on war. Theories of foreign policy and crisis decision-making provide a comprehensive analysis of the *sources* of misperception, but are generally not concerned with their consequences.[4] The seminal work by Jervis[5] is an exception, of course, and is indispensable for any analysis of misperception in international politics. More remains to be done, however. Jervis is not primarily concerned with the problem of war, and a conceptualization related specifically to this issue is needed. Furthermore, Jervis does not systematically identify different kinds of misperceptions, specify their consequences, or demonstrate what kinds of misperceptions have the greatest impact, under various conditions; neither does he show how they interact with institutional and systemic factors (the independent impact of which he minimizes). Similarly, the literature on intelligence failure provides excellent analyses of the causes and consequences of misperception in crisis, but these refer to only one type of misperception and are more concerned with the failure to recognize the imminence of war than with the actual causes of war.[6]

There are a few studies that deal more directly with the question of misperceptions and the causes of war. White and Stoessinger identify certain forms of misperceptions contributing to war and attempt to

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Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969); L. L. Farrar, Jr., *The Short-War Illusion* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1973).

[3] For an interesting analysis of the conditions necessary for deterrence and stability from the perspectives of several different theoretical frameworks, see Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977), chap. 3.

[4] See Steinbruner, Janis and Mann, Brecher, Hermann, and Allison, cited above (fn. 2). See also Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980); Ole R. Holsti and Alexander George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy Makers," in C. P. Cotter, ed., *Political Science Annual*, Vol. 6 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), 255-71.

[5] Jervis (fn. 2).

[6] Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962); Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973); Klaus Knorr, "Threat Perception," in Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976); Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," *World Politics* 28 (April 1976), 348-80; Michael A. Handel, "The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise," *International Studies Quarterly* 21 (September 1977), 461-502; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision; Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," *World Politics* 31 (October 1978), 61-89; Betts, *Surprise Attack* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982).

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demonstrate their impact in a small number of cases.[7] Their conceptualizations are weak, however, and they share none of Jervis's sensitivity to the analytical problems involved in establishing a causal relationship between misperceptions and war. Somewhat more useful are the recent studies by Lebow and Stein. Lebow provides an excellent review of the sources of misperceptions and some evidence of their impact in several cases—though he too is somewhat insensitive to important conceptual and methodological problems. Stein undertakes a game-theoretic analysis of the conditions under which misperceptions of adversary preference orderings contribute to conflict. His analysis is not inconsistent with anything that will be said here, but his focus is somewhat limited. By considering only misperceptions of adversary preferences and 2×2 games, he excludes some important forms of misperceptions and types of empirical situations.[8]

To summarize, we know much about the sources of misperception, but less about their consequences. Misperceptions are commonplace; but little attention has been given to the question of what kinds of misperceptions are most likely to lead to war, and to the specific theoretical linkages through which they operate. The aim of this article is to suggest such a conceptualization. A major concern is that this framework be useful for empirical research. It must be capable of generating testable hypotheses, sensitive to analytical and methodological problems, and reasonably parsimonious.

II. Forms of Misperception

Among the various studies of misperception, the only explicit efforts to identify different forms of misperception relevant to war are those by White and Stoessinger. White's categories include the following: (1) diabolical enemy image; (2) virile self-image; (3) moral self-image; (4) selective inattention; (5) absence of empathy; and (6) military overconfidence. Stoessinger suggests a similar set of categories: (1) a leader's perception of himself; (2) his perceptions of his adversary's character;

[7] Robert H. White, *Nobody Wanted War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday/Anchor, 1968); John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War*, 2d. ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974).

[8] Lebow (fn. 2); Arthur A. Stein, "When Misperception Matters," *World Politics* 34 (July 1982), 505-26. It should be noted that Stein is misleading in claiming to analyze misperception of intentions rather than capabilities. The payoff matrix deals only with outcomes and not with the determinants of those outcomes, so that it does not distinguish between intentions and capabilities. Payoffs and preference orderings are determined by both. Preferences for war, for example, cannot be evaluated apart from the capabilities that determine the probability of victory and the expected costs. In the present study, the distinction between capabilities and intentions is made explicit, so that their different theoretical linkages to war may be identified and analyzed.

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(3) his perceptions of the adversary's intentions; (4) his perceptions of his adversary's power and capabilities; and (5) a leader's capacity for empathy with his counterplayer on the other side.[9]

The utility of these conceptualizations is limited by some rather serious analytical problems. First, they fail to differentiate between misperceptions themselves and the sources of misperception. For the purpose of a meaningful conceptualization, it is necessary to identify what it is that is misperceived, for it is through these phenomena that the linkages to war must be drawn. White's "selective inattention" is best conceptualized not as a misperception, but rather as a psychological process leading to misperception. Similarly, "images" of oneself or of an adversary's character are not themselves misperceptions, but instead a set of beliefs that may generate misperceptions, usually in interaction with selective inattention to information. This conceptualization is consistent with Holsti's analytical distinction between belief system or image on the one hand and perception on the other.[10] It is possible to have both a "diabolical enemy image" and correct perceptions of an adversary's intentions or capabilities in a particular situation, since other sources of perception may dominate. If the concept of misperception is to be a useful one, it must be defined and operationalized independently from the factors from which it arises.

Another problem with this focus on images relates to the difficulty of determining the accuracy of perceptions, a point to which Jervis has given some attention. He suggests that an alternative approach (which he does not adopt exclusively, but which he finds "very valuable") is to ask, not "Was this perception correct?" but instead, "How was it derived from the available information?"[11] My position here is that the concept of misperception is meaningful only if there exists in principle a correct perception. By avoiding the question of the accuracy of perceptions and by not isolating and operationalizing the concept of misperception, that concept is stripped of explanatory power. It then becomes impossible to construct testable "hypotheses on misperception."

Misperception involves a discrepancy between the psychological environment of the decision makers and the operational environment of the "real world."[12] Decisions and actions may be determined by the former, but their effects or consequences are constrained by the latter.

[9] White (fn. 7), chap. 1; Stoessinger (fn. 7), chaps. 1 and 7.

[10] Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 6 (No. 3, 1962), 244-52.

[11] Jervis (fn. 2), 7-8.

[12] Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

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Specific forms of misperception must be defined in such a way that they can be differentiated, in principle at least, from correct preceptions. To a certain extent, this is also true for perceptions of capabilities, since war provides an objective test of actual capabilities. It is also possible in principle to identify misperceptions of intentions, though it is often difficult in practice to gain access to the information necessary to determine the intentions or motivations behind a particular action or statement. Images of character, on the other hand, cannot be falsified because they involve normative judgments for which there exist no empirical or logical standards for evaluation. For this reason, White's concepts of "diabolical enemy image," "virile self-image," and "moral self-image" are excluded from this conceptualization of misperceptions.[13] That is not to say, of course, that these images are unimportant for either international politics in general or war in particular—only that they should not be conceptualized as perceptions or misperceptions.

In narrowing the concept of misperception, I have identified *capabilities* and *intentions* as two central forms. These are the primary concerns in any intelligence analysis.[14] Misperception of the adversary's capabilities or intentions contributes to the processes leading to war through a variety of theoretical linkages (to be analyzed in the following section). Other forms of misperception may also contribute to war, but they do so almost exclusively through their effect on the perception of capabilities and intentions.

Among the most important of these secondary forms of misperception is the misperception of the perceptions of others. What is misperceived here are others' perceptions of our capabilities and intentions, and also their broader definition of the situation and the nature of the threats it poses to their vital interests. Since an actor's definition of the situation cannot be treated independently of his definition of his own interests, misperceptions of the latter are included here. Erroneous judgments regarding how the adversary defines his interests and perceives the threats to those interests—including our intentions and capabilities—bias our expectations regarding his future behavior and his response to our own behavior. These misperceptions of the adversary's perceptions therefore lead directly to misperceptions of his intentions. They also distort our cost-benefit calculus and can lead to serious miscalculations of the consequences of our own actions. This category is related to the

[13] White (fn. 1), 10-14. Note that White's "virile self-image" goes beyond perceptions of actual strength and includes the preoccupation with prestige, resolve, and toughness. The belief that one *should* be strong is analytically distinct from perceptions of strength itself.

[14] See, for example, Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).

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concept of the "absence of empathy" discussed by White and by Stoessinger, although I differentiate between the misperception of intentions and of perceptions, and treat the latter as causes of the former.

Another important secondary form of misperception lies in the misunderstanding of the nature of the decision-making process of others. It may involve erroneous perceptions of centralized decision-making[15] or the failure to comprehend the importance of certain variables. This common phenomenon contributes to the inability to understand the meaning behind the adversary's actions (or non-action) and the implications of those actions for future behavior. These misperceptions will be included in the category of misperception of the adversary's intentions.

A related variable of considerable importance is decision-makers' "field of expectations" about future reality. Smoke argues that expectations about future reality are as important in major wartime decisions as perceptions of present reality, and that the main significance of an escalation lies in its impact on the expectations of the leading actors.[16] Although these expectations may turn out to be wrong, it is difficult to argue that there existed at the time a "correct" forecast against which all others can be judged. In addition to the innumerable and inherently unpredictable variables that might affect future reality, decision-makers' expectations themselves may turn out to have a self-fulfilling or self-denying impact because of the actions they induce. For these reasons, expectations about future reality are not really falsifiable in any meaningful sense (which Smoke seems to concede); they therefore will not be conceptualized as misperceptions.[17] However, erroneous assumptions regarding the adversary's expectations about future reality are falsifiable in principle, and are therefore conceptualized as misperceptions and included in the category of the misperceptions of the perceptions of others.

Often neglected in studies of misperception—but important in the processes leading to war—are perceptions of the likely behavior and impact of third states as well as those of one's adversary. If Blainey, Bueno de Mesquita, Iklé, and others are correct that expectations of the behavior of third states are a central variable in the causes of war,[18] it

[15] See Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 8.

[16] Richard Smoke, *War: Controlling Escalation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 268-77.

[17] *Ibid.*, 270. The exclusion of erroneous expectations about future reality from the category of misperceptions does not preclude the consideration of these expectations as an important variable in itself.

[18] Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973), chap. 4; Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 1), chap. 3; Fred C. Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 23-27.

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follows that misperceptions of the likelihood of third-state intervention and of the military or diplomatic impact of that intervention may also be critical variables. Thus, the misperception of the intentions and capabilities of third states are important categories, along with the misperception of the intentions and capabilities of the adversary. As in the case of the adversary, misperception of third-state perceptions is an important secondary form of misperception, contributing to an erroneous assessment of intentions.

This conceptualization provides the following primary *forms of misperceptions*: misperceptions of the adversary's capabilities and intentions, and misperceptions of third-state capabilities and intentions. These forms are analytically distinct, theoretically important, and amenable to empirical analysis. I shall now examine these different types of misperception in greater detail, indentifying the various linkages by which each might contribute to the outbreak of war.

III. The Linkages from Misperceptions to War

A. Misperceptions of the Adversary's Capabilities

White, Stoessinger, Lebow, and others identify *military overconfidence* deriving from underestimation of the adversary's capabilities or overestimation of one's own capabilities as an important form of misperception leading to war.[19] Often neglected in the literature, but not unimportant, is *military underconfidence* which results from the exaggeration of the enemy's capabilities or underestimation of one's own capabilities. Before examining the theoretical linkages from these misperceptions to war, it is useful to consider briefly the elements of miltary power that are particularly susceptible to misperception.

In addition to tangible military, economic, and demographic dimensions of existing military power and military potential,[20] there are numerous intangibles that are particularly subject to misperception. In addition to such things as morale, leadership, and the quality of military intelligence, the nature of the adversary's military doctrine is especially important.[21] Uncertainty or ignorance regarding the adversary's doctrine and its impact on the conduct and outcome of the war is a major source

[19] White (fn. 7), chap. 1; Stoessinger (fn. 7), chap. 1; Lebow (fn. 2), 242-47. Since military capabilities are relative rather than absolute, with states evaluating their adversary's capabilities only with reference to their own and vice versa, it would be redundant to construct a separate category for perceptions of one's own capabilities.

[20] See Klaus Knorr, *Military Power and Potential* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1970).

[21] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. by Anatol Rapoport (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968); Sun Tsu, *The Art of War*, trans. by S. B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), chap. 1.

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of misperception of overall capabilities. Misperceptions of doctrine and other elements of military power may be compounded by exaggerated confidence in the ability of one's own military intelligence to provide an accurate assessment of the overall capabilities of the adversary.

While misperceptions of existing military capabilities are important because of the common expectation of a short, victorious war with minimum losses, misperceptions of military potential are also significant since they may determine the outcome of a protracted war. Particularly unpredictable are the development of new technologies and their application to warfare, the administrative skill determining the efficiency with which resources are transformed into effective military forces, and political considerations such as the will and the ability to divert national resources to the military sector.[22] In both World Wars, for example, Germany underestimated the industrial capacity of the United States, and also its willingness to devote resources to the war.[23] Also important are faulty expectations concerning the impact of the war on the cohesiveness and political support of the adversary's population (or one's own), for they can have a significant effect on the ability to conduct a war. There may be a tendency to assume, erroneously, that the adversary's population is not hostile or is perhaps even sympathetic to one's own cause—as suggested by White's concept of a "black-top" enemy image.[24] Hitler believed, for example, that the Russian people would embrace his National Socialist ideology.[25] It is quite common to underestimate the difficulty of overcoming an aroused populace, especially if it is fighting on its own soil against what it regards as a foreign invasion—as was discovered by both Napoleon and Hitler in Russia, and by Iraq in Iran.

1. MILITARY OVERCONFIDENCE

Of all forms of misperceptions, the one most likely to play a critical role in the processes leading to war is the underestimation of the adversary's capabilities relative to one's own. As suggested by Blainey and Lebow in their historical surveys, it is very rare that a state will initiate a war it does not expect to win.[26] If the expectation of victory was erroneous and a state loses the war it initiated, it may generally be

[22] For a good analysis of the administrative and political dimensions of military power, see Knorr (fn. 20), chaps. 4-5.

[23] Iklé (fn. 18), 20-21; William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1959), 1170.

[24] White (fn. 7), 29-30, 312-13.

[25] Heinz Guderian, *Panzer Leader*, abridged ed., trans. by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: Ballantine, 1957), 368.

[26] Blainey (fn. 18), chap. 3; Lebow (fn. 2), 242-47.

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concluded that the underestimation of the adversary's capabilities relative to one's own played an important part in the decision to go to war. (This is a point to which I shall return.) There are innumerable examples of wars that were initiated on the erroneous expectation of victory. Some of the more dramatic examples, including the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, Hitler's war against Russia, and the Korean War, are well documented.[27]

Although the expectation of victory is generally a necessary condition for the initiation of war, it is not a sufficient condition. In addition to the tensions and conflicts of interest (and their underlying causes) that normally must be present to generate the context for war, a state's decision-makers usually expect not only victory, but also a relatively short war involving minimum costs. Examples are numerous—and shocking. A Russian general expected that the impending Russian war against Turkey in 1877 "will resolve itself into a mere military promenade."[28] After the defeat of Poland, Hitler told his generals that "a campaign against Russia would be like a child's game in a sandbox by comparison."[29] Kaiser Wilhelm expected that World War I would be over "before the leaves had fallen from the trees";[30] and, early in the Vietnam War, Defense Secretary McNamara was confident that the boys would be home before Christmas. Such optimism is rarely confined to only one party to the dispute. In 1914, the expectation of a short victorious war was prevalent in all European capitals.[31] Similarly, the rest of Greece believed that Athens could not hold out for more than two or three years, while Athens herself probably expected a relatively short, victorious war—but the Peloponnesian War lasted over a quarter of a century.[32] One interesting variation of the short-war illusion is the expectation that one's own stunning victories early in the war will lead to the internal collapse of the adversary's regime and the replacement of the enemy's war party by an elite willing to sue for peace. According to Kagan, that was Pericles' view of Sparta.[33]

For misperception to constitute a cause of war, it must affect an actor's

[27] See *ibid.*; Stoessinger (fn. 7), chaps. 1-3; White (fn. 7), chap. 1; Blainey (fn. 18), chap. 3; Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Dell, 1962), throughout.

[28] Quoted in Blainey (fn. 18), 46.

[29] Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 238.

[30] Tuchman (fn. 27), 142.

[31] Farrar (fn. 2), 3-7; Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1967), chap. 3.

[32] Thucydides (fn. 1), 120-22; Kagan (fn. 2), 340, 346, 355-56; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), 151, 207-8, 341.

[33] Kagan (fn. 2), 340.

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decisions as well as his expectations.[34] False expectations of a short war can be considered a cause of war if the winner's expected gains turn out to be less than the real costs of war had the latter been accurately perceived. It is this logic that leads Farrar to conclude that the assumption of a short war in 1914 "may have been essential to their decision for war. Few of them would have opted for war if they would have foreseen a protracted, revolutionary or unsuccessful conflict." Similarly, Kagan concludes that this form of military overconfidence was a necessary cause of the Peloponnesian War: "All of the leading statesmen expected a short war. . . . They all failed to foresee the evil consequences that such a war would have. . . . Had they done so they would scarcely have risked a war for the relatively minor disputes that brought it on."[35]

It is now necessary to qualify my earlier statement that the expectation of victory is necessary for the initiation of war, and that therefore the defeat of the initiator implies that military overconfidence was one cause of the war. The assertion holds true if the initiator expects to win; but that is not always the case. If war is conceptualized in Clausewitzian terms as an instrument of state policy to further national political objectives, then conceivably decision-makers could expect gains even from a losing war if the political benefits exceeded the military costs (Egypt in 1973, for example). This is all the more true if we broaden the conception of national interests to include the domestic political and personal interests of the dominant decision-maker, for whom a scapegoat war might be useful in spite of its risks (for example, Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas and Idi Amin in his war against Tanzania in 1978). It is possible to go even further: not only is the expectation of victory not absolutely necessary for war, but, contrary to Bueno de Mesquita, even the expectation of positive utility is not a necessary condition for the rational initiation of war. The expected utility of any action cannot be considered apart from the utilities of all possible alternatives, and under certain conditions war may be seen as the rational means of minimizing costs (rather than maximizing gains), as implied by the logic of the security dilemma.[36] Moreover, even a weaker state that perceives war as the least favorable alternative may rationally choose to initiate war if it expects that a preemptive strike will minimize its costs in a war that it perceives to be inevitable.

Up to this point, the focus has been on the individual state (or its

[34] For a similar argument based on an alternative conceptualization, see Stein (fn. 8), 506-10.

[35] Farrar (fn. 2), 148; Kagan (fn. 2), 355.

[36] On the concept of a scapegoat war, see Blainey (fn. 18), chap. 5. On the security dilemma, see Jervis (fn. 2), 62-76.

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decision-makers) as the unit of analysis, so that the impact of misperceptions has been conceptualized in terms of the cost-benefit calculus of a single actor. If, instead, we focus on the dyad and adopt a bargaining framework, further linkages between the misperception of adversary capabilities and war can be identified. In a dispute between two states, one state will generally attempt to coerce the other into conceding on the issue in question rather than immediately resorting to force in order to achieve its objectives. The outcome of the ensuing bargaining game will be determined by the perceptions and actions of *both* states, not simply the one initiating the coercive move. There are two analytically distinct paths by which such a bargaining game can escalate into war. One is the deliberate escalation to war resulting from a miscalculation of the states' relative capabilities or resolve. The other is escalation resulting from the decision-makers' loss of control over the situation. The first is the classic "war by miscalculation." It can occur if the two states disagree on the relative balance of military capabilities between them, *and* if either of them expects that the benefits from war will outweigh the costs, *and* believes that alternative means of achieving those goals are either not available or too costly.[37] The other path of escalation to war involves loss of control over the situation by decision-makers. This generally occurs at the final stages of a conflict spiral that is driven by an action-reaction process and fueled by further misperceptions, including the perception of the inevitability of war.[38]

2. MILITARY UNDERCONFIDENCE

Overestimation of the adversary's capabilities may also lead to war, but through different theoretical linkages. The common tendency to-

[37] This formulation differs somewhat from Blainey's (fn. 18, 113-24). He argues that war can be conceptualized as an instrument for the measurement of power differences and that "wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength" (p. 122). Missing from this formulation is any consideration of the value of the interests at stake: if they are small, the costs of war may be too high to justify the gains. Also missing is any explicit consideration of alternative policy instruments, such as economic coercion, that might secure the objective with lower costs.

[38] For an elaboration of the distinction between miscalculation and loss of control, see Glenn H. Snyder, "Crisis Bargaining," in Hermann (fn. 2), chap. 10; also Phil Williams, *Crisis Management* (New York: Wiley, 1976), 94-96. Snyder refers to the risks of deliberate escalation as "bargaining risks," and the risks of escalation due to loss of control as "autonomous risks" inherent in the nature of violence and the institutional and psychological context. The phenomenon of loss of control cannot be fully analyzed here, but its importance is widely recognized. It is the central concern of the crisis management literature and of recent studies of crisis behavior. See Williams (fn. 38); Lebow (fn. 2), chap. 8; Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), chap. 1; Holsti (fn. 2); Brecher (fn. 2); Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), chap. 5.

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ward worst-case analysis applies to the adversary's capabilities as well as to his intentions, and often leads to a military buildup to rectify the dyadic balance of power. It contributes to the exaggeration of the hostility of the adversary's intentions because of the inherent difficulty of estimating intentions and the common tendency to equate intentions with capabilities. In conjunction with other systemic and psychological factors (as well as institutional pressures for increased defense spending), this classic security dilemma generates further tensions, an arms race, and the well-known conflict spiral. This spiral can escalate into war because of further miscalculations, perceptions of hostility and the inevitability of war, temptations to preempt, and other instabilities of crisis situations. These processes have been analyzed in full in the literature on crisis behavior and need not be detailed here.[39] Because the overestimation of adversary capabilities that triggered the spiral is rather remote from the decision for war, however, and because of the numerous intervening and antecedent variables, it would be misleading to impute much causal weight to these misperceptions relative to other variables.

Overestimation of the adversary's capabilities relative to one's own may also contribute to the processes leading to war at points less removed from the final decisions. Perceptions of the adversary's strength are generally regarded as stabilizing because they induce caution and create incentives to compromise. The analyst should not ignore the opposite effect, however. Under certain conditions, a conciliatory policy may be destabilizing because it generates an image of weakness and expectations of future concessions, leading to further demands by the adversary, an escalation of the crisis, and perhaps a war by miscalculation. It is clear, for instance, that the Western policy of appeasement at Munich projected an image of weakness that led Hitler to miscalculate Western resolve over Poland and to precipitate a general war. In case of such a scenario, if there is good reason to believe that a policy of deterrence based on firmness would have discouraged aggression or future demands, one could conclude that the exaggeration of the adversary's capabilities is a contributing cause of the war.[40] Such a conclusion would require evidence of the adversary's intended responses in various contingencies or a well-confirmed theory of the conditions sufficient for deterrence. Unfortunately, the latter does not exist and the former is often not available.

[39] Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3; Lebow (fn. 2), chaps. 3-4; Smoke (fn. 16), chaps. 9-10; Holsti (fn. 2); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), chap. III.

[40] Most scholars, however, have concluded that Hitler was bent on a course that made a general war inevitable in spite of his miscalculations. See, for example, Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961).

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B. Misperceptions of the Adversary's Intentions

The perceived degree of hostility of the adversary's policies and of the motivations behind specific actions, as well as the perceived resolve of the adversary in a bargaining situation, are common forms of misperception because of the inherent difficulty of assessing intent. They are important because of their central role in decision-makers' definitions of threats to their vital interests.

1. Overestimation of the adversary's hostility

Exaggeration of the hostility of the adversary's intentions is the most common form of misperception. It derives from system-induced worst-case analysis, the tendency to define intentions in terms of available capabilities, diabolical images of the adversary, and psychological constraints on information processing. In the extreme case, perceptions of unmitigated hostility generate belief in the inevitability of war, possibly triggering a preemptive strike in a crisis situation in order to gain the benefits of the initiative. Even in the absence of a crisis, the perception of inevitability may be extremely destabilizing and may result in a preventive war, particularly if the long-term trends in relative economic and military capabilities appear to be disadvantageous to the threatened state. If such decisions for war are based primarily on erroneous perceptions of extreme or enduring hostility of the adversary, one may conclude that these misperceptions were an important cause of the war. Misperceptions of this kind are generally regarded as important in the decisions for war in 1914 by many of the European states, particularly Austria-Hungary.[41]

There is a less direct but more common route to war which also stems from exaggerated perceptions of the adversary's hostility. Frequently, the response to perceived hostility is to increase military capabilities in order to deter aggression and to prepare for war in case that deterrence fails. Such actions may initiate a conflict spiral that escalates toward war. The escalation of the conflict spiral is particularly likely if the initial perceptions of hostility are erroneous, because the adversary is then quite apt to see the escalation as an indicator of aggressive intentions,[42] which leads to the compounding of misperceptions in a contagious process. Among the notable illustrations of this action-reaction cycle triggered by continuous misperceptions of the adversary's intentions is the Seven Years' War in North America, which

[41] Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2 vols. (New York: Free Press, 1928): Vol. I, pp. 42-43, 390, 467; Vol. II, p. 9; Farrar (fn. 2), 3-6.
[42] Jervis (fn. 2), 71.

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Smoke describes as having "no offensive steps by any player at any time." Other illustrations include World War I, the Crimean War, the Peloponnesian War, and the War of 1812.[43]

2. UNDERESTIMATION OF THE ADVERSARY'S HOSTILITY

The underestimation of an adversary's hostility can also lead to war, but by different paths than the exaggeration of hostile intent. Here it is useful to distinguish between general hostility and resolve in a crisis situation. Underestimation of the adversary's resolve in crisis is more common because of its tendency to be linked with (and generated by) military overconfidence, and its path to war is more direct. Such misperceptions may generate a refusal to compromise, an increase in one's commitment, or the initiation of new coercive moves. This process may lead directly to war, or it may initiate a conflict spiral that results in a war by miscalculation or loss of control. An underestimation of the adversary's hostility may also follow in a temporal sense after overestimation of hostility: the latter motivates coercive moves whose effectiveness is, in turn, exaggerated. Although it is difficult to conceptualize and measure the role of misperceptions under these conditions, one could argue that such misperceptions are a necessary cause of war because accurate perceptions of resolve would lead any set of rational actors to reach a negotiated settlement. In terms of bargaining theory, each would recognize that the credibility of the other's firmness was higher than its own critical risk, thus leading to compromise.[44]

The underestimation of the hostility of the opponent's intentions is recognized in the growing body of literature on intelligence failure, but the assumptions and focus are different. The tendency is to assume that war is inevitable, and the question is why one state fails to recognize this fact and is caught unprepared. This assumption is not always justified, however, and it may result in failure to recognize the role of misperceptions in contributing to the causes of war. The direct consequences of the underestimation of the adversary's hostility are often complacency and a lack of preparedness. In the long term, states may fail to build up their military capabilities. In the short term, they may fail to take other steps to deter an impending war, either through their own actions or by securing allied support. In addition, the failure to perceive an impending war may contribute to military overconfidence because of the failure to anticipate the attenuating effects of a surprise

[43] Smoke (fn. 16), chaps. 8 and 7; Fay (fn. 41); Kagan (fn. 2); Melvin Small, *Was War Necessary?* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980), chap. 1.
[44] Snyder (fn. 38), 227.

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attack on one's own military forces. The failure to recognize the threat and the consequent failure to attempt to deter aggression may be an important cause of war, particularly if the combatants are of comparable capabilities and if there is reason to believe that deterrence would have worked.

Contributing to the misperception of the adversary's intentions is the misperception of the adversary's conception of his vital interests and his perception of one's own capabilities and intentions, as well as the threat these pose to his interests. The most common result is the underestimation of the adversary's hostility and the miscalculation of the consequences of one's own actions. By failing to anticipate the strength of the adversary's response, a state may unintentionally initiate an escalation of the crisis or even provoke the adversary to undertake a preemptive action. This escalation may result from a direct threat to the adversary's vital interests or from a change in the adversary's perception of one's own hostility. The Korean War is a good example: because the United States failed to understand China's perception of the threat imposed by a unified Korean regime associated with the U.S., it failed to anticipate the Chinese intervention in response to the crossing of the 38th parallel. Since an accurate prediction of the consequences of that decision would almost certainly have precluded it, these miscalculations were an important cause of the expansion of the war. In a different scenario, both Britain and Russia thought that the 1756 Treaty of Westminster would pacify Europe and localize the war in North America; instead, it united Russia, France, and Austria against Prussia and precipitated the Seven Years' War in Europe.[45] And neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany recognized the extent to which the Russian humiliation over the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 would make her unlikely to agree to further concessions in the Balkans.

Included in this category are not just erroneous assumptions about the adversary's perceptions and his definition of the current situation, but also misperceptions of the adversary's expectations regarding future reality, and the extent to which those expectations differ from one's own. Smoke presents convincing evidence of the importance of this factor in the Seven Years' War (North America), the Crimean War, and the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars.[46] Particularly dangerous in this regard is the erroneous belief that the adversary perceives that war is inevitable, for this may generate a self-fulfilling prophecy

[45] Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire*, 1740-1763 (New York: Harper & Row, 1940), 306.

[46] Smoke (fn. 16), chaps. 5-8.

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and preclude efforts at crisis managment and conciliation. Also included in this category are misperceptions concerning the nature of the adversary's decision-making process: on the eve of the Crimean War, Tsar Nicholas correctly perceived that Aberdeen preferred a peaceful solution, but assumed, incorrectly, that the Prime Minister would have his way over a hawkish cabinet.

C. Misperceptions of Third States

Since the probability of victory and the expected costs of the war are greatly affected by the likelihood of third states intervening on one side or the other and by the expected impact of that intervention on the course of the war, misperceptions of these variables may generate serious distortions in cost-benefit calculations and thereby contribute to war. Included in this category are misperceptions of the intentions and capabilities of both potential adversaries and potential allies.

The underestimation of the probability of other states intervening on the side of one's adversary contributes to military overconfidence, which in turn may lead to war. It generates the false expectation that a contemplated war can be "localized" and will thus result in victory with minimum costs. The impact of these misperceptions is particularly great for small states in their calculation of the behavior of outside powers, since the capabilities of the latter are likely to be large compared to the dyadic power differentials between the primary adversaries. It is more difficult to be certain that great powers would have been deterred from wars against smaller states or other powers if they had correctly anticipated outside intervention, since the impact of that intervention would be proportionally less. The evidence is rather persuasive in many cases, however. Contributing to the outbreak of World War I was the belief of the Central Powers that an Austro-Hungarian war against Serbia could be "localized" without the intervention of other powers.[47] Moreover, it is often argued that Germany's underestimation of the probability of the likelihood of Britain's entry into World War I was an important cause of the war, as evidenced by the Kaiser's later statement, "If only someone had told me beforehand that England would take up arms against us!"[48] Similarly, Corinth's war against Corcyra was predicated on the erroneous assumption that Athens would not intervene.[49] And Louis XIV was planning a "painless little war" against the German

[47] Lebow (fn. 2), 121.
[48] Tuchman (fn. 27), 143.
[49] Kagan (fn. 2), 351; de Ste. Croix (fn. 32), 70-71.

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princes in 1688 and did not anticipate its expansion into the nine-year War of the League of Augsburg.[50]

The misperception of the perceptions of third states that are potential adversaries is a major source of the misperception of their intentions. It may involve one's failure to understand that others may perceive that their interests would be adversely affected by a war in which they did not intervene. The result may be a serious miscalculation of their probable behavior as the crisis or war escalates, and therefore a serious miscalculation of the consequences of one's own actions. Thus, Germany's failure to anticipate British intervention in World War I derived largely from its failure to perceive the traditional British concern for Belgian neutrality and control over the Channel ports. Such miscalculations may also involve the impact of actions short of war that lead to a serious escalation of the crisis. Kagan, for example, argues that Pericles seriously underestimated the impact of the Megarian decrees on Sparta's perceptions of Athenian hostility, and the resulting gains by the war party in Sparta.[51] A similar case is that of Ferdinand II, who failed to recognize that his Edict of Restitution would provoke Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years' War. Mann argues that "Gustavus Adolphus would probably never have launched his invasion of Germany without the Restitution Edict."[52] Even if the risk of outside intervention is recognized, there is a tendency to minimize its impact on the course of the war by underestimating the capabilities of potential adversaries—again resulting in military overconfidence and the increased likelihood of war. In both World Wars, Germany underestimated the effect as well as the likelihood of American intervention. Shirer, for example, notes Hitler's growing tendency to "disastrously underestimate the potential strength of the United States."[53] Although estimates of capabilities are analytically distinct from estimates of the likelihood of intervention, there is a tendency for underestimates of capabilities to reduce estimates of the likelihood of intervention, compounding the resulting military overconfidence. General MacArthur's contempt for Chinese strength had considerable influence on his confidence that China would remain neutral in the Korean War.

Another factor contributing to a false sense of military confidence and war by miscalculation is the tendency to exaggerate the likelihood that potential friends will provide support in an impending war. Such misperceptions are exacerbated by the failure to understand a potential

[50] John B. Wolfe, *Louis XIV* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), 442-46.
[51] Kagan (fn. 2), 352-53.
[52] Golo Mann, *Wallenstein*, trans. by C. Kessler (London: André Deutsch, 1976), 532-33.
[53] Shirer (fn. 23), 1170.

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ally's definition of the situation and his cost-benefit calculus. There is a tendency to believe that one's ally perceives the threat in the same way as one does oneself and has a comparably low estimation of the costs and risks of intervention. Maria Theresa's war against Prussia (after the 1740 invasion of Silesia) was based in part upon the erroneous assumption that France, England, and Russia would come to her aid.[54]

The likelihood and impact of economic or diplomatic support may also be misperceived. Both Corinth and Sparta, for example, mistakenly expected economic aid from their Peloponnesian allies and Sicily.[55] Israel and her British and French allies would not have embarked on the 1956 invasion of Egypt if they had anticipated the diplomatic and economic opposition of the United States. (This case is interesting because the Israelis correctly perceived the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but erred in thinking that Eisenhower would agree.) Even if the expectation of support is an accurate one, the estimation of the effects of that support in the war effort may be misguided—again leading to a false sense of optimism. Whether such optimism has a significant effect on policy is a more difficult question, but one that can in many cases be answered by the available evidence. After the failure of the Spanish army and navy in the last two years of the Seven Years' War, the French war minister Choiseul conceded, "Had I known what I now know, I should have been very careful to cause to enter the war a power which by its feebleness can only ruin and destroy France."[56] This example refers to the expansion of an ongoing war rather than to the initiation of a new one, but it constitutes the type of evidence to which I refer.

There are variations on these forms of misperceptions which may also be destabilizing, but they operate through other causal linkages occurring less frequently and with less overall impact. The emphasis in this study, however, is on forms of misperceptions that have the most direct and most common linkages to war.

IV. Conceptual and Methodological Problems

Conceptual and methodological problems involved in determining that misperceptions exist and that they have an impact on war may profoundly affect our ability to conduct empirical research; yet they have not received sufficient attention in the literature. Although a complete

[54] David Jayne Hill, *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, 3 vols. (London: Longman's Green, 1914), Vol. III, p. 458.

[55] Donald Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), 22-23.

[56] Quoted in Dorn (fn. 45), 375.

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analysis cannot be undertaken here, it is useful to develop some of the more important points.

A. Misperceptions of Capabilities

Methodological problems involved in the analysis of misperception of capabilities are generally manageable. Because of the magnitude of many of these misperceptions, they can easily be identified; in addition, war itself serves as an objective standard by which the accuracy of capability estimates can be determined (with qualifications to be noted later). Moreover, since it is rarely rational for a decision maker to initiate a war he expects to lose, military overconfidence can generally be attributed to an initiator who loses the war,[57] unless there exists good evidence to the contrary.

If we go beyond minimum expectations of victory to expectations of a short, victorious war with minimum costs, some potential problems do arise; perceptions are more a matter of degree, and no minimum standard exists for comparison. One potential problem involves the decision-makers' distortion of capability estimates for domestic political and bureaucratic purposes. Such distortions are particularly common at early stages in the escalation process, where overestimates of the adversary's capabilities are used to secure domestic support for additional increases in armaments. Deliberate underestimates of the adversary's capabilities are more likely on the eve of war, as a means of enhancing military morale and public support. For this reason, caution must be exercised in the interpretation of public statements. It is important, of course, to recognize variations in relative capability estimates among different decision-makers. It is also necessary to determine the point in the escalation sequence at which certain misperceptions occur. There is a tendency for long-term underconfidence to give way to overconfidence as the crisis escalates, which in turn may give way to uncertainty and fear as war becomes imminent. Military overconfidence and underconfidence affect decisions for war through different theoretical linkages, and the evidence must be interpreted accordingly.

It is more difficult to attribute a causal impact to military overconfidence in a war won by the initiator, or in which there is no clear initiator. The fact that a war lasts longer or involves greater costs than expected does not prove that military overconfidence was a contributing factor. Rather, it is theoretically necessary to show that the real costs of

[57] According to one study of interstate wars since 1816, the category of defeated initiators comprises 30-35 percent of all cases. J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War, 1816-1965* (New York: Wiley, 1972), 367.

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the war are greater than the expected benefits. Although evidence of these details of the cost-benefit calculus is often not available, in many wars the optimism is so exaggerated that causal inferences are reasonable; consideration must be given to the possibility, however, that this optimism is expressed partly for internal consumption. What is sought is evidence from the decision makers themselves to the effect that "had I known then what I know now, I would not have done what I did."

Inferences that the overestimation of the adversary's capabilities had a causal effect are even more difficult to confirm because their hypothesized impact takes place at a point much further removed from the decision for war. This problem also occurs with respect to the misperceptions of intentions, and will be analyzed in that context.

The use of the outcome of war as a standard for determining the accuracy of relative capability estimates is generally reasonable, but it does involve a difficult analytical problem. Clausewitz argues that "War is the province of uncertainty," that "in War all is undetermined," and that "the law of probability must . . . guide."[58] If the outcome of a war is determined by "chance" factors beyond the conceivable knowledge or control of statesmen, is it analytically useful to attribute an ill-fated decision for war to misperceptions, or a successful war to an astute calculation of the military balance? Is it meaningful to say that the Spanish misperceived the military balance in launching the Armada in 1588, when in fact unfavorable winds and storms had much to do with their defeat? Is it meaningful to say that William the Conqueror correctly perceived the military balance on the eve of his invasion of England, when in fact his victory at Hastings was assured largely by the weakening of Harold's forces by the unexpected and unpredictable Norwegian invasion just weeks before? Diplomatic calculations of the intentions of third states are also relevant. Prussia was saved in the Seven Years' War only by the death of Empress Elizabeth of Russia and the accession of Peter III, who withdrew from the anti-Prussian coalition because of his admiration for Frederick the Great. In view of the unpredictability of war, at what point do we make the analytic distinction between misperception and bad luck?

Although this problem may be critical in only a few cases, some general guidelines are necessary. Perceptions of relative capabilities and the expected outcome of war should be conceptualized as subjective probability estimates. Incorrect estimates do not necessarily imply misperceptions. The main criteria must be whether the probability estimates

[58] Clausewitz, (fn. 21), 140, 184, 162.

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were reasonable, given the information available (or potentially available at reasonable cost), and whether decision-makers at least recognized the nature of the imponderables and attempted to incorporate them into their probability estimates. A misperception can be said to occur if the estimation of the military balance is incorrect *and* there is evidence that (1) decision-makers were insensitive to the uncertainties and calculated risks involved, making no attempt to evaluate them, *or* (2) nonrational psychological, institutional, or cultural factors significantly distorted capability estimates, *or* (3) capability estimates and expected war outcomes were grossly inaccurate, and the operation of chance factors does not appear to have played a significant part. Calculated risks based on a reasonable recognition of the uncertainties involved should not be classified as misperceptions if they go astray for various extraneous reasons.

B. Misperceptions of Intentions

Statesmen have always recognized that intentions are more difficult to assess than capabilities. Unless the analyst is able to determine the accuracy of perceptions of intentions, however, the concept of misperceptions cannot be a useful one for empirical research.

The accuracy or inaccuracy of some perceptions of intentions is fairly easily ascertained. The inaccuracy of underestimations of the adversary's hostility or resolve would appear to be confirmed by his preemptive strike or other strong coercive moves (though the latter may be a bluff). More difficult to analyze are overestimations of hostility or resolve, since there are no specific actions that even appear to disconfirm these hypotheses or misperceptions. This is the classic problem of deterrence. Though certain actions are sufficient to prove that deterrence has failed, one cannot determine by actions alone whether deterrence has succeeded. Has the supposedly aggressive adversary failed to attack because he has actually been deterred by one's own signals or actions? Or did the adversary have no intention of attacking to begin with? Evidence that serves to discriminate between these alternatives requires, in principle, data illuminating the decision-makers' perceptions.[59]

[59] A potential problem in both these cases is the danger of a self-fulfilling or self-denying prophecy. *A*'s perceptions of *B*'s lack of hostility may be correct, but may either lead *A* to fail to augment his capabilities, thus providing *B* with an unexpected opportunity for war that he cannot resist, or may cause *A* to take coercive actions that generate an unexpected conflict spiral leading to war. Alternatively, *A*'s incorrect perceptions of *B*'s peaceful intentions may lead to a passivity that moderates *B*'s initial hostility. Underestimation of the adversary's hostility may induce conciliatory gestures that pacify an initially hostile adversary through a downward action-reaction spiral. What is more common, overestimation of the adversary's hostility may result in an arms buildup that provokes a nonaggressive adversary into a conflict spiral. All these, of course, are simply the "consequences" of the misperceptions discussed earlier. The problem is that the same phenomena might be viewed *either* as the

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This discussion leads to other problems which are perhaps more abstract and difficult but not insurmountable. The assertion that intentions can be objectively determined in principle requires that actions be purposive and that an actor plan to act in certain ways under a range of future contingencies.[60] One of several difficult analytical problems regarding purposive behavior lies in the fact that even an individual decision-maker may not be certain of his own intentions. He may be undecided and, for a variety of reasons, postpone a final decision. These conditions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of an accurate perception of the adversary's intentions. The correct perception would be the recognition that the intentions in question were "soft" or had not yet been formulated, while a misperception would be the assumption of a well-defined intent behind certain actions or statements. The misperception would generate the erroneous prediction that certain behavior will necessarily follow, while a correct perception would recognize the existence of uncertainty.

The problem of purposive behavior in individuals is compounded for collective decision-making bodies. Arrow has demonstrated that purposive behavior cannot be attributed to collective decisions without some rather restrictive assumptions.[61] In the absence of a dominant decision-maker or of unanimity on a particular issue,[62] an accurate perception would consist of the recognition that an adversary's actions may not necessarily be purposive and that they do not necessarily imply that certain forms of behavior can be expected in the future. A misperception would be the attribution of purpose, or the assumption of a well-designed plan where none exists, or the belief that the adversary's decision-making process is more centralized than it actually is. In any of these cases, the consequences are false expectations regarding future behavior. Hypotheses on these types of misperceptions are falsifiable in principle.

Once misperceptions of intentions are identified, the problem becomes one of assessing their actual causal effect on the decision for war. This is generally more difficult for misperceptions of intentions than of capabilities. First of all, there is no minimum standard by which to judge rational behavior which is comparable to the assumption that decision-

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consequences of misperceptions *or* as indicators confirming the existence of those misperceptions (as opposed to correct perceptions). Unless the analyst can make this distinction by carefully drawing temporal boundaries around a "misperception" and determining its accuracy, causal inferences cannot be made.

[60] Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20 (April, 1968), 454-79.

[61] Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: Wiley, 1951).

[62] For a discussion of practical solutions to Arrow's paradox and an argument for the assumption of a dominant decision maker, see Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 1), 11-18.

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makers do not initiate wars they expect to lose. Second, the impact of intentions generally occurs at points further removed from the actual decision for war, so that their effect is more difficult to establish and is more confounded by intervening variables.[63] Hypotheses involving these linkages are rather demanding in terms of the kind of evidence needed to demonstrate some causal impact; they often require data regarding perceptions and intentions that may not be readily available.

Even if some kind of causal influence can be identified, there remains the problem of evaluating the importance of misperceptions relative to other factors in the processes leading to war. For misperceptions of intentions, as well as for many of the linkages involving capabilities, there exists no basis for assigning relative weights. The problem is as much conceptual as it is methodological. Misperceptions may initiate a process that culminates in war; they may intensify a conflict spiral already underway or provide the illusion of victory that is the immediate trigger for war. These different forms of misperceptions may occur at different points of the escalation sequence and interact with a variety of other variables in complex and poorly understood ways. In the absence of a more integrated theory of the causes of war, we lack the conceptual apparatus to suggest what it would mean to say that misperceptions are either more or less important than other variables.[64] This theoretical limitation makes it extremely difficult to test the hypothesis that misperceptions are genuine causes of war against the alternative hypothesis that misperceptions affect only the timing of war, but that its actual occurrence is determined by underlying variables.

V. Conclusions

In this study I have identified various forms of misperceptions as well as the theoretical linkages by which they might lead to war under certain conditions. Although I have not yet undertaken a systematic empirical analysis of misperceptions leading to war, it is possible on the basis of the preceding conceptualization to identify certain forms of misperception that are more important than others. One of these is military overconfidence deriving from the underestimation of the adversary's capabilities and from the underestimation of the likelihood of the in-

[63] An exception is the case of preemptive strikes generated by overestimations of the adversary's hostility. If these perceptions actually are erroneous, it might be concluded that misperceptions are a cause of the war. However, the misperceptions and the preemptive strike may both be the products of underlying forces which produce the crisis—in which case an inference of a causal relationship between misperception and war would be spurious.

[64] An exception would be hypotheses suggesting that under certain conditions military overconfidence, and perhaps overestimation of the adversary's hostility, may be necessary conditions of war.

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tervention of additional adversaries and their potential impact on the outcome of war. In certain situations, this military overconfidence may be a necessary condition without which war will not occur, since it can be assumed, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, that states will not initiate a war they expect to lose. Another important form of misperception is the overestimation of the hostility of the adversary's intentions, which in certain situations may lead to a preemptive strike. These general types of misperceptions are important because (1) their impact is felt immediately prior to decisions for war; (2) this impact is felt directly and is not extensively entangled with that of other variables; (3) in the absence of these misperceptions, it is often possible to infer that war would not occur; and (4) there are numerous historical cases to which these forms of misperception appear to apply.

Other forms of misperception with more complex theoretical linkages to war may also be important, but are more difficult to analyze conceptually or to verify empirically. Their impact occurs at more remote points in the causal processes leading to war and is intricately intertwined with that of antecedent and intervening variables. These misperceptions are sufficiently important, however, that the impact of other variables and the dynamic processes leading to war cannot be understood in their absence.

A number of historical case studies, as well as a growing body of literature on crisis decision-making, suggest the importance of misperceptions in the outbreak of particular wars.[65] Among the tasks for further research is a more systematic study of misperceptions across a number of cases in an attempt to identify the specific types of misperceptions that occur repeatedly with significant effects. Admittedly, the incorporation of misperceptions into a general theory of conflict introduces further complexity and additional methodological problems, but it may contribute significantly to our theoretical understanding of the causes of war. Whether these increases in descriptive, explanatory, and predictive power are enough to justify the sacrifice of theoretical elegance and mathematical or methodological rigor can be determined only by further empirical analysis based on a theoretically sophisticated research design.

[65] This tentative conclusion that misperception is often an important cause of war is not necessarily inconsistent with Stein's argument (fn. 8) that "misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations." Even if it were true that there are few empirical situations in which misperception contributes to conflict, Stein could not draw this inference from his study. He deals only with the theoretically defined conditions under which misperception matters, but not with the empirical question of how often these situations occur. It is entirely possible that misperception leads to war only under a narrow range of theoretical conditions, but that such conditions occur quite frequently.

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Review Articles

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AS A CAUSATIVE PHENOMENON:
Some Recent Analyses

By CHONG-DO HAH and FREDERICK C. BARTOL

Glenn D. Paige, *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership*. New York: The Free Press, 1977, 416 pp.
James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, 530 pp.

THE study of political leadership has undergone a shift of focus in recent years. Until little more than a decade ago, it centered primarily on the question of "who leads and why." Examinations of leadership tended to merge with studies of political elites—their recruitment and performance and the consequences of both. The study of political leadership tended to mean "leaders" almost exclusively, and thus, a concern with the psychological origins of the drive of certain individuals to attain leading political roles, and of their behavior in these roles.[1] Since the late 1960s, however, political science has been increasingly interested in the question of exactly *how* persons who are identified as leaders influence the political process. In a sense, this concern marks a return to a question that political analysts had largely passed by in their zeal to scrutinize political leaders: why are leaders important in politics? Since it is possible to identify the outcomes of leaders' activity, it should also be possible to define the precise nature of that activity, and how it translates into specific outcomes. Although interest in leadership as a political position and personal attribute or quality has not necessarily waned, interest in leadership as a causative force, and in the underpinnings of that causation, has moved to the fore.

[1] See, for example, James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Thomas Carlyle, *On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946); Erwin C. Hargrove, *Presidential Leadership* (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (New York: John Day, 1943); Eugene E. Jennings, *An Anatomy of Leadership* (New York: Harper, 1960); Harold Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1948); Charles E. Merriam, *Four American Party Leaders* (New York: Macmillan, 1926); and Marshall R. Singer, *The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964).

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A prominent manifestation of this shift is the growing appreciation that leadership is best examined not merely as a function of a leader's activity, but of the activities of leaders in interaction with their followers. Edinger has noted a general reorientation in the definition of political leadership, entailing a move from "positional" to "behavioral" definitions. Positional definitions attribute leadership to persons in positions of authority or command, whether in formal or informal organizations. Behavioral definitions, on the other hand, identify as leaders persons who "shape the actions of other persons."[2] By this definition, "followership" is an indicator of leadership; in the absence of evidence of followers, an individual, regardless of his formal position, cannot be considered a leader. Moreover, the behavioral approach tends to demand that those identified as leaders cause their followers to behave other than in random ways unintended by the leader.[3] The shift from positional to behavioral emphasis has occurred both in economic models of leadership based upon the idea of a transaction between leaders and followers, and in models exploring the psychological dimensions of the leader-follower relationship. Both models, Edinger suggests, represent a movement from "the comparison of institutional structures to the comparison of interpersonal dynamics."[4]

This transition appears still to be in progress. Current scholarship is not unanimous in embracing a behavioral definition or in focusing on the causative role of political leadership; it has yet to articulate a full-fledged theory describing the nature of causation. Though Edinger hints at some models based upon transaction or psychological interaction, these have not yet assumed the form of general or working theories consistent with prevailing canons of contemporary political science. Rather, there are fragmentary attempts to develop conceptual frameworks, and the aggregation of tentative hypotheses and generalizations that represent *parts* of emerging theory. A unified view of leadership as a causative agent does not seem to be forthcoming.

Two recent monographs that investigate political leadership in depth reflect the transitional nature of current leadership study. They differ in the extent to which they focus on leadership as a causative force, though in each the predominance of such a focus is unmistakable. They vary, too, in the rigor with which they attempt to formulate a workable theory of the role of leadership in historical and social causation. Neither study actually develops such a theory; in fact, both explicitly disavow

[2] Lewis J. Edinger, "The Comparative Analysis of Political Leadership," *Comparative Politics* 17 (January 1975), 256.

[3] *Ibid.*, 258.

[4] *Ibid.*, 268.

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any such intention, acknowledging instead the goal of establishing the preliminary framework within which to formulate a theory. Finally, the authors have taken dramatically different avenues of approach to the problem of outlining such a framework. Together, these two works suggest that the study of leadership as a causative phenomenon leaves considerable room for contrasting means of interpretation.

To some extent, the differences between the two volumes represent differences in theoretical approach, with regard both to the general paradigms within which they seek to explore leadership and the conceptual level (macro or micro) at which they do so. The portion of Paige's work that outlines his conceptual framework is concerned primarily with leadership as a phenomenon within the context of a political system which acts upon it and upon which it impinges. Hence, his approach might be characterized as system-oriented. Burns takes a socio-psychological or interactional approach, exploring the relationship between leaders and followers as the engagement of persons with diverse evaluative predispositions and psychological motivations. From a somewhat different perspective, we might regard Paige as adopting a macro-level approach, in that he seeks to understand the total political context within which leadership operates. Burns, on the other hand, takes a micro-level approach, concentrating on the psychological make-up of individuals engaged in the leadership process. In at least two senses, then, these studies arrive at their subject matter from discernibly different theoretical directions.

To make too much of these distinctions, however, would be somewhat misleading. Neither of the authors explicitly adopts a particular approach or seeks to elaborate on one too rigorously or systematically. Both attempts at constructing a framework are extremely eclectic—"poaching," to use Burns's term, on a variety of different dimensions of political analysis. Most importantly, however, a discussion of the diverse theoretical approaches, runs the risk of obscuring the much deeper variance between the works. For not only are the approaches different, but the very questions these approaches seek to answer are themselves substantially different.

Paige poses the question, "What affects how leaders behave, and what aspects of political affairs does that behavior affect?" He takes for granted that this behavior has an effect. His analysis seeks to differentiate between identifiable types of behavior, and to inquire into its causes and the precise nature of its effects. Burns, in contrast, asks not only why leaders behave as they do, but how that behavior causes a positive response in

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followers. His analysis takes a distinctly normative or prescriptive tack which, for the most part, is absent from Paige's work. Burns sets down a set of norms by which to distinguish leadership from other forms of interaction. According to his conceptualization, not all of those in authority are leaders: leadership is a particularly defined type of causative agent. Hence, in many respects these two authors do not even focus on the same phenomenon; more accurately, perhaps, they focus on different aspects of the same general set of phenomena. Thus, we may say that the study of political leadership is in a state of flux, with little consensus about what its central objects of analysis are.

And yet, while these studies differ in attack and focus, they have a common objective. Both seek, through their diverse approaches, a vehicle by which to move toward a general theory that explains how leadership acts as a causative phenomenon in a political community. The question we face in analyzing them, then, is how far each vehicle can take us toward the objective. To the extent that both display a number of limitations and neither seems to offer an ideal basis for theory, a second question is whether or not some synthesis between them seems possible or promising. For, though the authors disagree on various points, their approaches are not mutually exclusive. Are they, then, complementary? The fact that they focus on different facets at different levels of analysis suggests that both help to explain important elements of the leadership phenomenon, and that together the two may offer a comprehensive outlook on that phenomenon.

I

Glenn Paige defines political leadership simply as

> the behavior of persons in positions of political authority, their competitors, and these both in interaction with other members of society as manifested in the past, present, and probable future throughout the world (p. 1).

His central concern is the "creative potential" of this behavior, an element he includes in a subsequent elaboration on his definition:

> The study of political leadership directs attention to the potentially creative behavior of salient persons in interaction with significant others of similar potential as they engage in initiatives of pervasive societal relevance (p. 99).

He thus establishes his position that leadership is a causative phenomenon. Rather than viewing leaders as dominated by events and circumstances, Paige

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> sees them in potentially creative interaction with their followers and with socioeconomic conditions such that purposive political behavior can actually change factors formerly viewed as determining (p. 6).

In the first three chapters, Paige attempts to establish the intellectual background against which current leadership study, as defined by him, takes place. He notes the "surprising lack of disciplinary focus" on the concept of political leadership, a deficiency that has prevailed in spite of implicit, if not explicit, references to the concept within other paradigms of political analysis. It is important whether politics is studied from the standpoint of the exploration of power, decision making, cybernetics, authoritative value allocation, political economy, or structural functionalism—to name the six foci upon which Paige chooses to elaborate leadership behavior. The fact that relatively few attempts have been made to concentrate on leadership as a political paradigm in and of itself forms a major impetus for the book. Paige then outlines the attempts that have been made to focus on leadership, from the work of Charles Merriam in the 1920s to the most recent efforts to establish a conceptual overview of the subject. Next, in a discussion of the "alternative sources of conceptualization" of leadership, he draws upon such varied sources as animal behavior studies, the arts and humanities, and the social and behavioral sciences. The diverse concepts that come into play in the discussion of leadership—group syntality, performance of function or role, initiative, communication, need satisfaction, and coercion—suggest, Paige believes, both the complexity of the idea and the potential directions for analysis. It is upon these varied abstractions that Paige draws in developing his own conceptual framework. In the final chapters of the book, he seeks to set the agenda for further research, education, and practical application, culminating in a call for a world center for the study of political leadership. Chapters 5 and 6, in which Paige outlines his framework for leadership analysis, are of primary interest, however.

Having established diverse means of conceptualizing leadership, Paige sets forth what he calls a "multivariate, multidimensional linkage approach." He first establishes three basic assumptions about leadership: that it involves salience on the part of political persons (that is, that leaders are, by and large, readily identifiable as such); that it involves initiative on the part of those leaders; and that leaders interact—they "cannot not interact"—with followers and with other leaders. His general orientation here is that political leadership behavior characterized by these three elements

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> is ultimately predictable on the basis of a set of interacting explanatory variables. It can further be related to emerging general conceptions of the nature of politics, or of a political system, by positing dimensional linkages in terms of those conceptions (p. 99).

Paige thus sets out to perform two tasks: first, to establish the main variables that determine leadership behavior as he has defined it, and second, to demonstrate how that behavior impinges upon various elements recurrent in discussions of political systems and political behavior. Thus, "patterns of political leadership behavior may be regarded both as products of predictor variables and predictors themselves of political system outcomes" (p. 101).

In identifying types of leadership behavior, Paige pays particular attention to the classification of that behavior according to the degree or nature of change it causes, or seeks to cause, in the political system:

> *Minimal change* (*"conservative"*) *leadership*, tending toward maintenance of existing political institutions and policies;
> *Moderate change* (*"reformist"*) *leadership*, tending toward moderate change in given institutions and policies; and
> *Maximal change* (*"revolutionary"*) *leadership*, tending toward fundamental transformations of existing institutions and policies (p. 103).

He recognizes that these categories are not the only means of identifying patterns, but they are the ones on which he focuses. He then identifies the six variables that he considers to be the major determinants of these behavior patterns.

> Patterns of political leadership behavior are a function of personality, role, organization, task, values, and setting factors in reciprocal interaction, plus error variance for which these variables do not account (p. 105).

Each of these variables constitutes a general concept with its own internal complexities. By "personality," for example, Paige means merely the personality of the individual leader—which, of course, may be an area of specialization by itself, as the work of Barber, Erikson, and the Georges attests.[5] "Organization" denotes the organizational framework within which the leader behaves. "Values" are personal attitudes toward "modes of conduct" and "end-values of existence"; Paige points to "instrumental values," "terminal values," and "intrinsic" values (p. 120). "Setting" includes the social, cultural, historical, geographic, and, in

[5] See in particular James D. Barber, *The Presidental Character* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther* (New York: Norton, 1958), and Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth* (New York: Norton, 1969); and Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (New York: Dover, 1956).

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general, "environmental" circumstances within which leadership behavior takes place. Paige places these variables into a formal but unnecessarily complex "predictive model" of leadership behavior:

> If *persons* of characteristic $P_{i\text{-}k}$ are incumbent in, or aspiring to, *roles* $R_{i\text{-}k}$, within a context of amplifying and restraining *organizational* influences $O_{i\text{-}k}$, and are confronted with *tasks* of type $T_{i\text{-}k}$, with evoked *values* $V_{i\text{-}k}$, in physical-technological-social-economic-cultural *settings* $S_{i\text{-}k}$,—then *political leadership behaviors* $PLB_{i\text{-}k}$ are likely to occur with *political institutional consequences and political system consequences* of type $PI_{i\text{-}k}$ and $PS_{i\text{-}k}$ (p. 105).

Paige never specifies what the subscripts, *i-k*, stand for; presumably, they refer to the three patterns identified earlier.

The author describes the interaction of these variables by presenting a complex array of reciprocal linkages among them and suggesting the many ways in which each variable affects the others. For example, "The more the role power, the greater the leader influence upon overall organizational behavior" (p. 111). Or, "Physical environments can affect the emotional tone of leader personalities" (p. 127). Some of these statements are fairly obvious and commonsensical, while others are obscure and rather far-fetched, especially with regard to some of the examples given. In showing how "tasks affect personality," Paige notes how the task of campaigning left John F. Kennedy with a sore hand from too-zealous hand-shaking, and how the task of the Bolivian revolutionary campaign aggravated Che Guevara's asthma (p. 118). Certainly such linkages may be drawn, but one suspects that better examples are available; in any case, while these elements cannot be ignored, we may well question how far we want to carry this type of variable as an explanation of leadership behavior.

The political leadership behavior that stems from these variables, is, according to Paige, "multidimensional." That is, it manifests itself in ways that refer to numerous, commonly identified aspects of political behavior. In studies of small groups, the two-dimensionality of leadership usually displays an instrumental (task-oriented, "practical") element and an affective (emotional) one. For example, leaders may be adept or inept at certain leadership tasks, and they may maintain a positive or negative emotional demeanor. Paige also identifies a third common dimension: power—that is, the degree and type of influence any given leader is able to muster over his environment. Ultimately, Paige suggests *eighteen* such dimensions, but admits that they may all be merely more specific extensions of the first three. Thus, his analysis identifies political leadership through the dimensions of violent coercion, nonviolent influence, control, responsiveness, conflict, compromise, consensus, positive affect, negative

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affect, distribution, association, space, time, communication, technicity, activeness, creativity, and morality (p.139). Paige illustrates how these dimensions fit into leadership behavior by using them as a basis for a comparison of two leaders, Hitler and Gandhi. Thus, "Hitler's leadership promoted violence, Gandhi sought to minimize and eventually to eliminate it" (p. 141). "Gandhi welcomed compromise; Hitler disdained it" (p. 143). "Both Hitler and Gandhi emphasized communication, with stress upon transmission, but they differed in the modes they employed" (p. 146). Like the predictor variables, these eighteen dimensions are linked reciprocally to one another.

All of this analysis is very systematic, if quite daunting in its complexity. It is of unquestioned value in its presentation of the potentially important facets of political leadership behavior—both causes and end results—that are related to the analytical problems posed by the questions of political leadership. The questions one must ask, however, are: How much further can this analysis take us in solving these problems? To what extent does it clarify the concept of political leadership and provide us with a deeper understanding of leadership as a causative phenomenon? The answer on both counts would appear to be: very little. In many respects, Paige raises more questions than he answers—which may well have been his purpose. But the usefulness of the questions, at least as they are arrayed here, is somewhat doubtful. The conceptualization of political leadership that emerges from this maze of variables, dimensions, and linkages is still very vague at its base. Indeed, that maze, in taking the analysis in so many directions, may obsure more than it reveals about the *essence* of political leadership.

Paige never offers a very clear definition of leadership to begin with. The definition he does provide is very broad and verges on tautology. Leadership, he seems to be saying, is simply the behavior of those we identify as leaders; and he is firmly in the "positional" camp in his means of identifying those leaders. Leaders are those who occupy positions of formal or informal authority in a political structure, or who seek such authority. The question that needs to be raised here is whether or not such a definition forces Paige to consider behavior that probably would not fall under most people's intuitive categories of "leadership." Is mere occupation of a political position a sufficient condition for leadership? By Paige's definition, a Warren Harding qualifies as a leader in the same manner as a Roosevelt or a Lincoln, and yet the differences between the first one and the latter two are so great that to compare them on the same terms seems rather ludicrous. Paige's examples of leadership include references to the modern British monarchy—no doubt a formal

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position, but formal in the fullest sense of the word. Are we to consider Queen Elizabeth's behavior to be an example of true political leadership? An individual may be granted a position with significant power and action potential on a city council or in a state legislature, and remain essentially passive in that role. Is such a person to be thought of as a leader merely because of his position? Something seems awry with a definition that allows this broad an interpretation. The very breadth adds to the complexity of Paige's analysis, for he is forced to consider many diverse types of behavior that might not fall under his purview if his definition was somewhat more selective.

Why, for example, does Paige not follow the guidelines suggested by Edinger, of identifying leadership with evidence of followership—a seemingly straightforward means of avoiding this conceptual pitfall? Paige does stress followership as an important aspect of leadership, and interaction between leaders and followers as an element of leadership behavior, but this interaction is merely assumed rather than employed as a selective criterion for identifying leadership behavior. We cannot simply assume interaction or followership by observing that a person happens to hold a position: there are a multitude of political office holders who claim little or no followership.

Furthermore, the focus of the definition and the analysis built upon that definition lead Paige to overlook a central question in leadership analysis—namely, exactly how we can account for the creativity, or cause-and-effect relationship between leadership behavior and outputs of a political system. By defining leadership merely as behavior on the part of the leader, Paige is left with little more than categorizing that behavior, analyzing its causes, and identifying its presumed results. There is a fundamental discontinuity in this approach, for it bypasses almost altogether the matter of how the behavior, whatever its causes, itself creates the institutional and systemic effects attributed to it. What is it *about* these types of behavior that determines their causative or creative character? Paige seems to take the causative nature of leadership for granted, focusing on the variations that that causation may take, but not exploring its essential nature. He seems to assume that the political system within which leadership behavior occurs provides the necessary linkage, and that patterns of behavior, merely by existing within that system, can have the corresponding effects. This explanation is highly mechanistic and ultimately unsatisfying. Perhaps some of the dimensions of such a behavior pattern—"violent coercion," or "nonviolent influence," for example—are the means through which leadership exerts its "creativity." If so, Paige never makes it explicit; in any case, he merely

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begs the question, forcing us to explore just what we mean by, say, "nonviolent influence," how it is engendered, and how it works. In the absence of this essential explanatory element, Paige's approach lacks unity and coherence, even though it is highly ordered and systematic in its presentation.

The source of this discontinuity may lie in Paige's failure to incorporate the concept of followership more directly into his analytic framework. Although he refers to the importance of followership now and again, he offers no insights into why it occurs and how it fits into the general conceptualization he sketches. This is unfortunate because followership may offer the crucial element with which to tie the "anticipatory variables" and resultant behavior to the dimension of systemic effects. It seems clear that the main source of a leader's influence on a political system is the motivation of followers to act within that system to engender the desired changes, or, at the very least, to grant the leader tacit support to take the initiative. We are interested in political leadership behavior not because of its inherent importance, but because it generates a response on the part of other individuals, particularly those who come to be identified as followers. In examining the causative role of leadership, then, the proper question is not merely what causes leadership behavior, but what causes followers to respond positively to that behavior. Paige needs to apply his variables not only to the actions of leaders, but to those of followers as well. What is it about *followers'* values, personalities, and settings, for example, that might account for, or even predict, the kinds of leadership behavior to which they respond? In exploring merely the leaders' behavior, Paige touches upon only half of what is inevitably a two-factor equation. Perhaps "political leadership" is best thought of not as simply the behavior of leaders *in* interaction but as the interaction itself—the follower's response as well as the leader's initiative. The shift may seem to be a subtle, semantic one, but its implications for analysis, by drawing followers into the center of the conceptual framework, are potentially significant.

By failing to explain how leadership acts as a causative force, Paige bypasses a central concern of leadership study—a concern that he himself expresses. His insights into the complexities of the leadership phenomenon are valid, but his definition lacks rigor and his analysis displays a fundamental flaw, traceable to his failure to account for followership as part of the leadership process. He points out—and perhaps even proves—that leaders may be identified with the outcomes of political system activity, but he only skirts the essence of that association. Hence, we must search elsewhere for a basis of leadership theory.

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II

In turning to James MacGregor Burns's massive study, *Leadership*, we note immediately that Burns has focused on the question that Paige fails to answer—namely, the means by which leaders, interacting with followers, play a role in social and historical causation. Like Paige, he probes specifically into *how* a leader brings such change about. This focus is reflected in Burns's definition of leadership:

> Leadership is the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political, and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers (p. 425).

Thus, he seeks to go beyond merely identifying interaction as an element in leadership, to understanding what it is about that interaction—its ability to mobilize resources—that makes leadership a powerful causative agent.

Burns begins by associating leadership with a more general causative phenomenon, that of *power*. Leadership, according to Burns, is inherently a power phenomenon. But rather than treating power merely as a dimension of leadership behavior, Burns explores the sources of power and the nature of leadership as a *form* of power. His essential characterization involves the application of various power resources in ways that relate to the motives of both "power wielders" and "power recipients." These motives need not be the same: a power wielder may seek a confession from a power recipient, while the latter may only desire not to be tortured. Thus, if the threat of torture is removed in return for a confession, the threat constitutes a power resource. The key here is that power is inherently interactive—a function of the motives both of the power wielder and the power recipient.

Only after establishing this recognition of power as an interactive phenomenon does Burns launch his conceptualization of leadership as a particular manifestation of this phenomenon. Leadership, as a kind of power, is, like power, interactive. But the specific nature of this interaction is different. For leadership to occur, Burns asserts, the power wielder's motives and those of the power recipient must not only be related, but *congruent*. They must both want the same things, at least in general terms. "Leadership, unlike naked power-wielding, is thus inseparable from followers' needs and goals" (p. 19). In making this distinction, Burns explicitly rejects one of Paige's dimensions—that of violent coercion—as not relevant to the concept of leadership.

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Burns seems to pursue two analytical approaches to leadership—one "positive," the other more heavily "normative." The first seeks to understand the process by which leaders' interactions with followers become politically significant—that is, how those interactions exert change in the political context. The process is essentially one of elevating the intensity of followers' motivations into demands upon political institutions, whether from within those institutions or from without. The normative approach posits a second elevating process, that of the moral status of followers' motives and, in turn, of the profundity of the change resulting from their interaction with leaders. In this respect, Burns concerns himself with the leader's ability to turn his followers' attention from parochial, immediate concerns to more "universal" values that transcend nationalities and cultures. The two strands of analysis manifest themselves in Burns's distinction between "transactional" leadership in which leaders interact with followers for the immediate benefit of each, and which causes only limited, short-run changes in a political system's operations, and "transforming" leadership which, while it also involves a transaction, ennobles and elevates the followers' level of moral functioning, and causes profound changes in value patterns and political system characteristics.[6]

Burns argues that all leadership is at its base transactional, and that it stems from and results in the gratification of leaders' and followers' needs; they share the motivation toward mutual betterment, but the exact form of that betterment may be different for the leader than for the follower. Burns focuses his primary attention on the psychological needs that prompt a particular individual to seek a leadership role; he associates the will to lead with "unfulfilled esteem needs"—"both self-esteem and esteem by others" (p. 113). Followers are motivated by similar needs (though perhaps to a lesser extent), as well as by basic requirements for security, employment, sustenance, and so forth; the sense that these requirements are not being met, or even a sense of relative deprivation, may be a particularly potent source of motivation.

Leaders or potential leaders undergo in their psychological development a process of "self-actualization." Like esteem needs, it inspires the will to lead, but in addition it gives them the confidence to assume leading roles and, significantly, the capacity to empathize with others; hence, they can identify the wants and needs of potential followers that make up their "motive bases," and can gratify those needs, or promise

[6] Some twenty years earlier, Philip Selznick offered a similar typology of leadership in his *Leadership in Administration* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

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to, and in that way engender a followership. Gratifying those needs entails a second process—that of refining them into political *demands*. According to Burns's scenario, leaders begin this process by transforming needs into hopes and aspirations, and giving followers reason to believe that their needs can be fulfilled. They then help convert the hopes and aspirations into sanctioned expectations, which "carry more psychological force" and are more "purposeful, focused, and affect-laden" and "directed toward more explicit and specific goals" (p. 118). These expectations become politically significant to the extent that leaders can turn them into political demands, or specific claims against the government (p. 118). What gives these demands power is that the followers who manifest them possess any number of power resources in diverse forms (p. 435). Burns thus sees the unification of psychological factors—"motive bases" and "power bases"—as giving a leader the actual power to be a causative agent.

The concept of transforming leadership focuses on *what* leaders cause followers to demand, given their ability to engender such demands. Here, Burns emphasizes the power of ideas and moral values in motivating leaders and mobilizing followers. The key to transforming leadership is the disparity between the leader's level of moral development and that of his followers. The transforming leader embodies "higher," more noble, universal values—values such as justice, equality, liberty; the followers initially orient themselves around narrower, "lower" values. The transforming leader must meet the more immediate needs of followers first, so that he can draw their attention to higher planes of morality. Whereas transactional leadership emphasizes the ability of the leader to meet the needs of followers, transforming leadership is ultimately able to extract sacrifices from followers (p. 445). Transforming leadership may elicit changes in entire value patterns, and resultant changes in behavior. Longstanding injustices may be ended by morally committed reform movements, and entire social, economic, and political systems may be overturned by even more committed revolutionary movements.

Burns places within the category of transactional leadership a variety of familiar types—group leadership, party leadership, legislative leadership, opinion leadership, executive leadership. All of these involve engaging the motives, purposes, and values of followers in seeking some form of change in the existing state of affairs. But the motives tend to reflect immediate needs, the values may be narrow and parochial, and the change may prove to be for the short term. Burns admits that this does not hold true in all cases—that an executive leader, for instance,

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may cause gradual but profound changes over a long series of transactional encounters. For the most part, however, structural factors intervene; for example, limited tenure in office, the need for compromise and consensus in order to maintain one's position, and the arduous process of policy making conspire to preclude transactional leadership from becoming transforming. Only when certain types of leadership are able to transcend or bypass these structural barriers—as in the cases of intellectual leaders who rely on the power of ideas, of reform leaders who seek to exact fundamental change within the system (and thereby risk stumbling over structural impediments), and of revolutionary leaders who mount an extrastructural attack on the system—is real, profound, and permanent change likely to take place.

Structural factors are an impediment to transforming leadership to the extent that they require compromise, consensus, and harmony. Burns believes that conflict is an essential ingredient in all leadership, but especially in transforming leadership. Conflict is instrumental in bringing followers to political consciousness. Moreover, it prompts action. "Conflict is intrinsically compelling," Burns writes, in that "it galvanizes, prods, motivates people" (p. 38). Leaders may play upon conflict in various ways. By accentuating conflict among proponents of competing courses of action, they may solidify support on one side or another. By pointing out contradictions and conflicts between espoused values and actual behavior, they may alter both the values and the behavior. Burns points to Lenin and Mao as examples of transforming leaders who succeeded because they incorporated sound theories of conflict into their revolutionary strategy. "Leadership as conceptualized here is grounded in the seedbed of conflict" (p. 38).

Against this background of general concepts, Burns concludes his analysis with a set of general propositions about leadership. "Leadership is collective": the interaction of followers with leaders produces a "symbiotic relationship" that "binds leader and follower together into a social and political collectivity" (p. 452). "Leadership is dissensual": conflict "organizes motives, sharpens popular demands, broadens and strengthens values" (p. 453). "Leadership is causative": the extent of real change is a measure of that leadership (p. 454). "Leadership is morally purposeful": it is oriented toward identifiable goals and values (p. 455). Finally, "transforming leadership is elevating": preferably, Burns asserts, the level of morality on which leaders interact with followers is "only one stage higher than that of the followers" (p. 455).

Interestingly, Burns focuses upon many of the same "variables" and "dimensions" of leadership behavior that Paige enumerates, though in

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a somewhat different fashion. The concepts of "values" and "personality" are particularly important in Burns's conceptualization, though he also touches upon setting, role, and organization. But Burns makes better use of these concepts than does Paige, applying them to followers as well as to leaders, and explicating their role in the interaction between leaders and followers, as opposed to applying them merely to "political leadership behavior." Values, for example, provide critical junctures for this interaction, and are of concern not merely because of the way in which they influence leadership behavior. Many of the dimensions of political behavior presented by Paige find their way into Burns's analysis, but a number of them find their way out again. Burns rejects some, such as "violent coercion," and perhaps "consensus" and "compromise," and emphasizes others—"conflict," "non-violent influence," "association,"—as inherent in, and indeed prerequisites for, political leadership. In this sense, Burns's analysis represents a considerable sharpening of some of Paige's thoughts on leadership.

The degree to which Burns narrows his analysis, however, constitutes a serious limitation in his approach. While he offers a potentially useful insight into the means by which leaders act as a causative force in society, his heavily normative orientation severely limits the scope of his analysis. Where Paige's framework suffers from a definition and conceptualization that is too broad and vague to serve as a useful basis for theory, Burns errs in the opposite direction, offering too narrow a basis on which to build a theory explaining all the essential phenomena associated with leadership.

The central problem posed by Burns's work is the consequence of his explicit emphasis on "moral leadership." For him, the essence of moral leadership is the engaging of the followers' "true" needs, which the latter must define through a process of "conscious choice among real alternatives" (p. 36). Followers can define their needs

> only when they have been exposed to the competing diagnoses, claims, and values of would-be leaders, only when the followers can make an informed choice among competing "prescriptions," only when—in the political arena, at least—followers have had full opportunity to perceive, comprehend, evaluate, and finally experience alternatives offered by those professing to be their true representatives (p. 36).[7]

Such a heavy emphasis on conscious rationality strikes one as a highly idealistic approach to a phenomenon that is notorious for its tendency

[7] Cecil A. Gibb advances the same argument in distinguishing "leadership" from "headship" in his "Leadership," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2d ed., Vol. II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 213. In the present context, see also Paul Pigors, *Leadership or Domination* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1935).

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to let passions and personalities dominate events. The motives that underlie followership, like those promoting leadership, are complex and diverse, particularly in their emotional and psychological dimension; a truly "scientific" approach must try to take these motives into account or risk adopting an exceedingly narrow view of the concept—one that excludes a number of phenomena generally associated with leadership. We may consider the passions that prevail at a given moment over a given issue to be arational or even irrational, but they are therefore no less potent, particularly in light of the emphasis that Burns places upon conflict in the leadership process. We can exclude them only at the cost of considerable distortion of commonly accepted notions of leadership.

In particular, Burns's emphasis on specifically "moral" leadership creates at least two such identifiable distortions. First, it leads him to carry his exclusion of "coercive force" too far. Although much of the scholarship considers voluntary compliance by followers as a hallmark of leadership, it is clear that the exercise of violent coercion should not elicit an automatic rejection from the pale of leadership. For example, Burns argues that Hitler wielded brute force and hence was a tyrant and not a leader. And yet, as Tucker correctly points out, it is difficult to deny that much of Hitler's support was voluntary and that he amassed considerable such support behind him in his rise to and exercise of national power in Germany.[8] He did so by playing upon some profoundly powerful motivations latent in the political context of Weimar Germany—baser motives than Burns would like, perhaps, but potent just the same. To argue that Hitler was not a leader seems a monumental analytic distortion.

Many subtle forms of coercion lie behind leadership in all societies, in the ultimate power of the state to enforce the will of formal leaders. To try to drive too wide a wedge between "leadership" and "coercive force," and to insist that leadership entails a wholly conscious, voluntary, rational followership, is to take a somewhat utopian approach. It verges on turning "leadership" into a purely normative concept rather than an empirical phenomenon as well. After all, even despotisms must obtain at least the tacit support of a significant segment of the population in order to survive for any length of time.[9] Tucker carries this argument even further, suggesting that such despotisms seek more than mere compliance—they pursue active backing. Hence, "authoritarian regimes characteristically strive to mobilize popular support for their policies

[8] Robert C. Tucker, *Politics as Leadership* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1981), 13.

[9] See Taketsugu Tsurutani, *The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Transitional Societies* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1973), 10.

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before resorting to the coercive methods that they hold in reserve for use when persuasion fails."[10]

Another distortion in Burns's analysis is his exclusion of charismatic, or, in Burns's terms, "heroic" leadership. This leadership, he argues, is a relationship characterized essentially by total surrender on the part of the follower solely to the personality of the leader, and as such is not "authentic" leadership because it does not involve "deeply held motives, shared goals, rational conflict, *and* lasting influence in the form of change" (pp. 244, 248). Burns is not alone in holding this view. Kenneth F. Janda, in distinguishing leadership as the exercise of legitimate power, explicitly excludes from his definition of leadership "referent" power based on the power recipient's identification with the power wielder.[11] Much of the scholarship on charisma, however, not only identifies it as a major leadership phenomenon, but describes it as involving interaction between leaders and followers far more complex than simple personal identification.[12] Charisma need not presume the suspension of rationality; it still entails the perception on the part of followers that the leader offers a means by which they may realize shared goals. Willner, for example, does not base charisma on identification merely with the man, but with the man and his mission.[13] This belief in the mission may be an outgrowth of initial identification with the man, but the ingredients of the charismatic relationship certainly include more than just the leader's personage. Indeed, Katz, whose analysis Burns uses to support his own, suggests that some charisma can have a significant "rational," "conscious" element, that "people can magnify the power of their leader because they perceive in him some attributes that can advance their interests."[14]

[10] Tucker (fn. 8), 61-62.

[11] Janda, "Toward the Explication of the Concept of Leadership in Terms of the Concept of Power," *Human Relations* 13 (No. 4, 1960), 358.

[12] See Ann Ruth Willner, *Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 32 (Princeton, 1968); Robert C. Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," in Dankwart A. Rustow, ed., *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership* (New York: George Braziller, 1970), a re-issue of *Daedalus* 97 (Summer 1968); and Daniel Katz, "Patterns of Leadership," in Jeane M. Knutson, *Handbook of Political Psychology* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), 203-33.

[13] See Willner (fn. 12). In the present context it should be noted that Tucker gives special attention to the importance of leadership in settings of sociopolitical movements and in the altered global political environment facing the crisis of human survival. He identifies two main types of sociopolitical movements: movements for revolution and movements for peace. Emphasis on these movements leads him to distinguish "nonconstituted" leaders from "constituted" ones—performers from without a system or from within. Tucker asserts that the former may emerge as leaders of influential sociopolitical movements, which frequently become the habitat within which charismatic leadership flourishes. See Tucker (fn. 8), esp. 77-157.

[14] Katz (fn. 12), 217. Katz's analysis, however, suffers from distortion of its own, for it allows him to identify Eugene McCarthy and Adlai Stevenson as "charismatic" leaders, indicating, it would seem, a very broad definition of the term.

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Tucker insists that charismatic leaders "offer to followers and potential followers not simply and solely their extraodinary selves as instruments of leadership, but also a formula or a set of formulas for salvation"[15]—an argument that suggests Willner's reference to the man and his mission.

Burns's argument that charisma does not contribute basic, real change overlooks Weber's well-known maxim that charismatic leadership or authority "characteristically undergoes transformation from an extraordinary and purely personal relationship into an established authority structure"; that is, that it may be "routinized."[16] Willner carries this thought somewhat further, asserting that a charismatic leader "may, and frequently does, have a revolutionary impact on the beliefs and behavior of a small group of followers initially and subsequently upon a larger following."[17] Even if charismatic authority itself is fleeting, the changes brought about by this form of leadership are not necessarily ephemeral. We should therefore question the usefulness of an approach to leadership that would force us to exclude a commonly observed, seemingly important phenomenon.

To the extent that it explains the essential process of leadership in its causative dimension, however, Burns's analysis goes a long way toward filling the gap left by Paige's approach to the concept. While some aspects of Burns's approach leave us on the horns of a dilemma between too narrow and too broad a conceptualization of political leadership, the two analyses together complement each other in ways that may bring

[15] Tucker (fn. 12), 89. On the other hand, we need not accept unreservedly Paige's suggestion that political leadership means "not only those who rule by moral persuasion and reasoned argument but those who gain compliance by fear and force" (p. 2). If nothing else, the idea of "gaining compliance" falls far short of the mobilization process many analysts suggest as a crucial characteristic of the leadership phenomenon. Wiatr, for instance, provides the example of individuals who gain compliance by fear and force, and do not qualify as leaders. Distinguishing between legitimized and unlegitimized coercion, he suggests that the officials of an occupying power may "rule" a conquered territory, but cannot be said to be "leading" its inhabitants. See Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Political Elites and Political Leadership: Conceptual Problems and Selected Hypotheses for Empirical Research," *Indian Journal of Politics* 17 (December 1973), 137-49. Alvin J. Gouldner also provides a useful distinction. The gunman who herds a group of store employees into a back room certainly stimulates action on the part of that group, but he could hardly be considered a leader. See Gouldner, ed., *Studies in Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action* (New York: Harper, 1950), 20. Gouldner's and Wiatr's views, need not be accepted without reservation, however. See Robert E. Ward's perceptive work, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned Political Change in Japan," in Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 477-535.

[16] See Tucker (fn. 12), 91; H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 245-52; and especially Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1964), 358-92.

[17] Willner (fn. 12), 10-11.

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us closer to an understanding of the essential nature of leadership as a causative phenomenon.

III

Do the studies analyzed above provide some foundation for the development of a workable theory of political leadership? Yes. Political leadership is a dynamic process; Burns, Paige, and others have recently brought its general nature and key elements into somewhat sharper focus.[18] The process involves the complex interaction of leaders, possessing various motives and resources, with followers or potential followers, also characterized by certain patterns of motivation and capabilities. This interaction, which takes place against the background of a certain set of circumstances, ideally culminates in politically significant activity toward change in those circumstances. Describing just how leadership generates this activity is the central concern of efforts toward a general theory of political leadership.

The foregoing analysis suggests several general propositions about the process of leadership, which may serve as a skeletal outline of such a theory. We have, for example, already seen that leadership is contextual—that is, its emergence and development in a particular place at a particular time is influenced by the circumstances prevalent at that place and time. These circumstances include the nature and extent of the political and social structure and system, particularly with regard to the norms and values embodied in and transmitted by that structure. They are of particular importance to the extent that they shape the "motive bases" upon which leaders and followers act. In the form of an explicit

[18] Studies consulted in addition to those already cited include, in alphabetical order: James D. Barber, ed., *Political Leadership in Amercian Government* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); Robert S. Byars, "Small Group Theory and Shifting Styles of Political Leadership," *Comparative Political Studies* 5 (January 1973), 443-69; Paul R. Dettman, "Leaders and Structures in Third World Politics," *Comparative Politics* 6 (January 1974), 245-69; Leon Dion, "The Concept of Political Leadership: An Analysis," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1 (March 1968), 1-17; James V. Downton, Jr., *Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process* (New York: Free Press, 1973); Lewis J. Edinger, ed., *Political Leadership in Industrial Societies* (New York: John Wiley, 1967); Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963); Margaret G. Hermann, ed., *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Andrew S. McFarland, *Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); Donald S. Searing, "Models and Images of Man and Society in Leadership Theory," *Journal of Politics* 31 (February 1969), 3-31; Lester G. Seligman, "The Study of Political Leadership," *American Political Science Review* 44 (December 1950), 904-15; Ralph M. Stogdill, *Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1974), which provides a comprehensive overview of studies of leadership in diverse academic disciplines; and W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

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statement about the relationship of the context to the process of political leadership, we may say that the situation affects the motive bases of both leaders and followers.

It would be incorrect, however, to regard the situation as wholly determining these motive bases, which are also shaped by individual personality factors not rooted in a particular situation. In the case of those identified as leaders, this higher intensity of motivation is one of the "traits" seen as distinguishing them from followers. To the extent that both leaders and followers face the same general situation, the situation alone cannot account for this difference in motivation. Hence, in another proposition concerning the process of political leadership, leaders may be said to have motive bases that are influenced by individual personality elements to a larger degree than those of followers.

This pattern of motivation is important because it translates into concrete, identifiable acts on the part of the leader. These are to a large extent acts of communication; they may be either affective or instrumental. They are significant insofar as they engage the motive bases of followers and potential followers, motive bases that consist of their needs, values, and goals. Thus, the followers' patterns of motivation may be regarded as the essential targets of a leader's acts, and provide the "potential power" that, in its activation, is the central purpose of the leadership process. The leader's ability to tap and direct this potential political power successfully is a function of the resources at his command—resources that in large measure consist of his intuitive and intellectual capacities for understanding the motive bases on which he seeks to act. It is also a function of the competence of the followers to act in patterned and coherent ways at the instigation of a leader. Three further propositions about the leadership process thus suggest themselves: that the leader's motivations and resources lead directly to concrete acts; that these acts engage the motive bases and political capacities of the followers; and finally, that the followers' motive bases and capacities, so acted upon, translate into political activity.

This activity may come in the form of votes for a particular candidate, votes for or against a particular piece of legislation, collective action by a committee or social movement, or any other means of influencing the political process. It is politically significant to the extent that it causes change in some aspect of the political situation—that is, in the authoritative allocation of values in the society in which the particular instance of leadership takes place. Thus, we may explicate the concept of political leadership as follows: political leadership is the mobilization and direction, by a person or persons using essentially noncoercive means, of other

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persons within a society to act in patterned and coherent ways that cause (or prevent) change in the authoritative allocation of values within that society.[19] The outcome of the leadership process is that it changes, or at least entails an attempt to change, the circumstances that in part give rise to it, thereby establishing a new or altered set of circumstances that in turn affect leaders' and followers' motivations in a process set in motion by a subsequent initiative on the part of a leader acting on these motivations.

Thus the leadership process, in a sense, is a circular one: situational factors as well as individual personality elements give rise to motivations on the part of some individuals; other individuals facing the same situation with their own pattern of motives may or may not be receptive to these initiatives; if they are receptive, they will act so as to change the existing situation.

These propositions in themselves may not constitute, in the strict sense, a "theory" of political leadership; they do, however, constitute an explicit articulation of what appear to be key elements of political leadership, as well as of the interrelationships among them. These key elements are: (1) individual personality factors; (2) leaders' motives and resources; (3) situational factors; (4) followers' motive bases and capacities; (5) leaders' acts; and (6) politically significant activity. Each of these elements and interrelationships is, of course, worthy of study in its own right, especially the first four. But it is the connection of each with the others as part of a larger process that is of primary concern to the student seeking to understand the political process identified as political leadership, which, according to Tucker, is in fact the very essence of politics.[20]

[19] The concept of the authoritative allocation of values is the main distinguishing feature of political leadership. These values need not be restricted to material benefits, rewards, and obligations; indeed, Burns identifies political leadership with "end-values such as security and order, liberty and equality, freedom and justice" (pp. 430, 435). Similarly, we interpret values broadly enough to include less tangible elements such as esthetic, moral, and philosophical values, as well as material resources. For the concept of the authoritative allocation of values, we are indebted to David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 50.

[20] See Tucker (fn. 8), 3.

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REPORTS TO THE CLUB OF ROME

By NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF*

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Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, *Road Maps to the Future*. Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1980, 193 pp. [cited as *Road Maps*].

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I

THE Club of Rome occupies a shadowy but definite place among contemporary institutions that make up the intellectual and normative infrastructure of industrial civilization. Its understated organizational features complement the remarkable personal qualities of its founder and guiding spirit, the Italian industrialist Aurelio Peccei.[1] His concerns are the Club's: to alert the cosmopolitan *"haut-bourgeois"* class, whose concerns define contemporary liberalism, to the dangers facing the world in its present course, and to encourage corrective measures.[2]

* I am grateful to Fouad Ajami for inspiration, James R. Lee and John M. Richardson, Jr., for comments, and Peter S. Onuf, V. Spike Peterson, and Kathryn Wittneben for invaluable assistance.

[1] These qualities are easily discerned in Peccei's books: *The Chasm Ahead* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), *The Human Quality*, and *One Hundred Pages for the Future* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1977 and 1981, respectively).

[2] Following Ludwig von Mises, I "employ the term 'liberal' in the sense attached to it everywhere in the nineteenth century and still today in the countries of continental Europe. This usage is imperative because there is simply no other term available to signify the great political and intellectual movement that substituted free enterprise and the market economy for the precapitalistic methods of production, constitutional representative government for the absolutism of kings or oligarchies; and the freedom of all individuals from slavery,

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The animating idea for the Club is the now-famous predicament of mankind, "a profound pathological state and maladjustment of the entire human race . . . , an all-pervasive, epoch-making crisis which penetrates all aspects of human life."[3]

> It is a predicament for which, in the absence of a reliable diagnosis, we are unable to prescribe remedies, and which is aggravated by the interrelatedness and interdependence of everything in the human system. Since man opened the Pandora's Box of new technologies, which then got out of hand, what happens here has repercussions nearly everywhere. There are no longer separate economic, technical or social problems which can be judged fairly well on their own terms and attacked individually, at leisure, one after the other. The dynamics, speeds, energies and complexities of our artificial world are orders of magnitude bigger than anything before—and so are our problems.[4]

Equally familiar is the Club's idea of the *problematique*, which is nothing other than the same "baffling, intractable tangle of difficulties."[5] We cannot offer a serviceable way of distinguishing these terms except to surmise that the predicament is that we do not know how to deal with the *problematique*. Subsequent usage seems unconsciously to have settled on the distinction between the psychological and behavioral side of this unprecedented situation (the "human" predicament) and its material side (the "global" *problematique*). Both terms convey Peccei's belief that so much is wrong in this world that there is no one place to begin making things right. Instead of dissecting the situation and assessing problems serially, Peccei tells us on behalf of the Club that problems are inseparable and their effects interactive instead of merely additive. Solutions must necessarily be directed toward the whole problem-complex, effectively on an all-or-nothing basis.

One might conclude that this is a profoundly pessimistic message. It actively discourages hope that prevailing approaches to problem solving can help—on the contrary, it suggests that the very fact of solving one problem tends to aggravate remaining unsolved problems. Yet in his writing and by his example, Peccei rejects despair. Others in the Club of Rome are markedly optimistic. Peccei and his closest colleagues firmly believe that we could rise to the occasion if we were sufficiently impressed with the need to do so. The Club's role is to make just such an impression. By exposing our predicament, it does not recommend inaction; it coun-

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serfdom, and other forms of bondage." See von Mises, *Human Action* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 3d ed., 1966), v. A classical liberal, von Mises neglects to mention the costs of liberalism, which are the subject of my essay.

[3] Peccei (fn. 1, 1977), 60.

[4] *Ibid.*, 61.

[5] *Ibid.*

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sels understanding upon which shall follow the necessary course of action. The trailing thesis in this equation—that action will necessarily follow from understanding—is not something Peccei necessarily believes without reservation. It is required, rather, by the ingeniously simple way in which the Club is organized:[6] a self-designated membership of one hundred private persons holds annual plenary sessions. The real Club is the executive committee, led by Peccei and a few others from its beginning in 1968, and operating as an "invisible college."[7]

It follows that, without conventional resources, the Club is obliged to expose the *problematique* without cost. To do this, the Club authorizes and accepts reports on crucial aspects of the world situation. It also helps in securing private funding for the preparation of reports, but each project is autonomous. The Club then disseminates reports to a larger audience by arranging appropriate publicity and publication. The first project proposal brought before the Club was rejected because of the unduly complex and scholarly nature of the proposed program of work.[8] Later, another project was authorized, but the report on it was not accepted.[9] Since 1972, ten reports have been published with the Club's blessings; of these, the nine that are available in English are reviewed here.[10]

Lacking a research staff or even a project directorate, the Club can do little to ensure that reports come up to the demanding standard of enhancing our understanding of the human predicament. Nor can the Club presume that the reports will build on each other to provide that elusive understanding. In fact, they are related only through Peccei's tireless advertising, and are not cumulative in either conclusions or consequences. To the extend that the Club's reputation depends less on the cumulative growth of knowledge than it does on a cumulative impact

[6] See *ibid.*, chaps. 4-6, for a short history of the Club of Rome.

[7] This is Peccei's own description, *ibid.*, 77. See generally 73-77.

[8] The project proposal, entitled *Quest for Structured Responses to Growing World-Wide Complexities and Uncertainties*, was prepared by cyberneticist Hasan Ozbekhan, who later published a condensed version as "The Predicament of Mankind," in C. West Churchman and Richard O. Mason, eds., *World Modeling: A Dialogue*, II (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1976), 11-25.

[9] Prepared by a multidisciplinary team at the Bariloche Foundation in Argentina, the report, published under the title *Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American World Model* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 1976), is undoubtedly too radical for most of the Club's members. Although it is not avowedly Marxist, the report's computer projections for the future begin with the premise of significant changes in global distributive policies by 1980, and the report proposes an ideal world society in which "*production* is determined by social needs and not by profit" (p. 25, emphasis in original). There may also have been objections to the report on technical grounds. Peccei states only that it was initially sponsored and supported by the Club, but carried out independently (fn. 1, 1977), 136.

[10] The tenth report is Maurice Guernier, *Tiers-monde: Trois quatre du monde* (Paris: Dunod, 1980)

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on public awareness, each report must outdo the preceding one for the Club to be seen as making progress toward its objectives. Circumstances have decreed the opposite: a first report of extraordinary impact, followed by declining public interest in successive reports, whatever their quality. In view of the magnitude of the initial success, it could hardly have been otherwise.

The commission for the first report went to a team assembled by J. W. Forrester at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Forrester proposed to use a computer-facilitated technique he had developed for simulating "dynamics of change" in mathematically expressed models of complex social systems—a technique he called system dynamics.[11] He produced a preliminary world model, and his team produced an improved one, intensively tested and applied. To expedite publication of results and enhance public appeal, the report, bearing the memorable title *Limits to Growth*, was presented in a nontechnical form, only generally describing assumptions orienting the project and methods employed while emphasizing the conclusions drawn. A complete specification of the model and defense of its use followed in due course.[12] Making *Limits* a brief, nontechnical exposition of the *problematique*—though identified with a major research program housed at an institution whose very initials promise methodological virtuosity—certainly strengthened the report's public impact, but earned scorn from specialists eager to judge the model and its procedures on technical grounds.

For the Club's purposes (however ambiguously served), the report, not the formal computer model, is what matters. Although the severing of the two is inevitably arbitrary, Forrester himself introduced an argument, taken up by other system dynamicists, to support doing so. All social activity is governed by "mental models."[13] A particular model may be specified and explored with the help of a computer, and revised accordingly. In turn, a computer model becomes a mental model as soon as a human mind tries to comprehend it. Such an effort at comprehension is attempted in *Limits*. What there is to review, then, is a verbal reconstruction of a computer model formalizing a mental precursor. Not subject to review is the computer model itself; it has, in fact, spawned

[11] Forrester's preliminary version of his dynamically modeled world system, presented to the Club of Rome in 1970, was subsequently published as *World Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, 1971). The quoted words (from p. 2), bordering as they do on redundancy, betray the difficulty in finding a succinct verbal characterization of system dynamics.

[12] Dennis L. Meadows and others, *Toward Global Equilibrium: Collected Papers* and *Dynamics of Growth in a Finite World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, 1973 and 1974, respectively).

[13] Forrester (fn. 11), 14-16.

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an entire domain of activity—no longer associated with the Club of Rome in any meaningful respect—called "global modeling," and accompanied by a literature worthy of review in its own right.[14]

Limits articulates a model of capitalist growth in which the upward curve of growth shows every sign of driving past a threshold of sustainability. *"The basic behavior mode of the world system is exponential growth of population and capital, followed by collapse"* (p. 149; emphasis in original). There would seem to be no inherent obstacle to a gradual resumption of growth after this calamity, but a cyclical repetition of the exponential phase of growth is probably precluded in this model by previous exhaustion of resources.[15] The *Limits* model disaggregates growth of industrial civilization into several classes of things that are known to have grown exponentially—such as population and pollution, but not technology. By depicting technology as having a distinctive relation to each class of things that grow, the model avoids making technology a *deus ex machina*. At a given time, each category of material growth has an upper limit, which can be at least roughly calculated if everything else is held constant. Malthus was presumably the first to do precisely that nearly two centuries ago, with everything but population held constant.

Economists have subsequently amused themselves by noting the unempirical character of Malthus's *ceteris paribus* assumption. The actual growth of population in countries like England, as we all know, takes the form of a sigmoid curve because other rapidly changing features of industrial civilization have come into play. The fact that the authors of *Limits* treat population separately makes them Malthusians only in the most superficial sense. Unlike Malthus, they define growth as having analytically separate *but not* substantively autonomous components. *Limits* acknowledges that, taken separately, growing material stocks do not have to have fixed limits; but it demonstrates that, if particular limits (like population) are broken through, other such limits (like pollution) will harden. The collective consequence is an eventual, but inevitable, ceiling on aggregate growth: everything cannot grow exponentially *and* indefinitely.[16]

[14] On "The First Decade of Global Modelling," see Donella Meadows, John Richardson, and Gerhart Bruckmann, *Groping in the Dark* (Chichester, England: Wiley, 1982), for which the quoted words serve as subtitle.

[15] The authors of *Limits* advert to an overshoot and oscillation model but choose not to develop it; see Meadows (fn. 12, 1974), 8. The Science Policy Research Unit of Sussex University, after replicating the *Limits* model, developed an oscillating population curve in some simulation runs by altering *Limits*'s resource and population assumptions. See H.S.D. Cole and others, *Models of Doom* (New York: Universe Books, 1973), chap. 9.

[16] In one of their simulation runs, the modelers adjusted resource consumption, agricultural

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Again, on the surface, the projection of uncontrollable overshoot seems to evoke a Malthusian label. According to Malthus, however, population growth simply proceeded toward disaster because nothing could be done about it.[17] In *Limits*, according to the theory, corrective responses set in motion through a system's feedback loops mean that something is being done; but, in the peculiar situation characterized by exponential growth, what is in the process of being done does not happen in time. Thus, in *Limits*, the term "limit" has a linked pair of meanings. It is both a point beyond which no further growth is sustainable and a point beyond which growth is irreversible and thereby bound for disaster. If Malthus had used the term, a limit would have been the point beyond which growth is impossible. Insofar as Malthus conveys the image of overshoot and collapse, it arises from the fact that obstacles to growth often have the effect of disposing of more people than circumstances actually require. The proper Malthusian model might then be one of oscillations, not around, but beneath a limit; metaphorically, growth would bump into and be only temporarily deflected by a hard ceiling.

If the critics of *Limits* use Malthus's name as an epithet, the authors of *Limits* are no wiser in appearing to find support in Malthus.[18] In the nature of their model, they are actually closer to Marx and to at least one of his contemporary, Trotskyite interpreters, Ernest Mandel.[19] Characteristic of capitalism, in Marxian analysis, is a tendency toward periodic overproduction and consequent economic crisis. Several factors converge in their effects to result in overshoot. Their conjuncture is not caused by any one thing; according to Mandel, these separate but related components of the dynamic of capitalist growth can be summarized as a result of the declining rate of profit.[20] Mandel, convincingly citing Marx,

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yields, and pollution levels to reflect an annual 4% rate of technological change in each category secured at no cost; they found that overshoot and collapse were indefinitely forestalled. No other, more plausible, adjustments generated this result. Meadows (fn. 12, 1974), 510-24.

[17] Birth control was possible but, by Malthus's reckoning, a vice—apparently the moral equivalent of war.

[18] In their important rebuttal appended to the Sussex Group's critique, the authors describe themselves as Malthusians with a "humble view of the human capacity to solve all problems indefinitely." See Donella H. Meadows and others, "A Response to Sussex," in Cole (fn. 15), 240. Insofar as the terms "Malthusian" and "pessimist" have a casual interchangeability, either label fits this distinctly post-enlightenment view of the human condition. The authors of *Limits* correctly perceive their critics as falling within the enlightenment tradition of human progress and perfectibility.

[19] The resemblance is dismissed by K.L.R. Pavitt, "Malthus and Other Economists," in Cole (fn. 15), 153, because collapse has physical causes in the *Limits* model; in the Marxist model, it has social ones.

[20] The term "conjuncture" was presumably Trotsky's. Mandel develops its use in *Late Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1978). Louis Althusser, hardly a Trotskyite, considers it "the

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decries monocausal explanations for overshoot, just as the authors of *Limits* do. In Marxian terms, overshoot means that capitalism will fail, as feudalism did before it, because it is too successful.

Marxist and *Limits* models are obviously structurally similar, even though their specific contents differ; their predictions are parallel to the extent that capitalism and industrial civilization are one and the same.[21] For both, the crucial point is the uncontrollable, even pathological, character of composite overgrowth. The control of any one component in composite growth can alter only the historical timing of the eventual conjuncture of crisis-producing factors.[22] Both models stipulate that dramatic changes in the way business is done on the planet can eliminate the overshoot syndrome by gaining control over the whole growth process. In Marxian thought, salvation comes in the form of revolution. The dilemma for the *Limits* team and the Club of Rome was to find a liberal equivalent of revolution, or to suffer rejection as Malthusian pessimists or, worse, self-fulfilling doomsayers. *Limits* settles for the assertion that the situation is not *yet* out of human control. "If there is deep concern, there is also cause for hope. Deliberately limiting growth would be difficult, but not impossible, The way to proceed is clear . . ." (p. 188). How clear, others find not so clear.

It is almost euphemistic to say that *Limits* was controversial. The report's computer projections of the consequences of ignoring the problem of limits for even a few more decades are in a form so visually direct as to make it seem self-explanatory that industrial civilization is bound to collapse during the coming century. Nowhere does *Limits* say that unabated growth beyond unforgiving limits will result in catastrophe, but its computer plots, and the pungent writing throughout, create an impression of crisis and urgency bound to shock readers.

In some quarters, *Limits* was hailed as a stupendous psychological and intellectual breakthrough—especially by those who read it from an

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central concept in the Marxist science of politics. . . ." See Althusser, *For Marx* (London: NLB, 1977), 250 (glossary prepared by translator and approved by author).

[21] Marxists would naturally identify capitalism with only one part of industrial civilization. In Immanuel Wallerstein's view, however, capitalism *is* today's world economy and therefore subsumes state socialism. If the former collapses, the latter must also. Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16 (September 1974), 413-15.

[22] Althusser's well-known use of the notion of the overdetermination of capitalist crisis (contradiction) to help solve the paradox (for Marxists) of "*the accumulation of effective determinations*" imposed by superstructural phenomena like national policies and international events and "*determination in the last instance imposed by the economic*" seems to us as ineffable as it is unnecessary when superimposed on the notion of conjuncture. Quotation from Althusser (fn. 20), 113; emphasis in original.

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ecological or humanistic point of view. Conversely, technologists, politicians, managers and, most vociferously, economists responded to the report with unfettered hostility.[23] The negative attitude of economists was partly parochial—their diatribes revealed deep resentment at being challenged by outsiders (the system dynamicists who prepared the report) on the proper way to study material growth. Their objections were generally couched in recondite technical and methodological terms which, even if they were conceded, would not seem to work decisively against the report's conclusions.[24] Beneath the specific objections was a frequently expressed disagreement with the report's unwillingness to assign an automatically redemptive role to technological development, abetted by the price mechanism; the record of the past amply demonstrates that unanticipated technological achievements invariably undid earlier dire predictions. London is not, after all, buried in horse manure. All such criticism misses the report's basic point that technological problem solving, with its disaggregating procedures, could hardly deal with problems unprecedented not just in number and complexity, but in the degree to which they are entangled—the *problematique* is new.

The critics typically, if implicitly, invoked two alternative models to capture the underlying pattern of growth. The first posits that limits are intellectual constructions of the parameters of capitalist growth *at a given moment*. But since these parameters grow at the same or an even greater rate than growth itself, they consistently move upward. As a static measure in a dynamic context, the term "limit" is meaningless. In this model the rate of growth is usually constant or varies moderately around a longstanding mean. Such a constant rate of growth provides an exponential increase in the quantity of growth. Graphically, there is no limit to growth; what becomes limited in due course is time in which to grow. Thus, the growth curve is asymptotic with respect to a Y axis if we use a conventional representation of growth through time on the X axis (Figure 1-A).

The logic of growth approaching infinity as time never quite runs out dictates an eventual expansion of industrial civilization beyond the confines of a finite planet. Adrian Berry's book, *The Next Ten Thousand*

[23] The range and intensity of responses is nicely revealed in Willem Oltman's interviews with a variety of Western intellectual leaders, including a number of economists. See Oltman, *On Growth* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1974).

[24] Among economists' critiques, the exemplar is Carl Kaysen, "The Computer that Printed Out W*O*L*F," *Foreign Affairs* 50 (July 1972), 660-68. The exemplar of criticism on technical grounds, with additional useful epistemological, substantive, and normative observations, is that of the Sussex Group. See Cole (fn. 15).

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FIGURE 1



Years, takes exactly this tack, as must any treatment of exponential material growth beyond the next few decades.[25]

The alternative model employed by the critics of *Limits* does accept eventual objective limits to growth, but posits an adaptive accommodation by industrial civilization to these limits in the form of a declining rate of growth. The growth curve then becomes asymptotic with respect to the X axis in a conventional graphic representation (Figure 1-B). In this model, the volume of growth gets infinitely closer to the X axis as the objective limit to growth over time. The rate of growth approaches zero and the result is a steady-state economy.[26]

The idea of a steady-state economy has been defended on normative grounds at least since the time of John Stuart Mill.[27] Whether such a

[25] Berry, *The Next Ten Thousand Years* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1974). See also Jack D. Salmon, "Politics of Scarcity versus Technological Optimism: A Possible Reconciliation?" *International Studies Quarterly* 21 (December 1977), 701-20.

[26] As an alternative formulation, "a system in which the rate of growth of the major variables was proportional to their distance from their limits would show a smooth, gradual, stable adaptation to its growth ceiling." Kaysen (fn. 24), 661-62.

[27] The literature is voluminous. Especially interesting are comparisons of Mills's and other classical economists' views on growth; see Harold J. Barnett and Chandler Morse, *Scarcity and Growth* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), chap. 3; Pavitt (fn. 19), 137-58; Robert Lekachman, "Mills, Malthus and Growth without End," *Dissent* 21 (Fall 1974), 492-500.

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condition is realizable under capitalist premises is an interesting question. Marxists say it is not. As they see it, the very effort to convert to a steady state reveals contradictions that spell capitalism's demise. That is not to say the problem does not exist for Marxists in identical form, inasmuch as socialism is also dependent on growth. The final transition to communism, with its steady-state implications, is supposed to take place only after the materialization of abundance; objective limits may prevent socialism from ever achieving that condition.

Among liberal economists with social imagination and a taste for thinking about the future, Kenneth Boulding believes that a steady state is achievable, although with a grave risk of collapse in the form of exponential down-growth through the disappearance of capital investment.[28] Robert Heilbroner is even more doubtful. He worries, too, about the likelihood of "severe economic crisis" resulting from "a falling rate of profit as the investment opportunities of the system are used up. Hence, in the absence of an expansionary frontier, the investment drive slows down and a deflationary spiral of incomes and employment begins."[29] He worries even more about reconditioning beneficiaries of capitalism to accept the material implications of "declining physical output per capita," such as non-growth logically implies. The easiest solution to the latter "political" problem is of course authoritarian control, which Heilbroner regards as the probable cost of a conversion to steady-state capitalism.[30] In any such event, it seems semantically unwarranted to label the results capitalism.

Most economists, and liberals in general, suspect that the limits to growth are not likely to recede before our eyes indefinitely. Nor do they welcome a marked decline in the rate of growth. Rather, they combine both models of *Limits*'s critics to split the difference. They believe in the likelihood of eventual slowdown in growth as limits cease to move upward as fast as growth itself. Nevertheless, the time span will be such that current distributive problems can be solved and political adjustments and social accommodations can be made progressively and, of course, relatively painlessly. In merging the models, they advance the familiar image of postindustrialism as a service-dominated, growth-dampened phase in the evolution of capitalism.

Can these models be reconciled without doing violence to their terms? In the case of the model of infinite growth, the motor source is technology. Its exponential growth not only drives material growth, but

[28] Boulding, "In the Shadow of the Stationary State," *Daedalus* 102 (Fall 1974), 96.
[29] Heilbroner, *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 84.
[30] *Ibid.*, 88-91.

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provides solutions for the limits of each component as they present themselves. Technological gains pay for themselves and everything else. The steady-state model also anticipates continued, though possibly not exponentially increasing, technological growth. Although this model acknowledges that technology cannot indefinitely force limits upward, it sees technology—along with its social counterparts of planning and management—as agents in this qualitative transformation of life; thus, there is no need to regret the decline in quantitative growth. Apparently, technology changes from motor to governor of growth. As the latter, it performs a social function of expediting the distributive adjustments that are impossible to ignore under conditions of diminished growth. Now we have a model that resembles the *Limits*/Marxist model of composite growth, but adds an auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that technology transmutes from material to social functions, substitutes composite non-growth for monocausal growth, and saves the system from overshoot and collapse. It would thus appear that infinite growth and steady-state models conflate; but the result is a more complicated explanation in which technology is the key both to growth and to the management of non-growth.

Interestingly, the reconciliation of infinite growth and steady-state models takes the form of a particularly common and important natural regularity. If we argue that the material function of technology smoothly transforms into a social function of managing non-growth, there is a mid-curve point of inflection, ideally giving us a sine curve of growth (Figure 1-c). Even short of this symmetrical ideal, its sigmoid form makes this curve exceptionally familiar.[31] The relative complexity of a model allowing infinite growth and steady-state arguments to be combined is offset in some measure by the archetypal elegance of its graphic representation which may reinforce its undeniable normative appeal. By contrast, the overshoot curve of *Limits* (Figure 1-d) is both too unpredictable and too irregular in form to be readily expressed mathematically.[32] It is striking without being "pretty" or appealing.[33]

[31] Sigmoid curves of population growth and diverse other phenomena were very much in vogue fifty years ago. Apparently the model was based less on a theory of growth than on a simple realization that indefinite exponential growth was literally impossible; see William Page, "Population Forecasting," in Cole (fn. 15), 168-70. With the aid of mathematics, a common empirical generalization—albeit defensible only in probabilistic terms—could be expressed in a law-like fashion. Contemporary theoretical constructs for sigmoid population curves tend to be complex and multicausal.

[32] The recent development of "a mathematical framework wherein discontinuous phenomena (especially abrupt changes in qualitative structure) can be produced from smooth causal processes" (fittingly called catastrophe theory), may duly change this situation. Robert T. Holt and others, "Catastrophe Theory and the Study of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (June 1978), 176. The relevance of catastrophe theory has already been asserted

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Another, quite different, critical assault on the *Limits* report perceived the report as a transparent attempt by the privileged beneficiaries of prior growth to hold on to a disproportionate share of planetary wealth for themselves; they would prevent additional significant growth because large growth increments are especially susceptible to redistribution. Stretched-out growth tends, on the other hand, to preserve the existing distribution for posterity.[34] The liberal answer to this critique is quite simple. A collapse of the empire of privilege can hardly make it possible to entitle additional beneficiaries. Perversity alone would compel a preference for uniform underprivilege that would follow upon a collapse. Only if the *Limits* argument is construed as a dishonest attempt to use scare tactics—in order to manage further growth selectively—is this radical criticism of *Limits* telling. It is far more plausible to charge the authors of *Limits* and the Club of Rome with an unselfconscious tendency toward cultural imperialism. Their frame of reference certainly includes non-Western political and managerial personnel with a stake in an orderly and prosperous future. Perhaps *Limits*'s projections of possible collapse alienated many people who shared the instrumental assumptions of *Limits*, not by its deceptions or deficiencies, but by casting doubt on their ability to do their jobs in the future.

II.

The second report to the Club of Rome appeared in 1974 with much fanfare and an eye-catching title—*Mankind at the Turning Point*. Written by Mihajlo Mesarović and Eduard Pestel, directors of a large staff on two continents, *Mankind* projects the image of being a bigger, better version of *Limits*. Its concern over the human predicament is comparable, as is its adoption of a systems conception of the *problematique*. The project was even more fervently committed to computer-assisted modeling of the global system, on a scale far more ambitious than that attempted by the *Limits* team. The report itself ignores, on a scale commensurately greater than does *Limits*, the technical dimensions of

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for the Marxist model of material growth and transformation in Philippe Van Parijs, "From Contradiction to Catastrophe," *New Left Review*, No. 115 (May-June 1979), 87-96.

[33] "Pretty" is James D. Watson's term, used repeatedly in his widely read book, *The Double Helix* (New York: Atheneum, 1968). Scientists like Watson normally prefer the prettiest among alternative models, on the assumption that nature does also, until their research conclusively demonstrates otherwise. The double helix model of DNA triumphantly confirms the force of this assumption and its appeal in distant domains of inquiry.

[34] The exemplar of radical criticism is Johan Galtung, " 'The Limits to Growth' and Class Politics," *Journal of Peace Research* 10 (No. 3, 1973), 101-14. The Bariloche project (fn. 9) was devised in the same spirit, as an answer to liberal assumptions about the distribution of planetary welfare.

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the project. Like *Limits*, *Mankind* is obviously intended for popular consumption, but its much greater technical complexity substantially increases the burden of faith imposed on the reader.[35]

The global model developed for the project has been subject to constant refinement since the report's appearance; it has been put to a number of other uses. There is a burgeoning technical literature on the "world integrated model," as it is now styled, and its allied methodology, which are not a matter of review here.[36] The depiction of the model behind *Mankind* takes the form of a simple verbal sketch, occupying barely two dozen pages, within which is to be found a highly compressed "brief" that diagrams the actual computer model. *Mankind*'s model is forthrightly asserted to improve on its counterpart in the *Limits* project by stratifying the world into five levels—in ascending order, they are environment, technology, demo-economic, group, and individual strata—and ten geographic regions, all of which are modeled separately.[37]

The system's strata are said to be "hierarchically organized," but they appear to have no objective existence: they lack rank, causal significance, and other criteria for differentiation external to the model. The strata are baldly asserted to operate autonomously, or are only loosely coupled, under "normal" conditions. For this reason only, "the world appears comprehensible." This egregious epistemological claim is supported by asking the absurd question, "How else would progress over so many centuries have been possible?" (p. 53). The regions are identified on common-sense grounds of "shared tradition, history and style of life, the stage of economic development, socio-political arrangements, and the commonality of major problems . . ." (p. 40). The regional systems also appear to be substantially autonomous, so that the global system, while affected throughout by devastating occurrences anywhere within it, will not collapse. Dampening rather than intensifying or cascading effects are assumed, not demonstrated. Furthermore, no region is seen as significantly above, or systemically more consequential, than the others. Dependency is thus implicitly rejected, and with it an ordering role for global capitalism. The opportunity to give the concept of hierarchy substantive—as opposed to some obscurely procedural—meaning is lost.[38]

[35] In *Mankind*'s model, "about 100,000 relationships are stored in the computer, as compared to a few hundred in other well-known world models" (p. 34).

[36] For an overview by a chief developer of the model, see Barry B. Hughes, *World Modeling* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980).

[37] There is also a passing but provocative reference to "the norm stratum" (p. 54), which, while not modeled, is deemed crucial to social change in crisis.

[38] In work providing the theoretical foundations of the model, Mesarović and others define hierarchy by requiring an order-of-magnitude difference in the size of units and a distinctive set of interactions within units. In their own words, "the vagueness of these two criteria

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The normal operation of a multilevel system is said to result in "organic growth" (pp. 53-54). This phrase has two meanings that are fused. One is that growth tapers off as need for it is fulfilled; the other is that growth follows its own course in different sectors and strata of the system. The specter of runaway growth is banished, and nodes of growth can be advocated by reference to need. Nevertheless, no evidence is adduced, beyond the metaphor of an organism, that any large-scale system is ever balanced as an enduring condition (if that is what normal means) or, as a precondition, that material growth normally stays differentiated in such systems. In the absence of genetically coded development or its improbable social equivalent—an arbitrarily introduced "master plan" (pp. 7, 9)—changes in the rate of growth chart the complex relations between an always needful, ever adaptive system and its environment. No one path is normal except, possibly, as a statistical generalization.[39] While planning on a modest scale is a normal activity in all social systems, and five-year plans and the like are a fixture in some very large societies, predicting the pattern of growth, whatever the prescription, has always proved to be hazardous.[40]

Seen in this light, the claim by the authors of *Mankind* that the project "is not based on ideological considerations, i.e., verbal inferences, but on scientific methodology and actual data" (p. 36) is preposterous. The assumptions built into the choice of model are surely more consequential than the choice of data, while the term "actual" hardly suffices to save data from the taint of ideology. Even Peccei and Alexander King in their postscript to *Mankind* chide its authors on this point (pp. 204-5).

The message of *Mankind* is simple enough: use a method similar to but presumably more advanced than system dynamics, to cut through the gloom of *Limits*. The Epilogue purports that "the results of the

('order of magnitude' and 'strength and type of interactions') indicates quite clearly the difficulty in establishing a hierarchy of structures which can stand the test of time even over a short period." M. D. Mesarović. D. Macko, and Y. Takahara, *Theory of Hierarchical, Multilevel, Systems* (New York: Academic Press, 1970), 31.

[39] *Mankind* presents four typical growth curves (p. 8), one of which is the sigmoid or logistic curve of growth characterized by slow take-off, a period of exponential growth that seems to feed on itself, and a topping-out either because of the increase of structural complexity in the thing growing or because of limits in the growing environment. This curve, as well as its many near cousins, is found so frequently among individual organisms, biological populations, and social activities as to be a strong candidate for the curve of "normal" growth. See also fn. 31.

[40] Because of the inclusive character of the five strata, the authors of *Mankind*, of course, assume that there is no environment, and thus no indeterminate range of system-environment relations. This strategy of inclusion by definition merely alters the form of the problem, not its substance. It is also hard to see how a "master plan," or any other ranking device suggesting an origin outside the system, comports with a comprehensive conception of the system.

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computer analysis . . . provide answers to the basic questions" raised by undifferentiated growth (p. 143). In fact, these "answers," taking the form of four general propositions (pp. 143-44), appear to be contrived for dramatic effect. Proposition one, that "*current crises are not temporary*, but reflect rather a persistent trend," overstates the study's methodological premise that the current system is abnormal, suffering a mere "*disorder*" (p. 53; emphases in original). Proposition two, that the solution to crises must be global, runs against the stipulated antonomy of regions and, under normal conditions, strata. Proposition three, that solutions cannot be "confined to an isolated aspect of the world system," is pushed beyond sensible meaning, not to mention any machine's computing capacity, by recommending "nothing short of a complete integration of all strata . . . that is, a simultaneous consideration of all aspects of man's evolution from individual values and attitudes to ecological and environmental conditions." Finally, proposition four, that crises can be resolved "*through cooperation rather than confrontation*" (emphasis in original), is good-willed liberal rationalism. It denies the hostile reality in which system participants often find themselves and the consequent rationality of their hostile behavior. Wishful thinking is offered instead: "in most instances cooperation is equally beneficial to most participants." Such observations have nothing to do with the model and subvert the normative preferences they imply. Exploitation of the world system's periphery may be seen as the product of capitalist cooperation on a grand scale; cartelization hardly maximizes welfare just because competition does not.

We ascend this staircase of questionable conclusions to reach a higher plane than is permitted by the project's empirical foundations: the presentation of a "new global ethic" (p. 147). What is needed is "world consciousness," frugality in resource use, an attitude of harmony with nature, and an identification with future generations. The report, but not the project, offers an opportunity to affirm an ideology of humane, cosmopolitan optimism, the latest stage of liberalism, which is the link to the next several reports.

The third report, *Reshaping the International Order*, was coordinated by Nobel economist Jan Tinbergen with substantive participation of 21 other specialists from diverse fields, most of them notables in their own right. Appearing in 1976, it was prompted by the movement in the United Nations to initiate a New International Economic Order. It follows the fashion of the day in proclaiming the existence of an international order where previously there was said to be a system—or, even

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more passive, an arena. *RIO* seems doubly derivative, inasmuch as Tinbergen had published a study in 1962, called *Shaping the World Economy*, to convey the wisdom of its time.[41] We thus find a preoccupation with a structural situation (denominated an order), which looms behind economic and functional activities, institutions, and politics on a global scale. If Tinbergen's audience is the community of professional economists and technicians who manage this order without a thought to its shape, then an orientation that deliberately substitutes "order" for "economy" could prove revelatory.

Nevertheless, the *RIO* report unduly limits its structural characterization to the distribution of power—"the creation of a just and equitable international social and economic order entails changes in the existing distribution of power" (p. 105). This spares the project and its audience a Marxist explication of the *problematique* and also eliminates any other materialist view of structure, such as is found in *Limits*. With a safely liberal conception of structure, the international order is assumed to have sufficient plasticity for some prescribed shaping. *RIO*'s prescriptions are as limp as they are obvious: encourage the growth of functional activities, strengthen legal institutions, enhance global awareness, change structure "through the creation of *'new coalitions'* " (p. 106; emphasis in original). To put to rest any doubt about the last recommendation, the report observes that "the greatest power which the third world possesses is its *solidarity*. It is of absolute importance that the third world retain its 'collective poor power' " (*ibid.*; emphasis in original).

The report is studded with numerous observations that are just as glib, indeed bordering on the disingenuous and exiguous. To illustrate: global distributive problems "would be most effectively overcome through the negotiation and adoption of a *framework* treaty . . . based on cooperation rather than competition and would clearly demonstrate that all can benefit from organized change" (p. 116; emphasis in original). "In the final analysis, our world is ruled by ideas—rational and ethical—and not by vested interests. The 'power of the idea,' the particular weapon of scientists, moralists and concerned citizens, must prove of decisive importance in constructing a fairer and more peaceful world . . ." (p. 107).

In attempting to broaden the perspective of its audience, *RIO* does much to confirm its deepest prejudices. The report reinforces the smug

[41] Tinbergen, *Shaping the World Economy* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962). The Twentieth Century Fund affords established scholars an opportunity to present an up-to-date appreciation of particular social problem areas to interested lay audiences. Its objectives, though less focused or sustained, are not so very different from those of the Club of Rome.

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presumption of most economists and technicians that structural ills will respond to functional treatment. It accepts fully the liberal belief in the power of apparently rational ideas held by people of evident good will. It denies the materialism and determinism that so many liberals read into *Limits* with so much alarm, but refuses to acknowledge the power of uncongenial ideas by attempting to rebut them directly. Its prescriptions are virtual placebos; it advises a patient in great distress, one who suspects cancer (*Mankind*'s image for runaway growth), to have faith in the body's restorative powers.

To the extent that *RIO* had an impact, it could hardly be accounted for by the power of its ideas. Rather, it represents a return to the liberal fold already anticipated by *Mankind* and dramatically confirmed by the next report to the Club, which was published in 1977. It was prepared by Ervin Laszlo, systems philosopher and self-proclaimed heretical thinker on the human predicament,[42] in conjunction with a staggering array of project participants, consultants, and advisers. The report, entitled *Goals for Mankind*, is divided into three parts. The first is an inventory of goals for major regions and transnational interests; the second, an inventory of global security, resource, and development goals; the third (and presumably heretical) part is a discourse on world solidarity. The inventories are combinations of what particular elites say their goals are, and what can easily be inferred from brief descriptions of the political and economic life and international position for each country and transnational interest as it is serially discussed. Global goals are reduced to inane clichés by the act of digesting them. For example, global energy goals are "condensed under the heading of 'three A's': *abundance, accessibility,* and *affordability*" (p. 218; emphases in original). The obvious question, "Is there a source of energy that can meet all these specifications, and a technology to tap it for human use?" is summarily dispatched with the answer, "Today there is not. But it is virtually certain that tomorrow there can be" (p. 219).

The last part is anything but heretical. It proposes "breaking through mankind's inner limits and opening up new horizons in the global community" (p. 301).[43] It is a tired rehash of liberal cosmopolitanism, functional elitism, would-be populist exhortation about global awareness, nuclear pacifism, and the current high fashion for appropriate technol-

[42] Laszlo's book, *The Inner Limits of Mankind* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1978), is subtitled *Heretical Reflections on Today's Values, Culture and Politics*.

[43] Laszlo appropriated the phrase "inner limits" from Peccei (fn. 1, 1977), 194-95, but abandoned Peccei's partly materialist view that such limits are bio-physical as well as social and cultural.

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ogy, self-reliance, alternative cultures, and holistic thinking. As if in recognition that his recipes are anything but original, Laszlo has appended a postscript to the mass distribution paperback version of the report, in which he vainly attempts to offset the report's flatness by means of a binge of pretentious rhetoric: "Diversity *with* cooperation can bring all the benefits conferred by successful achievement of global goals. It calls not for mere coexistence and détente, but for positive interexistence and entente" (p. 363; emphasis in original). For a philosopher to mint a word—interexistence—the meaning of which recedes in accelerating proportion to the attention it secures must stand either as an act of extreme desperation or of intellectual bankruptcy.[44]

Goals is surely the nadir in the succession of reports to the Club of Rome. It represents the culmination of a trend toward ever more participants in each project and manages to achieve the lowest common denominator with the greatest number.[45] It is the longest in a series of ever longer reports, each more florid but less striking in language than its predecessor. However grotesquely, rhetorical excess pays tribute to the *problematique*, even as it documents a retreat, report by report, into the safe, comfortable world of liberal sensibilities, fixed on the idea that articulation of any problem is at least half the battle in solving it. The reports that follow *Goals* no longer pretend that anything more than a serial approach is required. They are brief, narrow in scope, and bland in their purpose. They are published by a science and technology press at an exorbitant price—presumably for a small audience of established means, interest, and access.

Beyond the Age of Waste is billed as an opportunity for the Club's "technological optimists" (p. x)—Nobel Laureate Denis Gabor and Umberto Colombo chairing a "working party" of 36, including 14 Club members—to address the same elements of the global *problematique* that were brought to attention by *Limits*. This 1978 publication says very little about what lies beyond the age of waste, leaving the reader to conclude that sober policies, sound management, and sensible consumer attitudes will give us time to find technological solutions to long-run problems of scarcity. The report recommends stop-gap measures to buy time for redemptive technology, even if some of these measures are

[44] But Archie J. Baum, *The Philosopher's World Model* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), 53, regards interexistence as a "quantum-leap" in conceptual development.

[45] *Mankind* is less an exception to this trend than appears from the large size of its team (42 collaborators, 21 consultants): most members were involved in technical model-related activities rather than in developing the conceptual foundations of the project or in drafting the report. Neither *RIO* nor *Goals* employs a formal model.

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costly or painful. *Waste* accepts the consequences of its analysis by calling the continued development of nuclear energy facilities "an unavoidable choice" (p. 97), implying that to choose otherwise, while not actually impossible, would be unreasonable and irresponsible.

The report ends by reaffirming its authors' "conviction that the real limits to growth, rather than being scientific and technological, are political, social and managerial" (p. 229). Their technological optimism insists that science and technology on one hand, and society on the other, occupy autonomous domains. (*Limits* implied that such a distinction cannot be made.) In principle, these optimists say, science and technology can solve all problems *if only* they are allowed to. The rejoinder supplied by the subtext of *Limits* is that science and technology are by their nature political, social, and managerial activities. Properly understood in the largest sense, science and technology are the source of problems represented in material terms as limits to growth. In keeping with rationalist sentiments, the optimists go on to conclude that political, social, and managerial limits to growth "can, with effort and good will, be overcome," but then they enter a reservation that betrays the parochial character of their optimism and the limits of liberal assumptions: "Still lying deeper may be the limitations which reside in the nature of man—but consideration of these is not for the present study" (p. 229).

Two reports appeared in 1979. One, entitled *Energy: The Count-Down*, was prepared by Thierry de Montbrial; it is prefaced by recommendations by Robert Lattès and Club member Caroll Wilson. The recommendations and the report hew to the position staked out in *Waste*, but avoid all ambiguity by calling the energy problem "undoubtedly the most important one facing the world between now and the end of the century, because every other problem, including food supply, is subordinate to it in one way or another" (p. 47). Having thus simplified the *problematique* to a single, overarching problem, the report attacks this problem with economists' as well as technologists' weapons. Discussion of prices, rents, and markets complements the predictable assertion that "in the face of reality the international cooperation which is so essential will gradually find its way and means of functioning" (p. 197).

Energy worries about energy problems over the next few decades even more than its predecessor, *Waste*. It also supports nuclear development, for example, but registers the same optimism for what lies beyond the "difficult transition" we face "before finding the means of producing energy in abundant if not unlimited quantities from totally renewable

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sources" (p. 38). How we might "find" this fountain of eternal energy is left to the readers' imagination, for this outcome presupposes a supply of capital to pay for such an awesome technical accomplishment.[46] Investment such as is needed in the absence of a political decision to pay is conventionally presumed to respond to demand for a good, with the result of an increase in that good's supply. Yet we are informed, most emphatically, that "*demand must adapt to supply*" (p. 36, emphasis in original). Apparently the use of economics by technological optimists is a matter of window dressing, and the place of politics is behind the lace curtain of techno-managerial propriety.

The second report released in 1979 is called *No Limits to Learning*, an obvious reference to *Limits*. Written by an international team with much expert participation, *No Limits* reads dismayingly like another version of the last, hortatory part of *Goals*. The report chooses to emphasize "the human element as central to the global problematique. . . ." Its association with "movements that began towards the mid-seventies" is proudly acknowledged: "Recent currents of thought have provided clear indications that developments should foster self-reliance, meet human needs, and promote harmony with nature" (p. 120).

Limits is not rebutted, merely ignored. "No Limits" means not that there are no material limits, but that the capacity to learn is unlimited; we are left to infer that we can learn to live with material limits. No longer must we hear about goodwill and cooperation. Apparently we can take these for granted, along with the prognoses of the technological optimists. Being self-reliant, encouraging solidarity across generations and among peoples, engaging in innovative learning, respecting diverse values—all of these make up a stance conducive to cooperation, management, problem solving, and whatever else must be done to fix up the system. More importantly, the very existence of this stance as a generalized state of mind will relieve the system of most of its stresses and strains, thus making action far easier. The *problematique* turns out to be an illusion, at most an occlusion, and the predicament a matter of dispelling ignorance and little more—as "forward-looking people" (Laszlo's phrase, *Goals*, xv) knew all along.

Nowhere in *No Limits* is there even a glimmer of appreciation for the possibility that innovative thinking takes place all the time, with

[46] *Mankind* (p. 190) provides a useful illustration in connection with proposals for solar energy farms which would cost $20 to $50 trillion to develop on the requisite scale. Though the authors calculate the amortization of this astronomical investment to be 30 to 40 years, they do not speculate on its source.

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infrequent and unpredictable impact on the larger meaning of things; that many problems are not solved by the mere fact of understanding them; that self-reliance takes as given a minimal public order and access to the conditions of well-being; that harmony with nature requires a renunciation of the liberal ideology of mastering nature; and that, in any event, the massive violation of nature represented by Western civilization can never be undone, even if we all wished to be self-reliant. Our numbers are too great, as is our dependence on large-scale, centralized systems of support for huge populations.

Global "greening" is actively and unabashedly sought by the authors of *No Limits*, and passively accepted by the technological optimists' soothing message: that we can get by if we waste less, dampen our demand for material goods, distribute more fairly, develop according to the diverse requirements of each situation, cooperate and otherwise display goodwill and, of course, acknowledge the adaptive capacity of our science and technology. One of the two reports that apppeared in 1980 draws on these themes to map the future—to use its own imagery. The other resists the drift toward complacent liberal humanism by offering a dialogue on many of the same themes. *Road Maps to the Future* and *Dialogue on Wealth and Welfare* bear certain superficial similarities. Each is substantially the work of one individual—Bohdan Hawrylyshyn and Orio Giarini, respectively—and thus represents a departure from the collaborative character of earlier reports. Both writers are associated with small institutions in Geneva that serve business needs: Hawrylyshyn with the International Management Institute, and Giarini with the International Association for Insurance Economics Research. Neither reports on a research program nor claims originality in a strictly scholarly sense. Instead, they locate themselves in relation to established intellectual traditions and sift through varied materials in developing their presentations, very much as if they were leading seminars for the Club's public-spirited constituencies. Here the resemblance ends. *Road Maps* is short and polished, while *Dialogue* is long, lumpy, and incompletely digested. Nevertheless, *Road Maps* is as forgettable as it is accessible; *Dialogue* demands even as it deters consideration.

Road Maps proclaims its major concern with its subtitle: *Towards More Effective Societies.* Although he is a member of the club, Hawrylyshyn gives every appearance of being unaware that this orientation runs directly counter to Peccei's conception of the *problematique* as a *global* matter. The societies he refers to are those of major countries such as the United States, Soviet Union, China, Japan, India, Brazil, and a

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sampling from Western Europe. By effectiveness, he means performance in economic, political, and social terms. Precise measurements are impossible, but comparison and evaluation are not.

Hawrylyshyn's comparison proceeds by itemizing unique combinations of assets, values, institutions, and experiences for each society. The entities under comparison are thereby presumed to be discrete, their problems distinctive, and their destinies particular. Everything may be connected within societies, but, by the terms of comparison, connections among societies are schematized as responses taken within them to their respective problems.

To hold that such problems are not the world's to solve not only disowns the *problematique*, but would also seem to promote corrective strategies within societies that are most likely to succeed at someone else's expense. Hawrylyshyn escapes the beggar-thy-neighbor implications of his method by prescribing a series of adaptations for each society which, taken as a whole, would foster "group cooperative values," "shared-consensual power," and, less clearly, socialism with some mix of distributive and market tendencies (chap. 4). Allowing for differences in culture and circumstance, the ideal society would probably combine the best traits now identifiable in Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Instead of converting neighbors into beggars, societies are invited to contain their futures, thus to ease the strains they place on each other and on the planet.

Small is not only beautiful in this view, but a world of small places is safe, fair, and diverse. It is also a world of comfort for everyone. Hawrylyshyn does not explain just how the material benefits of the global, growth-dominated economic order are to be sustained under these circumstances. He does not admit the possibility that a world not growing might reduce our progeny to poverty: a particular future is "inevitable" because no other is tolerable (p. 178). His evidence of inevitability is the usual anemic assortment of sentiments about humanity having "risen to extraordinary challenges before," and the argument that the "educational level of people is increasing everywhere" (p. 181). In the same spirit, he finds that disorder and economic decline are impossible because "populations at large would not accept such a situation for very long" (p. 177). We never get one large road map for the planetary future. Instead, the map kit comes with the same wish list found in all reports after *Limits*—except, to its credit, *Dialogue on Wealth and Welfare*.

Dialogue consists of three long essays, mingled more than ordered for the purpose of a general argument. The first takes the form of an actual

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dialogue on the nature of economics between Giarini and a conventional, well-informed and good-willed liberal. In offering an alternative view, Giarini questions blind faith in science—"too often the image of science is the image of a *belief* in human 'supernatural' power over things that are not really understood" (p. 11, emphasis in original)—and in the assumptions of conventional economics about value, utility, cost, capital, and wealth. Though his argument defies easy summary, his objective does not: he "would give economics the priority task of researching the conditions under which it is currently possible to increase the availability of real wealth. The fight against scarcity is first and foremost a problem of adequately developing the 'supply' side, or, simply, the worth of goods and services produced" (p. 35).

Giarini's dialogue is useful in placing his argument in the context of contemporary preoccupations with distributive and ecological matters. It permits him to introduce an important and, by his lights, central concept of wealth as "Dowry and Patrimony," meaning "the stock of natural, biological and man-made goods and services we have available to us and from which we derive our welfare in the largest sense" (p. 42). By considering wealth in these terms, Giarini is able to include non-monetarized wealth and its role in global welfare. The discussion is a significant advance over previous reports in using economic analysis to gauge dimensions of the *problematique*. In particular, it reveals that *RIO*, despite its reformist intentions, was altogether conventional in its approach.

The dialogue format is by its nature excessively wordy and a trifle patronizing. Giarini would have been better served by the more direct form of presentation that we find in his second essay, on the generation and depletion of wealth defined in a large way. When he discusses monetarized wealth in a detailed treatment, Giarini returns to the issues first raised in *Limits* and then progressively abandoned in subsequent reports. In *Dialogue*, he assesses the role of technology and capital in the Industrial Revolution, and the peculiar dependence thereafter of wealth, as conventionally understood, on the apparently cyclical character of science- and technology-based revolutions in industrial production. In doing so, he reveals much about the inertial qualities of contemporary capitalism (highlighted in *Limits*) that press on the planet's nonmonetary reserves of wealth. At the same time, he exposes the other side of inertia in the global engine of growth: its loss of forward momentum, *not*—at least not directly—because of the resistance encountered from material limits, but because of the diminishing thrust provided by technology and capital formation as they operate in tandem today.

Giarini's arguments draw on several intellectual currents that are not

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brought to attention in the other reports: recent, stimulating work by Nicholas Rescher on "the reasons and implications of a deceleration of science" (p. 139); by Gerhard Mensch on "long-term cycles of the industrial system and their relationship to cycles of innovation" (p. 144); and even by J. W. Forrester on the "superimposition of cycles" (p. 145);[47] as well as more familiar studies by David Landes, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, and Thomas S. Kuhn; and seminal work done earlier in the century by Kondratieff and Schumpeter. *Dialogue*, along with this recent and rediscovered work, renews and redirects the attack on the central problems of global growth raised in *Limits*. Seen in this light, the last part of *Dialogue*, an essay on operations and instruments of the current world economic order, is distracting, far less original, and unneeded; indeed, it contributes to the report's bloated feel. *Dialogue*'s significant theses are to be found in a slender book Giarini wrote with Henri Loubergé, tellingly entitled *The Diminishing Returns of Technology*.[48] This essay would have better served as a report to the Club, although *Dialogue* is clearly designed to fit within—even as it attempts to carry off a revolutionary departure from—the Club's recent concerns.

III

The Club of Rome triggered a great debate on the future of industrial civilization when *Limits* was published in 1972. With the exception of *Dialogue*, subsequent reports may be interpreted as attempts to back off from the polarizing impact of that first publication by rising above extreme positions and marshaling all interested parties into practical courses of action. While the temporizing thus reflected in a decade of reports to the Club fits its pluralist and programmatic commitments, the debate itself has been lost in a torrent of writing on the future—much of it frothy—that has engulfed the very institution largely responsible for unleashing it.

What happened to the debate as originally joined? Its early vitality

[47] These are Giarini's and not necessarily the authors' characterizations. His citations are: Rescher, *Scientific Progress* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978); Mensch, *Stalemate in Technology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979); Forrester, *The Changing Environment for Industrial Enterprise*, System Dynamics Group, Paper No. D-2667-2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).

[48] Giarini and Loubergé, *The Diminishing Returns of Technology* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1978). Note the phrase "internal limits" to growth (pp. 8, 16), which is not to be confused with Peccei's "inner limits" (see fn. 43). Internal limits are precisely those built into a system of material growth that is dependent on the growth of technological possibilities, dependent in turn on material growth, and so on, in what may be shown as unstable circularity. See also a brilliant formal exposition of the parallel situation of the growth of science in Nicholas Rescher (fn. 47).

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stemmed from the uncertain condition of the Western economies. Prosperity, which was seen by *Limits* as our greatest problem, has the disconcerting effect of making scarcity seem far away and altogether unreal. The temporary economic dislocations that industrial countries experienced soon after *Limits* had appeared brought a glimpse of the future and stirred second thoughts about everyday improvidence. The passing of the immediate threat to the material well-being of the West left a residual sense of concern, which was conveniently directed toward penumbral issues in the debate.

Arguments over meeting basic human needs on a planetary scale, enhancing the quality of life in complement to material gains, and accounting for the real costs of growth *appear* to be informed responses to the debate over planetary limits. Still, they follow only its surface texture, which is formed by articulating the basic problem of planetary limits by references to population growth, scarcity seen in distributive terms, pollution and consumer habits. Taking issue on these matters obscures the fundamental concern with the long-run consequences of runaway growth; it does raise awareness of undeniably important questions—which, if solved, would contribute, in the ineluctable logic of *Limits*, to the long-run problem. Issue by issue, we learn about the material dimensions of growth that are raised to view in *Limits*, but to different effect than its authors intended. The obvious though particular importance of the several secondary issues now in the foreground has charmed both principals and audiences into thinking that all questions of growth are confined to each issue as framed. In each instance, however, the problem is different, raising a host of practical and moral dilemmas, all of which satisfy a need to propose grand strategies, document everything in sight, denigrate adversaries, and anticipate dramatic confirmation of each author's prejudices.[49] Meanwhile, the real issue, embedded in the logic of *Limits*, but lost in the caricature of *Limits* animating today's discourse on all sides, his slipped almost entirely from view.

Peccei is fully aware that the debate has gone awry. He also believes the planetary situation has worsened markedly in the last decade, and that the decade of the eighties will prove to be the decisive one. His tone is now more pessimistic than ever before.[50] Peccei wants to reorient

[49] Illustrations of the first three tendencies are, respectively, *North-South: A Program for Survival*, The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980); *The Global 2000 Report to the President* (Washington: G.P.O., 1980); Julian L. Simon, *The Ultimate Resource* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). Together, they illustrate the temper of current discourse on the future and, of course, the fourth tendency.

[50] Peccei attributes this increased pessimism, rather unconvincingly, to others as well: "Gloomy views and forecasts were everywhere. Earlier, people had accused the Club of

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the debate and restore the Club to a central place in it. The strategy he proposes is "to widen the debate even more." The Club "will place particular emphasis on the *problem and prospects of human development*."[51] More precisely, the Club will concentrate its efforts on following up on the lamentable *No Limits* report. We should scarcely be surprised that Peccei's liberal humanism has pushed him in this direction, which may result in any number of new studies "on processes that govern our learning," as well as a network of study centers on the future, staffed by young people.[52] But how can he believe that such activities properly address the risks and dangers of this decisive decade? The alternative would be to acknowledge that the prospects of capitalism are the real issue. That would also mean acknowledging the likes of Herman Kahn, who held this to be the case, and considered the Club to be his true adversary.[53] If the Club has no limit to its learning, this time it should stand by the implications of its diagnosis, stop functioning as a *salon* for high-minded members of the techno-managerial set, and accept the perils of partisanship.[54]

Rome—unjustly—of being alarmist; now, they were beginning to compete in pessimism . . ." (fn. 1, 1981), 55, speaking of the seventies.

[51] *Ibid.*, 134; emphasis in original.

[52] *Ibid.*, 173, 179-82.

[53] See Kahn and others, *The Next Two Hundred Years* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), and Herman Kahn and John B. Phelps, "The Economic Present and Future," *The Futurist* 13 (June 1979), 202-22. By taking on Kahn and his associates at the Hudson Institute, the Club need not repudiate its other initiatives. On the contrary, the Club's network of study centers could help to counter a new project of the Hudson Institute entitled "Visions of the Future," which is directed at high school students in the United States.

[54] For a similar conclusion, though supported somewhat differently, see Phillipe Braillard, "New Political Values for a World in Crisis: The Approach of the Club of Rome," *International Political Science Review* 3 (No. 2, 1982), 240.

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THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

By G. K. HELLEINER*

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I. Introduction

IS it conceivable that the international monetary system now operating might have been intentionally constructed by the "fathers" of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944?

We now have a system of managed flexible rates, similar to that of

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the 1918-1925 period, in which short-term turbulence and uncertainty are taken as inevitable, if unfortunate, parts of the international scene. Macroeconomic coordination among the major powers, backed by reciprocal credit arrangements, is limited and much more complex and multipolar than that existing between the Bank of England and the U.S. monetary authorities in the 1920s. The central international monetary institution (the International Monetary Fund, or IMF) has little influence or control over the major surplus countries or the major powers, and is itself controlled by them. Its credit is increasingly employed in support of balance-of-payments adjustment in the poorest of developing countries, toward whom it is liberal with its deflationary advice and tough in its lending conditions.

The rest of the world manages its balance-of-payments problems through the use of multiple-currency foreign exchange reserves, commercial bank credits, and official bilateral credits. Multilaterally agreed-upon expansion of global liquidity has constituted a tiny proportion of the actual increase therein over the past decade; indeed, the value of gold (the "barbarous relic") in official reserves—the price of which fluctuates spectacularly in the open market—has risen by a multiple of the value of the drawing rights of various kinds in the IMF. The adequacy of liquidity is determined more by private international banks than by governmental institutions; in recent years, the former have dispensed over ten times the amount of balance-of-payments lending to developing countries that the International Monetary Fund has made available for similar purposes.

How would the architects of Bretton Woods have viewed the present macroeconomic circumstances? During the most severe recession since the 1930s, the central international monetary institution is calling for increased restraint on the grounds that times are tough. Simultaneously, the West's central bankers' club (the Bank for International Settlements, or BIS) is warning that private banks should not cut their international credit too sharply, and is organizing emergency credit arrangements for countries like Hungary and Mexico, which find themselves illiquid as a consequence of unexpected difficulties and/or bankers' loss of nerve. The major powers are in sharp and overt dispute as to the appropriate conduct of macroeconomic policy (not to speak of the possibility of a trade war). Nervousness is high about bank balance sheets, and the adequacy of official lender-of-last-resort arrangements governing the overseas operations of international banks has been questioned anew in the wake of the failure of a major Italian bank. Monetarily, we are living in interesting times!

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The role of the developing countries in the seemingly rickety international monetary system has become much greater in the 1970s. At the same time, systemic failures, when they occur, are likely to register most severely on the economic circumstances of the peripheral countries. There is a real need for a reassessment of the place and interests of the developing countries in the international monetary system.

Outside of the developing countries, their interest in global monetary arrangements was not, until quite recently, seen to be distinct from that of the rest of the world; although there have been longstanding disputes over the possible link between special drawing rights (SDRs) and development finance, the principal interests of the less developed countries were assumed to lie in the resumption of a more ordered and rapid growth of the global economy.

It should have been more evident to all that these issues are complex: that macroeconomic and monetary problems of the developing countries have always looked different from those of the industrialized countries (and, particularly in Latin America, have been the subject of prolonged controversies not dissimilar to those now wracking Northern macroeconomics); that the majority of developing countries did not experience any change in their own exchange-rate regimes during what many see as the "break" year of 1973 (although they were not totally unaffected by the fact that others did); and that there were other major changes underway in the international monetary arena—especially in the provision of balance-of-payments financing, which affected the interests of the developing countries in far more important ways than the exchange rate break of the early 1970s. Now that the international monetary system—and, more specifically, the functioning of the International Monetary Fund—has become one of the two most important areas in the North-South dispute (the other is Northern protectionism), it is no longer possible to avoid a careful analysis of the complexities of the developing countries' interests in international monetary arrangements.

It must immediately (and sadly) be stated that as yet no single author has successfully brought these issues up to date and together in focused and book-length form. The only recent volume in which the interests of developing countries are examined directly and consistently—that by Stewart and Sengupta—does not pretend to be a comprehensive survey, but it is provocative and highly to be recommended. There has, however, been a burst of writing on the subject, not least within the international agencies most directly concerned, such as the IMF, the World Bank (IBRD), and the UNCTAD. The interests of the developing countries have also been addressed within wider studies of international monetary

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problems (e.g., by Argy, Hirsch and others, and Gardner), or of North-South issues, most notably in the report of the Brandt Commission. Much of the recent discussion remains scattered, however, in mimeographed papers, journals, and in books on more general subjects. The best recent works that address at least some of the major issues are edited volumes, with their inevitable internal variations in approach and quality.

II. Some Conceptual Issues and Approaches

In the area of international finance, particularly as it relates to developing countries, the question of what is a monetary issue and what is a matter of development finance can be a difficult one. It has been customary to equate monetary issues with short-run, demand-related, and essentially temporary balance-of-payments problems. The International Monetary Fund's purposes, as expressed in Article I of the IMF agreement, include an aspiration "to give confidence to members by making the Fund's resources temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity" and "to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members" (Argy, 23). Development finance, concerned with expansion of supply and the long run, was considered to be a matter for official development assistance, foreign direct investment, bond markets, and the World Bank.

Private development finance and official development assistance are not, strictly speaking, part of the international monetary scene; they are geared to longer-run objectives. The IMF is forever concerned to make its point that it is not a "development institution" like the World Bank (despite the fact that its purposes explicitly include contribution to "the development of the productive resources of all members" and "the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income" as "primary objectives of economic policy"—albeit in the context of facilitating the growth of international trade). From the standpoint of the recipient, however, finance is finance, and the object is to manage it and the resulting debt as best one can in pursuit of domestic long- and short-run objectives.

The activities of the IMF and the World Bank have increasingly overlapped, as the Fund has become interested in supply-side policies and more extended (longer-term) adjustment programs, and the Bank

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has moved, albeit on a limited basis, into so-called structural adjustment lending. Aid agencies have also become involved in monetary management as they offer balance-of-payments support, generalized lines of credit, and the like, to poor countries with limited capacity to absorb additional projects. IMF-IBRD cooperation is close by now; it is quite customary for representatives of one institution to join the country mission of the other.

In addition, it is important to distinguish between the impact of overall macroeconomic disruptions and malaise, and the effects of the international monetary system *per se*. All but the most fundamentalist monetarists (are there any still around?) recognize real changes—such as the pace of technological progress or the development of market power by the oil exporters—as major determinants of overall economic performance. Macroeconomic problems can arise and persist for reasons totally unrelated to monetary issues, although monetary events can certainly play an important role in their alleviation or deterioration. The performance of the international monetary system is best assessed in terms of such an auxiliary or "handmaiden" role, rather than in terms of any assumed centrality to the world's, or the less developed countries', economic performance.

III. Commercial Banking and the International Monetary System

Undoubtedly the most important international monetary development of the past decade has been the re-awakening of international money and capital markets after 40 years of hibernation. The liberalization of international capital flows on the part of the major industrialized countries, and a series of fortuitous circumstances—U.S. banking regulations, East European interests in non-U.S. banking, the needs of transnational corporations, the sudden emergence of the oil exporters as enormous depositors—combined to produce a burst of international banking activity in the new "offshore" Eurocurrency markets. A highly efficient, integrated, and virtually unregulated international currency and banking system now offers, throughout the globe, continuous service to a world whose distances have shrunk because of the wonders of telecommunications and computerized information systems. Private international banking now dwarfs the activities of the International Monetary Fund in the provision of short- and medium-term finance to sovereign governments, including many of the governments of less developed countries.

The implications of this vast privatization of the functions originally

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assigned to the IMF, and the rapid accumulation of enormous short- to medium-term commercial debts on the part of many developing countries, are quite properly the prime objects of attention in recent books on global monetary affairs. Assessments of the "new international monetary order" which has come unplanned upon us range from the panic-stricken to the passive, and even to the mildly enthusiastic.

In one view, not only is the monetary system now inherently unstable, but an international financial crisis seems to be imminent. Banks in the "unprotected" Eurocurrency markets have, as always, taken short-term deposits and converted them into medium- and longer-term loans. These loans are not backed by reserve requirements, and the availability of a lender of last resort in case of liquidity difficulties is uncertain. Many loans have been made to developing and socialist countries which have since run into major economic difficulties; consequently, the quality of these loans has deteriorated. At a time of severe worldwide recession, bank loans to domestic (and originally safer) borrowers are also increasingly called into question, raising further fears as to the banks' liquidity. In addition, official freezes of bank assets, such as those imposed by the U.S. on Iran and by the U.K. on Argentina, have not done much to strengthen confidence in the debtors' capacity to repay particular banks, or, again, in the liquidity of the banks.

Loans have typically been made through banking syndicates in which cross-default clauses ensure that once there is default on payment to one bank, all the others have the right to call their loans as well. The responsible and collectively sensible course for the banks that are locked into substantial loans to clients who have run into difficulties is to continue to lend to them collectively, usually via negotiated refinancing schemes. But there is an obvious temptation, in defense of the interests of individual banks, to preserve their own balance sheets by cutting back on such loans. Under stresses and uncertainties of this kind, interbank confidence is placed in significant jeopardy. The Eurocurrency markets are built upon a complex interweaving of interbank deposits; ultimately, their stability depends upon mutual confidence.

A major default, a bank failure, a loss of nerve—all increasingly likely as the recession deepens and interest rates remain high—could set off a massive contraction of credit as individual banks scurry for cover. Whatever its other effects, such a contraction would create enormous problems for the principal borrowing countries as they are suddenly deprived of credit. The virtually inevitable result would be debt repudiation and the closure of international financial markets to these countries and to many others for another several decades.

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A time lag in publication and in the reviewing process can sometimes be instructive. In the case of books on debt and international commercial banking, it is striking how different the overall mood regarding the prospect of financial crises was only a few years ago. The relative complacency found in the 1979 Franko-Seiber volume (especially in papers by McMullen, Seiber, and Ganoe, the latter a banker himself)—albeit punctuated by warnings as to the risks that could accompany future recession (e.g., Solomon, 38, and Franko, 294)—contrasts markedly with the current anxiety over worldwide recession in which the IMF, the BIS, and commercial banks strain to hold the system together in the face of dangers from East European and Latin American defaults.

It would be foolhardy to imagine that world finance had somehow moved to a new plane beyond the possibility of the major "hiccups" that have characterized the past two hundred years or so, even if the temporary cessation of international activity for 40 years and a period of sustained global growth has dulled memories. What can or should be done about the risks of a generalized financial crisis is not, however, obvious. While improving their joint surveillance of foreign lending activities and particularly of the functioning of the Eurocurrency markets, and in attempting to agree upon their lender-of-last-resort responsibilities with respect to offshore banking, the Western central banks have been treading very cautiously concerning the possibility of further joint intrusions into the activities of private banking. The superficially obvious device of increasing the regulation of the Eurobanks ("control and coordination": Versluysen, 246), particularly regarding their lending and their reserves and capitalization, runs into major objections and risks. Can one preserve the gains for the international system—and not least for the developing countries who are the beneficiaries of unregulated bank lending—while increasing regulation and reducing overall risks? The more creditworthy developing countries would gain from reduced uncertainty as to the rollover of their debts—not to speak of the future of the global economy—that might accompany a more regulated system; but they are justifiably suspicious that increased regulation may create instead a centralized and cartelized credit system in which lender competition is reduced, to the borrowers' disadvantage.

Alternatively, can one insulate domestic financial events from whatever disasters may befall the international lenders in the Eurocurrency markets? Traditional devices for achieving such insulation limit the degree of foreign involvment by domestic financial institutions; therefore, however useful they may be for particular industrial countries, such tactics are likely to be costly to prospective debtors. The interests

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of developing countries in money and capital markets, as in goods markets, involve keeping the industrial countries "open."

Proposals for developing insurance arrangements for private banks, or increasing resort to cofinancing with multilateral financial institutions, run into problems both of moral hazard and of doubts as to whether—particularly at a time of great stringency for the poorest countries—that is the best use of the limited available public funds in financing the developing countries.

Despite the enormous growth in lending by commercial banks and the relatively small role apparently played by the IMF, some authors argue that the private banks are not in effective control of international monetary events. This view is strengthened by the fact that the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund do not begin to describe its significance. IMF certification of the macroeconomic policies of its members exerts a major influence upon the lending activities of the private banks and, in some instances, of official lenders and aid agencies as well. The Fund's "capacity to impose political and economic conditions on borrowers is unequaled" (Aronson, 330), whether the borrowers obtain their funds from the IMF or the Euromarkets. One may also, with Susan Strange (Aronson, 15-16), see the IMF's role as one of bolstering the confidence and stiffening the nerves of the private creditors who are already entrapped in the countries concerned. Increasingly, the commercial banks appear to be asking the IMF to play an informational, disciplinary, and screening role on their behalf.

Commercial banks who originally opposed the creation of the IMF now value it for providing information exchange and cooperation; they seek an expanded role for the Fund in international finance, particularly in the straitened circumstances of the 1980s in which the growth of commercial lending may well be curtailed on grounds of prudence. In this view, the IMF is the keystone upon which the entire fragile system of international credit is heavily dependent—for objective information, neutral advice, strategic shoring-up loans, and, perhaps most important of all, the maintenance of confidence. Whatever the merits of a monetary system in which the IMF acts as a policeman for borrowers, leaving the market to do the bulk of the actual financing, it is a long way from the original Bretton Woods conception of the IMF's functions. Richard Gardner reminds us of U.S. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's expressed satisfaction in driving "the usurious moneylenders from the temple of international finance" (p. xix), and of the Bretton Woods delegates' advice to central bankers to dissolve the Bank for International Settlements!

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On the evidence, the bankers do not always "follow" the IMF. On the one hand, in the 1970s many countries used the banks as an alternative to the IMF—a means of evading its strict conditionality and of improving the borrowers' leverage over their creditors. Indeed, the better-off developing countries consider this alternative to be a major advantage of the new international monetary order. On the other hand, the banks have on occasion—for instance, in Manley's Jamaica—not taken the negotiation of an IMF-approved stabilization program as sufficient incentive for resumed or accelerated lending. In Turkey, IMF funding actually provided an occasion for banks to move their funds *out* (Stewart and Sengupta, 24). Where the principal new clients of the IMF are concerned, the banks' views of their creditworthiness are more likely to be influenced by their poverty and limited export prospects than by the IMF's stamp of approval.

IV. International Central Banking and the IMF

Within states, even centrally planned ones, it has long been considered necessary for the functions of commercial banking to be separated from those of macroeconomic and monetary management. In the absence of central banks that perform such traditional tasks as managing the overall money supply, backstopping the private banks as lenders of last resort, setting the ground rules for financial institutions and inspecting them to ensure compliance, protecting and insuring the interests of depositors, and so forth, private banking has historically proved to be both unstable and inequitable in the monetary servicing of market economies. As long as private international banking remained of small significance, there was no need for specifically *international* central banking services. The International Monetary Fund, supplemented by agreements among central banks, could effectively serve the main needs of sovereign governments for balance-of-payments financing and could monitor global requirements for overall official liquidity. The rise of international banks operating outside the jurisdictions of their traditional regulators and, indeed, their effective displacement of the IMF as the prime source of balance-of-payments finance for all those sovereign governments (particularly developing countries) that are commercially credit-worthy, raises serious questions concerning the effectiveness, and even the sustainability, of the world monetary system.

The instability of private bank lending is now being demonstrated at the international level. Having rushed pell-mell into lending to developing countries in the 1970s—offering easier terms than the IMF

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would have required—the banks now create consternation by threatening to lurch in the reverse direction, retrenchment. There is no global central bank to oversee the appropriate deployment of money and credit for smooth macroeconomic management. Robert Solomon warned as early as 1979 that

> no world body functions analogously to the makers of fiscal and monetary policy within individual countries. . . . The lessons of the 1930s have been learned, albeit imperfectly, regarding domestic policies. It is not evident that the lessons for international policies have yet been adequately appreciated (Franko and Seiber, 40).

There is still a major "institutional lag" (Stewart and Sengupta, 2) in the global monetary arena.

Clearly the stabilization of the global macroeconomy would be disproportionately beneficial to the developing countries that are most susceptible to shocks which originate externally. The widely acknowledged need for global macroeconomic management raises the question of how it can best be achieved, and whether the developing countries can expect to play a role in it. The issues have been well put in an earlier Council on Foreign Relations volume (Hirsch, Doyle, and Morse), particularly by Edward Morse. His conclusions favor a "tiered" system in which the major Western economic powers jointly (instead of, in effect, the United States alone) manage the world's money and credit, and provide whatever "sweeteners" are necessary to placate the excluded. Disquieteningly, that system now seems to be actually evolving—and not only in the monetary sphere. Morse's "practical" rationale for abandoning the principles of universality and participation will be familiar to students of politics. Its adoption could be as devastating for the global economic order as oligarchic rule has often proved to be within nation-states.

The developing countries' collective (and, in some cases, individual or group) role in the world economy is by now great enough for them to be legitimately interested and constructively engaged in deliberations concerning global macroeconomic management. At present, there are regular consultations within the OECD, the BIS, and the Western economic summits; but the only half-way equivalent occasions in which the developing countries are actively involved are the meetings of the IMF. These are not, and are not seen to be, adequate for the purpose. Cline suggests that "global policy coordination that included developing countries" or at least the "extension of . . . consultations to include representatives of developing countries" would be desirable (p. 238).

During the 1970s, the developing countries exerted influence within

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the International Monetary Fund in the direction of modest changes in its functioning that would better serve their interests. Their caucus within the IMF, the Group of 24, now holds regular meetings; communiqués, issued in advance of each meeting, express their joint objectives; they also sponsor research and studies that take up issues and perspectives which they evidently consider to be inadequately addressed in the IMF's own research department. Among the matters they emphasize are expanded IMF quotas and SDR allocations, more flexible IMF conditionality, improvements in the functioning of the compensatory financing facility, and interest subsidies for the poorest countries.

They have played their hand in a fairly restrained fashion, with a minimum of rhetoric and confrontation. Despite their joint legal capacity to veto IMF decisions, they have not sought to employ this tactic. Their ability to do so is obviously limited by their dependence on the IMF's resources and the knowledge that, if the major powers are sufficiently dissatisfied with the way the IMF functions, they can ultimately make their own monetary arrangements in cooperation with one another—as to a significant degree they already do—within the BIS, the OECD, and the Western economic summit conferences.

The International Monetary Fund has been shrouded in greater secrecy than the World Bank; consequently, there has not as yet been a good scholarly study of its functioning. Its changing objectives and wisdoms, internal bureaucratic infighting, genuine international politics, and the like, would make a fascinating account. Such an "inside" research undertaking may remain impossible for some time—in which case the field will remain clear for polemical and ill-informed attacks. Still, in view of the fact that public sources are available, it is striking that there have been so few independent studies of the IMF's activities. That the World Bank has been much better served is in substantial part the result of conscious decisions by the respective managements.

V. External Shocks and Stabilization Programs

The vulnerability of the developing countries to abrupt shifts in the external terms of trade has long been understood. It is an obvious point, but a crucial one, that the macroeconomic management problems of the developing countries would be greatly eased by reductions in external uncertainty. The 1970s have brought enormous and unexpected shocks from the world economy—two major recessions, two major import price hikes, and continuing global inflation. Instability in the terms of trade and in the purchasing power of developing countries' exports was sub-

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stantially higher than it had been in the 1960s. The least developed countries were the most unstable in both respects. Cline estimates that, whereas only a little over one-fourth of the increased current account deficit of the middle-income, non-oil-exporting developing countries in 1974-1975 could be attributed to world inflation and recession, the equivalent proportion for the low-income, oil-importing countries was three-quarters (pp. 27-28).

Cline's volume on world inflation and the developing countries provides an important and original contribution by documenting the great degree to which the accelerated domestic inflation within the non-oil-exporting developing countries in the mid-1970s was the product of external impulses transmitted through monetary and import price channels. It is interesting, however, that there is no apparent correlation between the degree of trade openness and the impact of external inflation upon domestic prices (Bhalla in Cline, chap. 3). Nor does there seem to be any correlation between inflation in the developing countries and their growth performance in the 1970s (pp. 231-33).

Policy responses to external fluctuations and shocks are the product of both political and economic forces and constraints. In the absence of credit (or reserves) which allow continued steady growth in imports while normal conditions return or the required longer-term adjustments are undertaken, countries that are hit by reduced export purchasing power are forced to adjust by cutting back their imports. In the short run, this usually requires overall deflation and accompanying increases in unemployment, as well as reductions in real incomes, investment, and growth. The burden of such cutbacks may be apportioned in different ways. The Malaysian and Indian experiences of the mid-1970s, for instance, as described in the Cline volume, show how appropriately targeted measures, notably regarding food prices, may buffer the poorest against externally caused macroeconomic shock. Cutbacks are frequently accompanied by accelerating inflation as the domestic prices of imports rise in consequence of tightened controls, protection, or devaluation. As governments find themselves unwilling or unable to cut their expenditures as fast as their revenues are falling, monetary expansion frequently adds to inflationary pressures. Inflation causes additional balance-of-payments difficulties as exporters and those who compete with imports find themselves—in the absence of compensating exchange rate or other measures—less and less motivated, or able, to earn or save foreign exchange.

By the time the IMF is approached for conditional credit, the balance-of-payments difficulties are often severe and the rate of inflation may

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be out of control. Unpleasant stabilization programs are then associated with IMF conditionality when, in fact, the need for stabilization policies of some sort is beyond dispute. Usually, the real debate between the IMF and its borrowers is not, as it seems to some, whether tough measures should be taken; rather, it turns on the precise nature, timing, and elements of these tough policies, and the precise terms (including performance criteria expressed in quantitative form) on which IMF credit will be made available. The Fund is vulnerable to the charge that its country missions have often been inflexible, politically naive or insensitive, and technically arrogant; not to the irrelevant accusations that it imposes conditions, or that these conditions involve hardships to some.

The politics and economics of the optimal adjustment path from a state of macroeconomic (or even simply balance-of-payments) disequilibrium to one of restored overall balance are highly complex, and are certainly not matters on which professionals have reached technical agreement. They will vary with the country and the time, and with judgments as to inherently uncertain events, including such matters as future terms of trade. One also cannot necessarily jump from agreement, both as to where one at present is and where one would like to be in macroeconomic terms, to agreement on a policy prescription to move from the former to the latter at maximum speed. Policy advice on such matters must be offered with considerable humility, coupled with flexibility regarding the circumstances of particular cases.

For a balanced analysis of these issues, one cannot at present do better than Killick's *Adjustment and Financing in the Developing World*. The introductory chapters, jointly prepared by Tony Killick and Mary Sutton, provide an excellent up-to-date survey; Manuel Guitian cogently presents the IMF's current view of the question of conditionality. The volume by Stewart and Sengupta contains a chapter on conditionality that is an excellent exposition of the concerns of the developing countries. A rich source of more specific case material (Turkey, Portugal, Peru, Egypt) is Robert McCauley's account, in Franko and Seiber, of "how foreign capital and private creditors and domestic groups influence the choices of government officials in the midst of a foreign exchange crisis" (p. 143). Volumes on current IMF practices, complete with many up-to-date case studies, are forthcoming from the new Washington-based Institute of International Economics and the London-based Overseas Development Institute. They are edited by John Williamson and Tony Killick, respectively.[1]

[1] The former is now in print under the title *IMF Conditionality* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983).

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Since overall stabilization is not likely to be achieved, it is a minimum requirement that schemes to protect the developing countries—particularly the poorest among them—from the costs of external shocks should be improved. If the last decade has taught us anything, it is that the international system's buffer and insurance mechanisms are totally inadequate. The banks rather than the IMF or any official mechanism have served as the essential financial stabilizer for many developing countries; as we have seen, they did not function all that well. The STABEX scheme of the EEC—apart from the evident peculiarities in its intercountry allocative mechanisms—proved far too limited to handle the agreed needs in 1980-1981; available resources could supply only half of the requirements in 1980 and about one-quarter of the agreed needs in 1981. It is also relevant to note the perverse role of official development assistance which, according to the OECD, fell in real terms by an estimated 4 percent in 1981, thereby intensifying the effects of external shocks rather than offsetting them.

Among the possible reforms are an expanded and more flexible International Monetary Fund, with an expanded Compensatory Financing Facility, expanded quotas, resumed SDR allocations, and continued interest subsidies for the poorest countries; countercyclical official development assistance programs in which balance-of-payments support rises in proportion to project aid during periods of balance-of-payments difficulties, and real flows are maintained through indexing; and a contingency repayment system in which the obligations for debt repayment vary with the terms of trade.

VI. The Problems of the Poorest Countries

The poorest countries have been the greatest losers in the evolution of the new international monetary system of the 1970s and 1980s. Not considered commercially creditworthy, they received scant support from the commercial banks for their balance-of-payments problems—which were no less severe than those of other countries, and frequently a good deal more so. The poorest are also, of course, the most rigid in their productive structures; they therefore incur the heaviest costs when short-term adjustments are necessary. Any commercial credit they obtained was for a short term and at very high interest rates; most of it took the form of arrears on payments for imports during times of particular adversity. For them, the IMF was therefore in effect the lender of first (or, at most, second) resort.

Because of their limited capacity to hold reserves, the extent and terms

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of these countries' drawing rights in the IMF encompassed their full capacity to weather balance-of-payments disturbances without resort to drastic "stop and go" macroeconomic policies. Despite the creation of special drawing rights, expansion of IMF quotas, and some innovations in the IMF's lending practices in the 1970s—the liberalization of the compensatory financing facility, the temporary establishment of an oil facility in the mid-1970s, the creation of a Trust Fund from some of the proceeds of the IMF's gold sales, an interest subsidy scheme, and a policy of enlarged access to IMF credit beyond normal rights—the liquidity of the poor countries failed to keep up with their need for the maintenance of a steady flow of imports comparable to that of countries with readier access to international credit. Relatively low-conditionality credit, such as that which the commercial banks provided to the better-off countries, was limited in the case of the poorest to the first credit tranche (25 percent of quota) of IMF borrowing rights, the first portion (50 percent of quota) under the compensatory financing facility, and newly created SDRs. SDR creation had already been outstripped by the increase in foreign exchange reserves and the increased value of official holdings of gold (despite the stated intention of making SDRs into the "principal reserve asset" of the system, as proclaimed in the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF); it ceased entirely after January 1, 1981, and shows little sign of resumption.

IMF lending was expanded in response to the global economic difficulties of the post-1979 period, less by expanding quotas than by authorizing increased highly conditional drawing rights as a proportion of existing quotas; this device severely limited the degree to which low-conditionality credit was permitted to grow. The Managing Director of the Fund was able to boast that, whereas during the mid-1970s two-thirds of IMF credit was made available on low-conditionality terms, in 1980-1981 fully 80 percent was provided on stringently conditional terms.

The first half of 1982 was a period during which the primary-exporting, oil-importing countries experienced the worst terms of trade since the 1930s. Because of the borrowers' inability to meet the IMF's tough performance requirements, the Fund cancelled so much of its credit during this period that new IMF lending commitments were in effect significantly negative. It is difficult to make sense of the IMF's very tight conditionality at this time and subsequently in terms of its own proclaimed distinction between temporary and permanent shocks. Unless officials of the Fund regard the current recession as permanent, credit should be provided relatively freely, as it was in the last recession;

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instead, they have been advocating, in Hooveresque fashion, the need to tighten belts further in response to the hard times. The IMF appears to be using the severe recession to apply greater pressure on countries that are judged to be pursuing policies which could not be sustained over the long run—with or without a recession. Only if they adjust appropriately to their permanent problems will the IMF supply them with short-term credit. This attitude represents a new degree of IMF leverage vis-à-vis its members, one that does not accord with its own tradition or its *raison d'être*.

By now, the IMF is subject to widespread attacks, on both technical and political grounds, because of the terms of its conditions and the limited extent of its assistance to those who have no other recourse. The sheer inequity of the arrangements by which balance-of-payments assistance is now made available to the various states in the system is at least as grave an indictment of it as any that may be based upon its possible instability and susceptibility to crisis. There is small comfort for the poorest in the argument that, if the financial system were to break down, they would be spared most of the direct consequences since they were its beneficiaries to only a limited extent.

VII. Exchange Rate Systems

The post-1973 exchange-rate system of managed floating has probably permitted smoother adjustments among the major currencies than an adjustable peg regime would have allowed in such a turbulent period. Currency instability has been considerably greater in the short and medium run, however, than many had expected. Overshooting of appropriate exchange rates has been not only frequent but prolonged; managers of international capital responsive to changing expectations have moved among currencies and have thus determined currency values on the same principles that speculators and investors employ in stock markets or potato futures. This increased turbulence in exchange rates does not appear to have greatly affected trade or investment among firms or countries with the capacity to manage asset or debt portfolios efficiently. The smallest and poorest countries, however, have generally experienced increased macroeconomic management problems—notably in reserve and debt management, the provision of forward-cover to their residents, and insulation against the effects of fluctuations in the currency to which they are pegged vis-à-vis third countries.

The question of the appropriate peg for the developing countries' currencies has surfaced as a major new policy issue in the post-1973

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exchange-rate regime. Increasing numbers of countries now reduce the impact of key currency fluctuations on their own economies by pegging the value of their currencies to a basket of foreign currencies. Many peg their currencies to the value of the SDR, since quotations are reported daily by the IMF, and its weights correspond roughly to the makeup of world trade. There are now 36 countries pegging their currencies to baskets, 15 of them to the SDR. Rather than serving as a principal reserve asset, special drawing rights are emerging, in consequence, in a major new role as a *numeraire*, a unit of account. Bank accounts, loans, bond flotations, and the books of many international organizations are now often denominated in SDRs. The developing countries, as the principal beneficiaries of this means of reducing exchange risks, have become champions of an SDR-based system, regardless of whether the SDR ever achieves its intended role (which also benefits the poorest disproportionately) as the principal reserve asset of the system.

During the past 15 years, the "crawling peg" has been an important innovation in exchange-rate management in some of the semi-industrialized countries, particularly those experiencing high rates of inflation. It involves commitment to some "peg" or "band" within which the exchange rate will remain, but provides for gradual and more frequent changes in this peg than the traditional "adjustable peg" regime. The changes in the peg can be determined either by some formula, such as the relative rate of price inflation in the pegging country vis-à-vis its major trading patterns, or by administrative decision; this exchange-rate regime can therefore be either less or more flexible than the traditional Bretton Woods regime. Among the countries that accepted or sought rates of inflation different from those of the rest of the world, "it is those without convertible currencies and with financial systems neither so well developed as to permit floating nor so undeveloped as to render continued jumps in the exchange rate practicable that have tended to adopt crawling" (Williamson, 25). Williamson is to be congratulated on his assembly of a collection of papers of uniformly high quality, which assess experience with this exchange-rate system and its possible wider replication. His book may well be a landmark among those focusing upon the developing countries' macroeconomic experiences, especially in its unabashed concern to draw lessons for the policy makers of the developed countries from the policy innovations of the developing countries. It would be unrealistic to expect his authors to have reached agreement. They have not, but they have provided the most challenging of the studies reviewed here.

Williamson's collection of essays reflects the burst of analysis and

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empirical research on the macroeconomic problems of the semi-industrialized, especially Latin American, countries within the past decade. There is still very little comparable literature on the poorest countries, those at present experiencing the greatest macroeconomic management difficulties and engaged in the most bitter disputes with the IMF. The need for more understanding and analysis is particularly urgent in tropical Africa, where data are weakest and analytical capabilities are least developed. It is striking that, while the number of African standby credits negotiated with the IMF rose from 3 in 1978 to 21 in 1981, there is only one very brief African case study in all of these volumes.

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

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

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

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